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1. Research Question 
The research question in this dissertation is whether law and politics matter in 
the separation of ownership from control in Singapore’s largest companies listed on 
the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). The research question was formulated out of 
Rafael La Porta’s thesis that law matters in the separation of ownership from control.  
It also drew inspiration from Mark J Roe’s political roots of corporate ownership. 
2. Hypothesis 
Many theories have been proferred to explain why the U.S and U.K have a 
dispersed ownership structure. It ranges from economic efficiency theory by Eugene 
Fama and Michael Jensen to Kenneth Arrow’s organizational decision-making to 
Alfred Chandler’s managerial revolution etc. The modern explanations are the “law 
matters” and “politics matters” hypotheses. This dissertation offers a new explanation 
for corporate ownership structure- the theory of path dependence. 
3. Questions 
1. What is the state of ownership structure in Singapore’s largest companies listed on 
the SGX? 
2. Does law matter in the formation of ownership structure of Singapore’s 
companies, focusing on family firms? 
3. If law does not matter, then what matters? 
 
xi 
4. Do politics matter in the formation of ownership structure of Singapore’s 
companies, focusing on government-owned companies (GLCs)? 
 
4. Thesis 
Firstly, I proved that the ownership structure of Singapore’s companies is 
concentrated and has been so ever since the first companies were incorporated. 
Secondly, I refuted the “law matters” thesis and used path dependence theories 
to explain how concentrated ownership structures were stochastically selected using a 
historical, socio-legal and economic survey. 
Thirdly, I explored the reasons why concentrated ownership persists in family 
firms, particularly Chinese firms using a path dependence theory: (1) “Culture is the 
mother of all path dependencies”, and so I argued that the Chinese culture of keeping 
control within the family self-reinforces concentrated ownership. The culture of 
keeping control within the family stems from the strong familial ties emphasized by 
Confucian ethics and values that are often taught and passed down through the 
generations in Chinese families. It is a cultural norm that Chinese entreprenuers carry 
with them from young and often into their businesses, making their businesses an 
extension of their families, and seeing their businesses as an inheritance to be passed 
down to their descendents. The dark side of strong familial ties is the low levels of 
trust against outsiders which have resulted in firms remaining family-owned in many 
Chinese-dominated societies such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. This 
phenomenon is observed in Italian families as well; (2) Further, I argued that the  
xii 
utilitarian and functional aspects of path dependence reinforced concentrated 
ownership. Firstly, I used Bebchuk and Roe’s controller’s roadblock to explain why 
concentrated ownership persists- the controlling shareholders extracted rents or 
private benefits of control and are unwilling to give them up. Secondly, I posited that 
because of IPO underpricing and the discounted value of family firms (due to 
minority expropriation), controlling shareholders do not cash out and unlock the value 
of their firms at IPO as they will not fetch good value for their shares. Instead, 
controlling shareholders often sold to another block holder (see Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd 
case study) in order to maximize their “rents”. Thirdly, the fiscal advantages of the 
imputation system of taxation of dividends that family firms in Singapore had enjoyed 
encouraged controlling shareholders to hold onto the concentrated ownership 
structure. 
Fourthly, I sought to show that Mark J Roe’s political roots thesis has more 
credence than the “law matters” thesis. The nation of Singapore is very much 
intertwined with the political thoughts and beliefs of one man called Lee Kuan Yew. 
Because of the tenuous way in which he had captured power, he developed an 
ideology of survival, crisis mentality, hegemony and dominance by the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) over the citizenry. Lee Kuan Yew ruled Singapore with an “iron 
fist”. 
Fifthly, the PAP government was so dominant that they interfered into every 
sphere of life of its citizens, particularly the economic sphere. Using James 
Mahoney’s reactive path dependence theory, I posited that post-1965 politics and Lee  
xiii 
 
Kuan Yew’s political ideology shaped the corporate ownership structures of the 
GLCs. The Singapore government was “forced” to become an entrepreneur when the 
British withdrew its troops in 1967. A stable of GLCs was created out of the 
government departments and ministries. These GLCs dominated the economy to the 
extent that it crowded out the private sector. The 1985 recession brought matters to a 
head and a policy change took place, whereby the government decided to roll back its 
role in business by “privatizing” the GLCs. Despite the government’s divestment 
policy of its GLCs, the process had been slow and tedious because these companies 
are the crown jewels of the nation and the government will not divest unless the price 
is right. Such government policies reinforced concentrated ownership of the GLCs. 
Sixthly, I argued that unless the Singapore government loosens up political 
control over its citizens and gives more space to civil society, debate and political 
freedom, Singapore’s economic sphere will remain moribund and its private sector 
will not blossom like the private sectors of Hong Kong and Taiwan. This is because 
the Singapore’s education system (resulting from Lee Kuan Yew’s political ideology) 
breeds a nation of risk-averse citizens who would rather be wage-earners than strike 
out on their own to be entrepreneurs. In addition, the stifling political atmosphere in 
Singapore leads to strait-jacket individuals deprived of creativity and innovation, not 
daring to speak out against wrong policies of the government for fear of reprisal. All 
opposition members have to tread carefully in what they say and do for fear of 




5. Methodology and Research Approach 
This dissertation is a theoretical and empirical one. For the empirical analysis, 
I collated the figures from the annual reports of the top 100 companies listed on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange in 2007/8 which was the year I started my Ph.D 
programme. These 100 companies comprised 86.02 per cent of the total market 
capitalization of the Exchange and thus is a fairly accurate representation of the state 
of ownership concentration in Singapore. Following Maurice Zeitlin’s methodology, I 
carried out a case-by-case examination of the 100 companies using four factors: 
(a) The identity of the substantial shareholders, their families and associates and the 
outstanding stock they hold in the company; 
(b) Whether the CEO or any other executive director is affiliated with any of the 
substantial shareholders; 
(c) Whether any non-executive director is affiliated with any of the substantial 
shareholders; 
(d) The percentage of directors’ shareholdings in the company. 
Secondly, using a modified Berle and Means’ classification, I classified the 
100 companies into “majority-owned”, “minority-owned”, “joint-minority 
management owned” and “management controlled”. 
Thirdly I classified the family firms into “strong family control”, “moderate 
family control” and “weak family control” using a framework which I modified from 
Henry Wai-chung Yeung, “Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards Hybrid 
Capitalism, Routledge, 2004. 
xix 
Fourthly, I empirically examine all the IPOs (with complete data) in the year  
2000 to show the extent of divestment by founders and found prima facie evidence 
that founders in Chinese firms do not use the IPO route to divest and cash out, 
doubtless due to IPO underpricing and undervaluation of the shares of family firms. 
The source for all the information was from the annual reports of the companies. 
1. Relevance and Importance of Research 
This dissertation is important because it propounds a new perspective for 
explaining corporate ownership structure, and adds to the existing knowledge and 
debate on ownership structures. The theory of path dependence originates as an 
economic theory but has been extended into the historical sociological arena. It is a 
broad and malleable theory that can be used to explain how concentrated ownership 
developed in Singapore and persists to this day. This dissertation is the first in 50 
years that sought to prove empirically that ownership is concentrated in Singapore’s 
companies, although anecdotal evidence had always assumed that ownership is 
concentrated in Singapore’s companies. 
Using a case-study method, this dissertation sought to refute the “law matters” 
thesis in the Singapore’s context, just as Brian Cheffins and John Coffee did for the 
U.K and U.S respectively. In fact, the “law matters” thesis has many methodological 
and conceptual flaws as pointed out in chapter 3. 
Mark J Roe’s “politics matters” thesis is a more plausible explanation and this 
dissertation seeks to prove its validity in the context of Singapore’s political 
developments and how it impacted the ownership structure in Singapore’s companies. 
xx 
The two theses are relevant for emerging economies developing their stock 
markets and companies. They will have to understand that the first ball they drew out 
of the Polya urn will set the course for future development. They will have to 
understand that “history matters” and the institutions, legal infrastructure, norms and 
culture they inherited from their colonial masters or predecessors will determine 
whether they have a dispersed or concentrated ownership structure. All these 
considerations affect the degree of success of the transplantation of business models, 
legal rules and strategies from the more developed countries into emerging 
economies. Any transplantation of legal rules and strategies have to be adapted 
according to the historical, socio-economic and legal environment because from these 
original conditions, path dependence reinforces and perpetuates the situation until 
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Do Law and Politics Matter In The Separation of Ownership 
and Control In Singapore’s Largest Companies? A Case Study 






Studies of ownership and control structures of large companies often 
began with Berle and Means’ seminal study in “The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property”. Berle and Means came to the conclusion that the atom of 
private property had become separated such that “we are dealing not only with 
distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the 
other- a control which tends to move further and further away from ownership and 
ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a management capable of 
perpetuating its own position”.1  
 
Berle and Means’ study spawned a host of academic research which 
refuted the methodology applied by them and the conclusion reached by them, viz 
that 44 per cent of the 200 largest companies was under “management control”. 
For example, Zeitlin refined Berle and Means’ methodology to aggregate family 
or corporate groups holding a block of voting rights as opposed to Berle and 
                                                            
1 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, The Macmillan 
Company, 1932 at 117 and 124. 
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Means’ method of simply looking for at least a shareholder that held more than 20 
per cent stock.2 Next, Leech’s probabilistic-voting model, also found that most 
companies are minority controlled and there was no pervasive evidence of the 
separation of ownership and control.3 More recently, Holderness in “The Myth of 
Diffuse Ownership in the United States” applied regression techniques and 
concluded that 96 per cent of U.S public firms have blockholders and these 
blockholders in aggregate owned an average of 39 per cent of the common stock.4 
 
Similarly, La Porta et al in 1999 carried out an ownership study of large 
corporations in 27 wealthy countries. They used the yardstick of a 20 per cent 
shareholder as a proxy to show a controlling shareholder on the grounds that a 20 
per cent shareholding is usually enough to have effective control of a firm.5 The 
study showed that 36 per cent of the firms in the world are widely held, 30 per 
cent are family-controlled, 18 per cent are state-controlled and the remaining 15 
per cent are divided between the residual categories. They then suggested that 
since only slightly more than a third of the firms in the world are widely held, the 
wide spread belief that the Berle and Means’ corporation is the dominant 
ownership structure in the world is misleading.  
 
                                                            
2 Maurice Zeitlin, “Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class” (1974) 
79: 5 The American Journal of Sociology 1073. 
3 Dennis Leech, “Ownership Concentration and Control in Large US Corporations in the 1930s: An Analysis of 
the T.N.E.C Sample”. The T.N.E.C study was carried out in the 1940s and substantially analysed the same 
sample of companies as Berle and Means. The overall results of the study found that out of 200 nonfinancial 
firms, 77 were family controlled, 56 were controlled by other corporations, 6 were under joint family and 
corporate interest group control and 61 had no centre of control. It was stated in the study that “no centre of 
contro”l may not necessarily mean “management control”. 
4 Clifford G Holderness, “The Myth of Diffuse Owmership in the United States”, copy available at Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=991363>. 
5 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around the World” 
(1999) 54: 2 The Journal of Finance 471. 
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However, in their sample of 20 firms selected from U.K and U.S, all 20 in 
the UK and 16 out of 20 firms in the US were widely held, apparently lending 
support to Berle and Means’ thesis that widely held firms form the majority of 
large corporations in the U.K and U.S. Of course this conclusion may be suspect 
because of the small sample size (20 firms) that were used in La Porta’s study. 
 
Be that as it may, academics have sought to find reasons or explanations 
for the diffuse ownership structure that is allegedly found in the U.S and the U.K 
in contrast to the concentrated ownership structures found in the commonwealth 
and the European countries. 
 
1.2 THEORIES EXPLAINING DIFFUSE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
A] Economic Efficiency 
 
In 1983, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen wrote two papers, namely 
“Agency Problems and Residual Claims”,6 and “Separation of Ownership and 
Control”7 where they justified the superior economic efficiency of the Berle and 
Means’ corporation over other kinds of organizations and touted it as the winner 
in the Darwinian struggle of the fittest organization. Essentially, they posited that 
in the absence of fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is one 
that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price whilst 
covering costs. Embedded in this process is the need to control agency costs 
                                                            
6 Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, “Agency Problems and Residual Claims” (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 327.  
7 Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 301. 
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because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced. Agency costs include 
the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among agents 
with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of full 
enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits. The contract structures of 
organizations limit the risks undertaken by agents by specifying either fixed 
payoffs or incentive payoffs tied to specific measures of performance. The 
residual risk-the risk of the difference between inflows of resources and promised 
payments to agents-is borne by those who contract for the rights to net cash flows. 
These agents are called residual claimants or risk-bearers. 
 
The common stock of open corporations allows more efficient risk sharing 
than residual claims that are not separable from decision roles (such as in 
proprietorships and partnerships) because common stock allows residual risk to be 
spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to 
which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations offering such 
claims. Other things equal, portfolio theory implies that such unrestricted risk 
sharing lowers the cost of risk-bearing services. 
 
In addition, the survival of a complex organization is enhanced by 
common stock residual claims that allow specialization of management. In other 
words, the function of risk bearing is separated from decision functions. In 
“Separation of Ownership and Control” Fama and Jensen postulated that agency 
problems can be controlled by decision systems that separate the management (ie 
initiation and implementation) from control (ie ratification and monitoring) of 
important decisions at all levels of the organization. Devices for separating 
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decision management and decision control include (a) decision hierarchies in 
which the decision initiatives of lower level agents are passed on to higher level 
agents, first for ratification and then for monitoring; (b) boards of directors that 
ratify and monitor the organization’s most important decisions and hire, fire and 
compensate top-level decision managers; and (c) incentive structures that 
encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents.  
 
In proprietorships, partnerships and other closed corporations, residual 
claims are restricted to decision makers. This may control agency problems but at 
the expense of the benefits of unrestricted common stock. The decision process 
suffers efficiency losses because decision agents must be chosen on the basis of 
wealth and willingness to bear risk as well as for decision skills. Residual 
claimants forgo optimal diversification so that residual claims and decision 
making can be combined in a small number of agents. Foregone diversification 
and limited alienability lower the value of the residual claims, raise the costs of 
risk-bearing services, and lead to less investment in projects with uncertain 
payoffs than when residual claims are unrestricted.8 Finally because decision 
agents have limited wealth, restricting residual claims to them also limits 
resources available for bonding contractual payoffs and for acquiring risky 
organization specific assets. Hence, the organizational form that separates residual 
risk-bearers from the decision managers is the most efficient. 
 
In fact, standard version of economic history treats dispersed ownership as 
a consequence of the development of large capital-intensive industrial 
                                                            
8 The common stock of residual claimants are unrestricted in the sense that (i) stockholders are not required to 
have any other role in the organization; (ii) their residual claims are freely alienable; and (iii) the residual claims 
are rights in net cash flows for the life of the organization. 
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corporations during the late 19th century. These firms were so large that 
investment from a single entrepreneur or family was not sufficient to capitalize the 
firm so that capital was obtained from attracting funds from many small investors. 
To diversify risk, these small investors, even wealthy ones, diversified their stock 
investments in firms leading to the Berle and Means’ corporation of diffuse 
ownership. 
 
B] Organizational Decision-making 
 
Kenneth Arrow’s seminal work on organizational decision making 
classifies two types of decision making structures: (a) consensus; (b) authority. 
Consensus is utilized when each member of the organization has identical 
information and interests, which permits relatively easy collective decision 
making. However, where the organization grew so large such that each member 
have different interests and amount of information, efficiency concerns demand 
that decision making be delegated to a central authority that is empowered to 
decide for all. This gave birth to the modern public corporation.9 
 
Alfred Chandler, Harvard historian gave further impetus to this theory by 
postulating that the advent of the large public corporations brought about the 
managerial revolution. It emerged at the point when businesses or units could be 
operated more profitably through a centralized managerial hierarchy than by 
means of decentralized market mechanisms. The visible hand of the manager can 
be seen in place of the invisible hand of the market to determine production, sales 
                                                            
9 Kenneth J Arrow, “Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing” North-Holland Publishing Company, 1974 at 223. 
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and distribution. Once a managerial hierarchy had successfully increased profits 
by co-ordinating operations, it became a source of power by itself achieving 
permanence and continued growth.10 
 
In addition, Herbert Hovenkamp argued that separation of ownership and 
control was less the function of firm size than of firm complexity. Because of the 
high degree of vertical integration, firms became sufficiently complex to require 
professional managers. According to Hovemkamp, the widely held firm was 
prominent by the middle of the 19th century, particularly in American railroad 
firms.11 
 
C] The “Law Matters” thesis 
 
In the “law matters” thesis, the basic argument is that insiders (ie 
controlling shareholders and executives) will cheat outside investors who own 
equity in the firm. As a result, potential investors fearing exploitation will shy 
away from buying shares. Insiders, being aware of such skepticism will decide not 
to sell shares to the public preferring other sources of finance. The outcome is an 
undeveloped stock market. However, where the legal system closely regulates 
opportunistic behaviour by insiders, minority shareholders will feel more 
comfortable in this type of protective environment so that they will buy equity in 
the stock market. The result is a vibrant stock market and a widely dispersed 
                                                            
10 Alfred Chandler and Herman Daems, “Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the 
Modern Industrial Enterprise” Harvard University Press, 1980 at 11-12. 
11 Herbert Hovenkamp, “Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937” Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University 
Press, 1991 (e-resource). 
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pattern of share ownership.12 This theory was given a boost by La Porta in the late 
1990s where he surveyed the ownership structures of firms and the legal system in 
49 countries. He found that in common law countries where there is better 
protection of minority shareholders by the legal system, the share ownership 
structure tends to be less concentrated whilst in civil law countries where there is 
little or less protection of minority shareholders, ownership is more 
concentrated.13  
 
However, as stated below, Craig Doidge in his Ph.D thesis appeared to 
have refuted this thesis when he found that firms from emerging markets that list 
on the US stock exchange retained their majority ownership structures and did not 
become diffuse even though there is now more legal protection of minority 
shareholders under the US stock market.14 
 
D]“Politics Matters” theory 
 
The law matters thesis was refuted by Mark Roe, a Harvard law professor 
in 1994. He published his thesis “Strong Managers, Weak Owners” wherein he 
postulated what could be themed as the “politics matter” thesis. According to Roe, 
the factors that shaped American corporate ownership structure were embedded in 
the political roots of American corporate finance. He posited that because of the 
fear of concentrated economic power (or any form of concentration of power or 
                                                            
12 Brian Cheffins, “Law, Economics and the U.K’s System of Corporate Governance: Lessons from History” 
(2001) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 71. 
13 Rafael La Porta et al, n 5 at 496-498. 
14 Craig Doidge, “U.S Cross-Listings, Private Benefits of Control and Ownership Structure”, Ph.D Dissertation, 
Ohio State University, 2002, a copy can be obtained at <http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-
pdf.cgi/Doidge%20Craig.pdf?osu1028840334> 
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monopoly), America fragmented its financial intermediaries. This meant that the 
financial intermediaries could not own industrial corporations and could not share 
power at the top, so power devolved to the managers. Managers’ then entrenched 
their power through devices such as anti-takeover mechanisms, the dominance of 
the CEO in choosing the board of directors and the like.15  
 
Roe’s thesis was critically examined by Professor Stephen Bainbridge in 
“The Politics of Corporate Governance: Roe’s Strong Managers and Weak 
Owners”.16 Firstly, Bainbridge argued that Roe erred in saying that the 
contractarian theory of corporate law eschews the political and legal constraints 
imposed upon the market for business structures. Secondly and more importantly,  
Bainbridge refuted Roe’s thesis on the ground that ownership and control had 
separated long before most of the legal rules (which had resulted from the politics 
of that era) that Roe blamed for the separation had gone on the books.  
 
E] Yet Another Reason-Business Policy and Institutional Developments 
 
Across the Atlantic, Professor Cheffins of the University of Cambridge 
tested Roe’s thesis in the context of the U.K. He found that developments in 
Britain do not appear to validate Roe’s thesis of the politically oriented analysis of 
corporate ownership. Specifically, he found that U.K in the opening half of the 
20th century had one of the most unconstrained market economies (ie a non social 
democracy), and yet the Berle and Means’ corporation did not emerged until after 
                                                            
15 Mark J Roe, “Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance”, 
Princeton University Press, 1994 at Preface ix-x. 
16 Stephen Bainbridge, “The Politics of Corporate Governance: Roe’s Strong Managers and Weak Owners”, a 
copy available from SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=275172> 
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World War II or by the latest in the 1970s. He suggested that business policy, not 
populist sentiment, caused banks and insurance companies in U.K to shy away 
from seeking close involvement with British public companies. Top banking 
personnel were deeply concerned about maintaining public confidence in the 
ability to pay cash on demand. Influenced by this strong bias in favour of 
liquidity, banks dismissed the ownership of shares as an option on grounds of poor 
marketability and high risk.  
 
To the “law matters” thesis, he opined that the legal developments that 
strengthened minority shareholders’ protection, did not develop prior to the 
emergence of the Berle and Means’ corporation so as to be the driving force that 
brought about the Berle and Means’ corporation. Hence, the “law matters” thesis 
was refuted. He suggested that it is not the legal system per se but rather the extra-
legal factors such as the reputational capital of financial intermediaries and the 
institutional developments of the London Stock Exchange which brought about 
more disclosure, pre-emptive rights, anti-insider dealing prohibitions etc which 
presumably encouraged investors to have more confidence in the market place and 
hence invests in equity. This in turn led to the Berle and Means’ corporation.17 
 
1.3 PATH DEPENDENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE THESIS 
 
This thesis seeks to find a theoretical explanation for why firms in 
Singapore have concentrated ownership patterns. It will examine in detail the 
relevance of the “law matters” and “politics matters” theories on corporate 
                                                            
17 Brian Cheffins, n 12 at 86. 
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ownership in Singapore. Chapter 2 contains an empirical analysis of ownership 
concentration in the top 100 companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange as 
at 2007. Chapter 2 shows that the median of the 20 largest shareholders’ 
shareholdings is a whopping 89.17 per cent whilst the median for the largest 
shareholder’s shareholdings is 32.77 per cent! 
 
Did law and politics give rise to this outcome? If not, exactly what 
accounts for this phenomenon? Why ownership remains concentrated in the 
family firms when and after they went public? And why is ownership 
concentrated in the GLCs? It is the aim of this thesis to find the answers and 
explain these answers in the light of the theory of path dependence. But first what 
is path dependence? 
 
A] The Economists’ Perspective  
 
In 1990, Brian Arthur popularized the concept of path dependence and 
increasing returns as a counterintuitive to the traditional neo-classical paradigm of 
diminishing returns. In diminishing returns, prices and market share will drop and 
reach an equilibrium state because of the reactions they generate, such as the high 
oil prices of the 1970s encouraged energy conservation and increased oil 
exploration, causing prices to adjust southwards in the 1980s. In contrast, Arthur 
posited that the reality is very much the reverse, where positive feedback 
magnifies small economic shifts. Diminishing returns make for a single 
equilibrium point but positive feedback mechanisms makes for many possible 
equilibrium points, ie multiple equilibria. Once random events select a particular 
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path, the choice may become lock-in regardless of the advantages of the 
alternatives. The ultimate equilibrium state may not be the “best” outcome.18 
 
The increasing returns thesis can be demonstrated by the Polya urn 
experiment. Imagine an urn where coloured balls are added one at a time. They 
can be of several colours-red, white, blue, yellow. The colour of the ball to be 
added next is unkown, but the probability of a given colour depends on the current 
proportions of colours in the urn. If a white ball is is selected, the next ball to be 
added is a white ball. If an increasing proportion of balls of a given colour 
increases the probability of adding another ball of the same colour, the system can 
be said to demonstrate positive feedback.19  
 
In the real world, the balls might represent companies and their colours the 
regions they decide to set up business. Or the balls could be competing 
technologies trying to dominate the global market.  
 
The history of the videocassette recorder illustrates the theory of positive 
feedback. The VHS and Beta format were launched roughly about the same time 
by JVC and Sony respectively in the late 1970s. The two formats competed neck-
to-neck. When Beta went to two hours, VHS went to four. When Beta increased to 
five hours, VHS increased to eight. Their pricing strategies and promotion of the 
formats were closely matched. Exactly what tipped the balance to make VHS the 
dominant player was the consumer’s taste and perception of VHS being the 
preferred standard, and predicting that others would do the same, bought the VHS 
                                                            
18 W Brian Arthur, “Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy”, The University of Michigan 
Press, 1994 at 1. 
19 W Brian Arthur, n 18 at 6. 
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format and increasing returns completed the process of making VHS the market 
leader. One can see that initially the market is unstable and which outcome, ie 
VHS or Beta is unpredictable. If we assume that the Beta format is superior, then 
the market’s choice is not the best economic outcome.20 The current “war” 
between Apple iphones and Samsung mobiles is another illustration of the path 
dependence dynamics, as was the tussle between the Apple Mac and Microsoft 
Windows. 
 
In particular, Brian Arthur postulated that the knowledge-based economy 
is particularly subject to increasing returns and positive feedback. Products such 
as computers, pharmaceuticals, aircrafts require huge initial investments in 
research and development and tooling. Once sales begin, incremental production 
becomes relatively cheap. As more units are built, unit costs drop and profits 
increase. The experience learnt in producing the units help the manufacturers 
achieve greater understanding of how to produce it even more cheaply. And 
computers and telecommunication devices work in networks that require 
compatibility; when one brand gains a significant market share, consumers have 
strong incentive to buy that brand so as to be “connected” to those using the same 
technology.21 This positive feedback creates “lock-in”. 
 
Hence, economic activities are quantisized by individual transactions that 
are too small to observe, but these small “random” events can accumulate and 
become magnified by positive feedback so as to determine the eventual outcome. 
This is the economists’ perspective of path dependence. 
                                                            
20 W Brian Arthur, n 18 at 2 and S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, “Path Dependence, Lock-in and 
History” (1995) 11:1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 205 at 219-222. 
21 W Brian Arthur, n 18 at 3-4. 
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Paul A David, an economic historian incorporated the notion that “history 
matters” in the evolution of economic equilibriums. To him, path dependence 
means that the process is non-ergodic- a dynamical system possessing this 
property cannot shake off the effects of past events, and consequently, its 
asymptotic distribution evolves as a function of its own history. Small events of a 
random character, especially those occurring early in the path, are likely to figure 
significantly in “selecting” one or other among the set of stable equilibria, or 
“attractors” of the system.22 
 
Using the “snow shoveling problem” as a model, Paul A David explained 
the concept of path dependence processes in economic activities. Suppose there is 
a city block lined with shops whose pavement leading to it is covered in snow 
which falls continuously and gently. The shopkeeper rightly believes that there 
will be a net benefit from shoveling the snow in his own pavement if and only if at 
least one pavement from his adjoining neighbours’ is shoveled so that customers 
may walk from his neighbour’s shop to his own. However, the shopkeeper’s 
private net gain isn’t big enough for him to hire someone to shovel his 
neighbour’s pavement when it becomes obstructed or make him persuade his 
neighbour to do so. Being busy with other tasks, the shopkeeper does not 
continuously monitor the state of the pavement but only does so when there is a 
randomly timed free moment. But things are such that the time interval between 
these random moments is enough for him to shovel his pavement so as to maintain 
a clear stretch of pavement throughout the duration of the storm.  
                                                            
22 Paul A David, “Path Dependence in Economic Processes: Implications for Policy Analysis in Dynamical 
System Contexts” in “The Evolutionary Foundations of Economics” edited by Kurt Dopfer, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005 at 151.  
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What is the shopkeeper’s response when he looks out the window at the 
pavement? If his own pavement is clear because his earlier decision was to shovel 
his pavement, and if he finds that his neighbours’ are similarly clear, he will 
decide to keep his pavement clear. If both his neighbours’ are blocked with snow, 
he will also decide to let the snow accumulate on his pavement. But if one side is 
clear and the other side obstructed with snow, he will toss a coin to decide 
whether or not to continue with his earlier policy to shovel the pavement. If his 
earlier policy was not to shovel, then his immediate response will also follow the 
previous pattern discussed aforesaid. The question springs to mind what will be 
the ultimate outcome? Will there be sections where the snow piles high, or will 
the entire length of the pavement turn out to be impassable, or will there be the 
happier outcome with the entire pavement kept clear and business humming 
along? 
 
The analysis is as follows: The evolution of his snow shoveling policy 
depends on the “current state” of his own pavement and the pavements of his 
neighbours’. He will develop a policy of shoveling his pavement if his 
neighbours’ shovel theirs, ie at a random moment adopt whichever policy a 
neighbor selected at random has been following most recently. Thus, if the block 
starts off with everyone shoveling their pavements, things would stay that way; 
and likewise if everyone starts off not shoveling until they saw what their 
neighbor(s) did, the eventual outcome is unpredictable at its outset. But the 
identity of the eventual equilibrium will be determined by the initial configuration 
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of policy assignments and the subsequent random timing of the visits the 
shopkeeper make to check on the conditions of his immediate neighbourhood.23 
 
In other words, “initial conditions” which can be aleatory or seemingly 
transient can determine or influence the path which shapes the eventual outcome. 
 
B] Lock-in by Historical Events 
 
S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis postulated three degrees of path 
dependence in the study of economic history. In the first place, allocations chosen 
today exhibit memory; ie they are conditioned on past decisions. Where past 
allocations exhibit a controlling influence on the set of choices made in the future, 
path dependence is set in motion. First degree path dependence carries no 
implication that the dependence on initial conditions results in any inefficiency. 
Action a° can be said to be path efficient when there is no alternative a¹ such that 
the discounted present value of the total net benefits of selecting a¹ are greater 
than the discounted present value of net benefits of aº. So a firm inherits capital 
stock such as fixed assets will continue to use an inferior technology when the 
average variable costs of the old technology are lower than the average total costs 
of the new. In this way, the firm might be considered to be “locked-in” to this 
inferior but more profitable technology. This is first degree path dependence.24 
 
Second-degree path dependence occurs when an action is taken that 
subsequent events reveal to be an inferior choice to some other alternative. But 
                                                            
23 Paul A David, n 22 at 157-163. 
24 S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, n 20 at 210. 
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information is imperfect and so the choice of aº is ex ante path efficient if at each 
time tº there is no known alternative a¹ that would provide a greater discounted 
social benefit than aº, although subsequent events reveals that if a¹ had been 
adopted, greater social benefits than aº will endure. Thus second-degree path 
dependence would occur only when actions are only ex ante efficient. Though this 
prompts some regret, seemingly inefficiencies are not remediable. In second-
degree path dependency, the existence or superiority of alternative paths are not 
known at the time initial decisions are made. Second-degree path dependence can 
be seen in the evolution of competing institutions where the costs of institutional 
change will preclude adjustment even where experience reveals better 
alternatives.25  
 
In contrast, third-degree path dependence occurs when an action is ex ante 
inefficient and yet that action is taken nonetheless. In addition, the error is 
remediable but not remedied. This is the case of market failure. Accordingly, 
Brian Arthur’s theory of increasing returns may exhibit second or third-degree 
path dependence depending on the state of knowledge or information the actors 
possess at t°. If the actors know ex ante that a¹ exists or is superior, and yet 
chooses a°, then third-degree path dependence is exhibited. On the other hand, if 
the actors do not know ex ante that a¹ exists or is superior, and so adopts a°, then 
second-degree path dependence is present.26 
 
                                                            
25 S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, n 20 at 211. 
26 S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, n 20 at 214-215. According to the authors, there is no convincing 
documentation of empirical cases demonstrating third-degree path dependence. The oft cited example of the 
adoption of  QWERTY keyboard over the much touted superior Dvorak as an example of third degree path 
dependence has been discredited by the authors, see S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, “The Fable of the 
Keys” (1990) 33 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
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We now apply these definitions to a case of two competing technologies 
with increasing returns as shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Increasing-return adoption payoffs 
 
Adoptions 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Technology 
A 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Technology 
B 
4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 
Source: W Brian Arthur, “Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy” The University of 
Michigan Press, 1994 
 
 The first actor chooses say, technology A. This enhances the returns of 
adopting A. The next actor, a fortiori, chooses A too. This continues, with A being 
chosen each time and B cannot get started. The end result is that A “corners the 
market” and B is excluded. One will note that after 30 adoptions, adopting B will 
deliver higher returns. But this situation cannot be remedied by any given tax or 
subsidy; the gap between A and B has gone so far that the market has become 
“locked-in” to an inferior choice. If at the start, adopters of the technology do not 
know (having imperfect knowledge) that if sufficient actors adopt B, then B would 
deliver a higher return, second-degree path dependence has taken place. On the other 
hand, if the actors knew at the start of this information but still choose A, then third-
degree path dependence has taken place.27 At any random point in time, each actor’s 
choice of technology depends on what other actors have chosen. The first actor who 
                                                            
27 W Brian Arthur, n 18 at 19 and S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, n 20 at 214-215 
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made the choice of technology A made that choice based on the “current state” of the 
environment which may be aleatory or seemingly transient. 
 
For our purposes, what is important is that the above analysis shows the place 
of history in explaining economic outcomes. In the words of the authors:28 
 
“In this analysis, history is important only because the sequence of events determines 
current values. If the sequence does not affect the end result, there is little place for 
history; it is a ‘mere carrier-the deliverer of the inevitable”. But surely history should 
be of interests even where the economic processes are ergodic-even when there are 
decreasing returns. While it may be useful to model supply-demand equilibria, no one 
actually believes that exogenous changes do not occur. There are important and 
frequent external shocks to the economy, that at any moment unknown 
parameters…So the knowledge of some initial endowment alone could never tell us 
very much about the eventual path of real economies over time. In addition, the 
endowment of one generation is the bequest of another, and there is value in learning 
what actions previous generations took that increased or decreased their wealth”. 
 
C] Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance 
 C.1] Bebchuk and Roe’s Structure-Driven Path Dependence 
 
 Bebchuk and Roe tell us that it is difficult, though not impossible for a 
concentrated ownership structure to become a diffuse ownership structure because of 
path dependence. In what is termed “structure-driven path dependence”, initial 
ownership structures at Tº persists at T¹ because the institutional and cultural 
                                                            
28 S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, n 20 at 223. 
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environment (ie sunk adaptive costs and complementaries) may favour such structures 
or the rents that controllers benefit from having control will not be given up easily.29  
  
 In essence, a controlling shareholder who sold half of his 100 shares at Tº to 
public shareholders and kept the other half as a control block will not at T¹ adopt a 
dispersed ownership structure because the gains to him are higher if he remains in a 
concentrated structure than in a dispersed structure, even though a dispersed structure 
may be more efficient overall. In other words, while the move to a dispersed 
ownership structure will be efficient, the controller would not be served by it, because 
the controller would lose her rent (ie private benefits of control) and would not fully 
capture the efficiency gains from the move, some of which inured to the minority 
shareholders.”30 This can be illustrated by a simple numerical example. Suppose X 
retains half her shares at Tº, her shares will be valued at $60 (being $1.20 per share in 
a control block) whilst the public shareholders’ shares will be valued at $40 (being 
$0.80 per minority share). Further, suppose that the total value of 100 shares in a 
dispersed ownership structure is $110 (being $1.10 per share). Would he adopt 
dispersed ownership at T¹?  
 
 The answer is clearly “no” because in a dispersed ownership structure, the 
value of the shares to the controlling shareholder is only $55, compared to the value 
of $60 in a concentrated ownership structure. So, the concentrated ownership 
structure will persist to T¹.31 
  
                                                            
29 Lucian A Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance” (1999-2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 127. 
30 Lucian A Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, n 29 at 147. 
31 Lucian A Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, n 29 at 143. 
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However, this is not to say that the controller will never move to a diffuse 
ownership structure. If the efficiency gains to the controlling shareholder in a 
dispersed structure far exceed the private benefit of control he gets under a 
concentrated structure, then the controlling shareholder will divest. In other words, if 
the private benefits of control are very large, then concentrated structures will persist 
unless some external forces break up these benefits. These external forces could be 
rent-reducing legal rules or other socio-economic or political conditions that are 
specific to every economy. Consider the situation above, if the total value in a 
dispersed ownership structure is more than $122, then the controlling shareholder will 
break up her control block and move to a dispersed structure because the gains to him 
is now $61. Thus, the authors concluded that rent-seeking behavior will cause the 
concentrated ownership structure to persist into the future. But is this phenomenon 
truly path dependent? 
 
At first glance, the path taken by the controlling shareholder is path efficient, 
based on neoclassical “rational” choice theory where each actor maximizes his utility. 
This is very different from the concept of path dependency as economists understand 
it to be. As stated above, in classical path dependence theory, the action taken by an 
actor depends on the “current state” of the environment and externalities as the Polya 
urn and snow shoveling problem examples illustrate. In Bebchuk and Roe’s model, 
the concentrated ownership structure persists into T¹ not because of what other 
controlling shareholders have chosen (ie network externalities) but because the 
controlling shareholder wants to maximize his utility. This is path efficient, not path 
dependence. In fact, the authors profererd two reasons why prior ownership structures 
affect subsequent structures; namely, efficiency and rent-seeking.  
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C.2] Ronald J Gilson’s Controlling Shareholder’s Trade-off 
 
This notion of the controlling shareholder enjoying private benefits of control 
which cause concentrated ownership structure to persist is called the controlling 
shareholder’s tradeoff by Ronald J Gilson.32 Gilson posited that controlling 
shareholders holding large equity stakes are more likely to have the incentive to 
monitor the managers or manage the company itself, and will be effective in curbing 
managerial excesses because of proximity and lower information costs. However, in 
return for bearing the direct costs of monitoring the managers, illiquidity and non-
diversification, controlling shareholders may take a share of the gain in productivity 
in the form of private benefits of control. This is the controlling shareholder’s trade-
off, and outside investors are willing to accept this trade-off so long as the reduction 
in managerial agency costs exceeds the detriment of the controlling shareholder’s 
extraction of private benefits.  
 
Gilson further hypothesized that countries with “good law” will act to curb the 
extent of private benefits of control, and hence, “good law” countries will support 
more widely held firms. So how does one explain the phenomenon that “good law” 
countries such as the U.S also has controlling shareholder structures, or even Sweden, 
another country with good minority protection laws only has controlling shareholder 
structures. This can be explained by the size of non-pecuniary private benefits of 
control found in Swedish companies.33 In Sweden, the “good laws” curb the extent of 
pecuniary private benefits of control but cannot reduce the size of non-pecuniary 
                                                            
32 Ronald J Gilson, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy” (2005-2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1641 at 1650-1652. 
33 Non-pecuniary private benefits of control are forms of psychic and other benefits such as social status and 
prestige which involve no transfer of money resources to the controlling shareholder, see Ronald J Gilson, n 32 
at 1663-1664. 
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private benefits of control. The social status and even political influence enjoyed by 
the entrepreneurs of large publicly-listed companies is far larger in a small country 
like Sweden than in the U.S, and this explains why entrepreneurs held on to control. 
 
 Coming back to the question whether path dependence grounded on efficiency 
and rent-seeking behaviour could be truly classified as path dependent, it is submitted 
that classical path dependence theories have also used neoclassical notions of rational 
choice. For example, in the VHS-Beta competition, consumers chose the VHS format 
over the Beta format because they perceived that other consumers have chosen VHS 
and they want to “better connect” with the other consumers, ie notions of utility are 
involved. In similar vein, the snow shoveling example shows that a shopkeeper will 
adopt a policy to shovel his pavement if his neighbor shovels his because there would 
then be a clear pavement for customers to walk to his shop, in which case he could 
enjoy a brisk business, ie maximize his utility; again a predication on rational choice 
theory. Thus, path dependence theory is a broad concept that can encompass notions 
of efficiency and rational choice. 
 
D] The Historical Sociologists’ Perspective 
 
James Mahoney hailed the use of path-dependence theories as an important 
strand in historical sociological investigations. He expounded two types of path-
dependence theories:  
(a) self-reinforcing path-dependence which is characterized by the long-term 
reproduction of a given institutional pattern. Using Brian Arthur’s theory of 
increasing returns, Mahoney postulated that “an institutional pattern-once adopted-
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delivers increasing benefits with its continued adoption, and thus over time it becomes 
more and more difficult to transform the pattern or select previously available options, 
even if these alternative options would have been more “efficient”’;  
 
(b) reactive path dependence which examines reactive sequences of chains of 
temporally ordered and casually connected events. These sequences are “reactive” 
because each event within the sequence is in part a reaction to temporally antecedent 
events. The final event is the outcome under investigation and the overall chain of 
events can be seen as a path leading up to the outcome. In order to be path dependent, 
the historical event that sets in motion the sequence of casually connected events must 
have contingent properties. The overall event chain must be marked by processes of 
“inherent sequentiality”.34 
 
 In self-reinforcing path dependence, the earlier parts of an event matter much 
more than later parts because an event that happens too late might be of no 
consequence. Mahoney explains that path dependence is not determined by any 
particular set of initial conditions. Rather, it is a system in which outcomes are related 
stochastically to initial conditions. For instance, in the Polya urn experiment, the final 
composition of the urn is entirely indeterminate before the first colour is selected. But 
once a random choice is made of selecting certain colours, the system will eventually 
settle down to equilibrium.35 
 
 With respect to historical sociological investigations, path dependence 
involves a study of particular circumstances that caused a tradition or institution to be 
                                                            
34 James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” (2000) 29:4 Theory and Society 507 at 508-509. 
35 James Mahoney, n 34 at 511. 
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started. These processes that start an institution (ie the genesis) are different from 
those that reproduce an institution (ie reinforce) the institution. Institutional genesis 
therefore begins at “critical junctures” in history where a particular institution is 
adopted over other alternatives. Once a particular institution is selected it becomes 
progressively more difficult to reverse the process and return to the original point 
when multiple alternatives were still available. The selection process at the “critical 
juncture” is marked by a contingency. Contingencies refer to the inability of theory to 
predict or explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a 
specific outcome. Hence, a contingency is unexpected.  
 
 To illustrate, suppose at T¹, there are three options, A, B and C available for 
adoption (ie the initial conditions). Theory is unable to explain or predict which 
option will be selected. At T², option B is selected over the others. This is a contingent 
event. At T³, option capitalizes on initial advantages and is stably reproduced over 
time. The sequence is called self-reinforcing path dependence.36 
 
 There is a paradox observed in self-reinforcing path dependence. In the first 
place, path dependence processes may be initiated contrary to neoclassical theory, but 
its reproduction over time is associated with the very neoclassical theory it seeks to 
contradict. For instance, most economists viewed the QWERTY as the less efficient 
format than Dvorak but it persisted over the Dvorak format because its reproduction 
is efficient due to the heavy costs of technology reversal.37 This is called the 
utilitarian explanation of self-reinforcing path dependence. For example, with 
                                                            
36 James Mahoney, n 34 at 513-514. 
37 James Mahoney, n 34 at 516. But see S.J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis n 20 where the authors adduced 
historical evidence to show that the Dvorak may not be the more efficient format than QWERTY. Furthermore, 
at the time of the launch of QWERTY, there were other competing claims of speed records showing that 
QWERTY may not be the most efficient at that point in time.  
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organizational institutions, factors such as information dissemination, organizational 
interdependency and user proficiency may work to lock-in a sub-optimal outcome.38 
In this explanation, institutions emerge only when it is in the private interests of 
individuals to establish them. And there will be an institutional change when change 
actors could foresee that there will be negative consequences in the future.39 
  
 Another basis for explaining self-reinforcing path dependence is the functional 
explanation. What this means is that once contingent events initially select a particular 
institution, the institution serves some functions for the system, which causes the 
expansion of the institution, which leads to further institutional expansion and 
eventually institutional consolidation. The utilitarian and functional explanations are 
closely connected, being predicated on a cost-benefit analysis. Thirdly, there is the 
power explanation. In this explanation, the institution that was contingently selected 
provides an elite with power, who having benefited from the privileges of the 
institutional arrangements then perpetuates the institution. In this explanation, power-
based institutions reproduce themselves to a critical point when inherent conflicts 
within the institution gave way to institutional change. This can occur when the elite 
so disadvantaged the other subordinate groups that the latter successfully challenged 
the status quo. Fourthly, there is the legitimation explanation. In this framework, 
institutional reproduction is grounded in the actors’ subjective orientations and beliefs 
about what is appropriate or morally correct. Once an institution is contingently 
selected, the institution will be reinforced through processes of increasing legitimation 
                                                            
38 James Mahoney, n 34 at 518. 
39 James Mahoney, n 34 at 518. 
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and positive feedback, even if other previously available institutions would have been 
more legitimate.40 
 
 In contrast, reactive path dependence denotes a chain of sequential events 
wherein each event is both a reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent 
events. In reactive sequences, each critical juncture is marked by backlash processes 
that transform rather than reinforce early events. A reactive sequence sets in motion a 
series of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions that move the system in a new 
direction. Reactive path dependence starts off with an initial event that was 
contingent, ie a critical juncture or breakpoint that could not be predicted or 
anticipated. For example, in the Isaac Street and Knaap study, the death of Martin 
Luther King was an unpredictable contingent starting point that led to the race-based 
poor relief programmes at the expense of more progressive programmes of class-
based economic reforms.41  
 
 Oftentimes, the contingent initial event that triggers a reactive casual chain is 
the intersection point of two or more prior sequences. This coming together or 
intersection is called a “conjuncture” and their time of occurrence cannot be predicted 







40 James Mahoney, n 34 at 519-523. 
41 James Mahoney, n 34 at 526-527. 
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Source: James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” (2000) 29:4 Theory and 
Society 507. 
 
 In example 1, the conjuncture at Z did not bring about an enduring 
consequence as the path reverts back to its original trajectory. In contrast, example 2 
shows that at the conjuncture G, a new direction or series of events are triggered. The 
events that make up a reactive sequence are connected by tight casual linkages called 
“inherent sequentiality”. What this means is that the events in a reactive path 
sequence are often necessary or sufficient conditions for subsequent events, ie without 
these events first happening, subsequent events would not have happened. 
Furthermore, one has to look at the casual mechanisms linking initial conditions to 
final outcomes. This refers to the intervening processes through which one variable 
exerts a casual effect on another variable. Lastly, inherent sequentiality has to be 




 This study is a historical sociological investigation of why family firms and 
GLCs listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange have concentrated ownership structures 
despite post-independent Singapore having adopted strong minority shareholder 
protection corporate laws that according to La Porta’s thesis postulated above should 
have led to a more dispersed ownership structure.  
 
It will be argued that Brian Arthur’s theory of increasing returns which formed 
the basis of Mahoney’s self-reinforcing path dependence can be used to explain why 
ownership structures are concentrated in Singapore’s family firms whilst Mahoney’s 
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reactive path dependence can be used to explain why ownership structures are 
concentrated in the GLCs. Chapter 2 will prove empirically that Singapore’s listed 
companies, whether family-owned or government-owned have concentrated 
ownership structures. Chapter 3 will argue how historical events have contingently 
caused our early entrepreneurs to choose concentrated ownership over diffuse 
ownership as the choice vehicle to hold their business assets. Chapter 4 will show that 
due to the enduring Chinese culture of keeping control within the family, an 
institutional pattern is reproduced that creates a positive feedback that in turn 
perpetuates concentrated ownership. When this dynamic is in action, the utilitarian 
and functional explanations of self-reinforcing path dependence cause the pattern of 
concentrated ownership to persist because controlling owners enjoy pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary private benefits of control which they refuse to give up. Furthermore, 
concentrated ownership fulfils the function of giving fiscal advantages to controlling 
family owners which in turn perpetuate the final outcome. 
 
 Chapter 5 sets out the initial historical conditions, in particular the initial 
political conditions that set in motion a series of reactive events which eventually 
determine the final outcome of concentrated ownership in Singapore’s GLCs. Chapter 
6 will argue how these initial political conditions forged a crisis mentality amongst 
the early founders of the PAP which created an ideology of survival. The PAP 
government faced a “critical juncture” at independence in 1965 when the British 
withdrew their troops from Singapore. Confronting the crisis squarely and in the spirit 
of survival, the government became a entrepreneur as the private sector could not 
undertake the task for economic development. This sets forth a series of events, 
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namely, the growth of GLCs that dominated the economy to the detriment of the 
private sector.  
 
Things came to a head in mid-1980s when the 1985 recession triggered a 
response to cut down government expansion in business and grow the private sector. 
Again, this “conjuncture” triggered a series of reactive responses that shaped the 
corporate sector in terms of more breathing space for the private sector, more 
assistance programmes for the small and medium sized companies, the creation of a 
second board for listing of start-ups, the development and encouragement of 
entrepreneurship among the citizenry in order to grow the private sector. The events 
have now reached another “conjuncture” in the general election of May 2011. A “new 
normal” is now observed where the government is in partnership with the private 
sector and non-profit organizations to build an inclusive society for the betterment of 
the economy and society at large.   
 
In conclusion, my thesis seeks to prove that there is no single theory that can 
explain why firms take on a dispersed or concentrated ownership structure. Certainly 
the “law matters” hypothesis, which sought to provide a unified answer to this 
question is erroneous. The “law matters” thesis has been severely criticized on 
principle and application (see chapter 3). This thesis sought to argue that path 
dependence is a better explanation for concentrated ownership structure in Singapore 
firms. Under this rubric, social factors such as culture, history, and utility reasons as 
well as politics had shaped the trajectory of ownership development in Singapore. In 
the final analysis, it is impossible to develop a single theory that can explain 
ownership structure on a global basis as was attempted by the “law matters” 
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researchers, but instead each country’s unique history, economic, social and political 


































Hitherto, it has always been assumed that the corporate ownership pattern in 
Singapore companies is concentrated. Empirical studies by local researchers on this 
question are few and far between.42 This study will be the first in nearly 50 years to 
undertake an empirical study on the extent of: (a) ownership concentration; and (b) 
the separation of ownership and control in Singapore’s top 100 companies listed on 
the Singapore Stock Exchange. Ownership concentration will be measured by the 
following indicators: 
 
(a) the distribution of shareholders in the top 100 companies according to 
amount of shares they hold; 
(b) the value of stock held by the 20 largest stockholders; and 
(c) the value of stock held by the largest stockholder. 
 
As regards (b)-separation of ownership from control, the study will undertake 
a case-by-case analysis of each company to determine whether ownership has 
separated from control in each company. But first we will look at the relevant 
empirical studies to examine the methodology used to measure ownership 
concentration and its implications. 
 
                                                            
42 Tay Watt Moi, n 123 and Goh Chee Hiong, n 127. 
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2.2 STUDIES AFFIRMING A DISPERSED SHAREHOLDING STRUCTURE 
AND A SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL IN THE U.S 
AND U.K 
 
A] Berle and Means 
 
Berle and Means’ seminal study on the widely dispersed shareholding 
structure of the top 200 nonfinancial corporations in America in 1929 defined 
“control” to mean “the power to select the board of directors”, either by mobilizing 
the legal right to choose them, controlling a majority of the votes directly or through 
some legal device, or by exerting pressure which influences their choice.43 
 
Consequently they identified five major types of control, namely;44 
 
(a) Control through almost complete ownership (more than 80%); 
(b) Majority control (more than 50%); 
(c) Control through legal device without majority ownership; 
(d) Minority control (20% to 50%); and 
(e) Management control (less than 20%) 
 
Berle and Means recognized four kinds of legal devices by which corporate 
control was exercised: (i) pyramiding, (ii) non-voting stock, (iii) stock with 
disproportionate voting power, and (iv) voting trust. 
 
                                                            
43 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, n 1 at 69. 
44 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, n 1 at 70.  
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Using the aforesaid classification, Berle and Means concluded with the 
following data: 
 
      By Number   By Wealth 
Management Control    44%    58% 
Legal Device     21%    22% 
Minority Control     23%    14% 
Majority Control     5%    2% 
Private Ownership    6%    4% 
In the hands of receiver    1%    negligible 
      100%    100% 
 
It is to be observed that Berle and Means examined both immediate and 
ultimate control. If an immediate control is by another corporation but the latter 
corporation is “management controlled”, then the corporation is classified as 
“management controlled”.45 It is further found that in the “management controlled” 
companies, no directors or officers were among the largest 20 shareholders, and not a 
single director held as much as one-tenth of one per cent of the stock., an indication 
that those in control do not own significant portions of the total shares.46 
 
Berle and Means further studied the different industry groups and found that 
of the three groups, namely railroads, public utilities and industrials, the separation of 
ownership and control had “become most nearly complete”.47  
                                                            
45 It is to be noted that this will tend to overstate the number of ‘management-controlled” firms. 
46 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, n 1 at 84. 
47 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, n 1 at 114. Out of 42 railroads, 26 were “management controlled” or 
controlled through minority interests by other roads which were in turn “management controlled”. Thus 62 per 
cent of the railroads and 79 per cent of their assets involved a high degree of separation of ownership and 
control. In addition, 7½ railroads were ultimately controlled by pyramiding (5½ being in the Van Sweringen 
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This led Berle and Means to conclude that: 48 
 
“It is apparent, that, with the increasing dispersion of stock ownership in the largest 
American corporations, a new condition has developed with regard to their control. 
No longer are the individuals in control of most of these companies as the dominant 
owners. Rather, there are no dominant owners, and control is maintained in large 
measure apart from ownership….It is therefore evident that we are dealing not only 
with distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on 
the other- a control which tends to move further and further away from ownership and 
ultimately to lie in the hands of management itself, a management capable of 
perpetuating its own position….” 
 
Though Berle and Means’ study has been ably refuted by many scholars,49 
others have endorsed their position and reaffirmed that ownership and control are 
separated in the largest corporations in both the U.S and U.K. 
 
B]Robert Aaron Gordon 
 
Thirty years later, Gordon’s “Business Leadership in the Large Corporation” 
examined the empirical question using the following indicators:50 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
System) indicating a total of 80 per cent of the railroads and 94 per cent of their wealth controlled by individuals 
without significant ownership stakes. 
48 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, n 1 at 117 and 124. 
49 Most notably the Temporary National Economic Committee’s (T.N.E.C) study by Goldsmith Raymond 
Williams and Parmelee RC, “The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Non-financial Corporations. 
Investigations of Concentration of Economic Power”. Monographs of the Temporary National Economic 
Committee, No 29 Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1940. 
50 Robert Aaron Gordon, “Business Leadership in the Large Corporation” University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966. 
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(a) the management’s stake in the large corporation;  
(b) the proportion of common stock issue owned by the 20 largest record 
stockholder between 1937-1939;  
(c) categorization of the 20 largest stockholders into individuals (personal 
holding companies, trusts and estates), other non-financial 
corporations, insurance and investment companies, banks and brokers 
as beneficial holders, foundations and miscellaneous; and  
(d) a classification of stock ownership into the following categories 50-
100%, 30-50%, 10-30%, < 10% held by (i) single family groups, (ii) 
two or more family groups, (iii) family and corporate groups, (iv) 
single corporate group, (v) two or more corporate groups, and (vi) no 
dominant stockholding group. 
 
As regards (a), Gordon found that for a group of 155 companies (which were 
all included in Berle and Means’ study), management typically owned a very small 
fraction of the voting stock. The median percentage holding by total management in 
all 155 companies was less than two per cent. For the 84 industrials, the typical 
median holding by management was 3.6 per cent, for the 35 public utilities- 1.18 per 
cent and the 36 railroads- 0.58 per cent.51 
 
The data on (b) showed that the median holding of the largest 20 stockholders 
was an average of 23.8 per cent with the highest concentration of ownership in the 
                                                            
51 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 24. 
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utilities (33.75 per cent) than the manufacturing companies (18.52 per cent) and 
railroads (18.33 per cent).52  
 
Gordon further categorized the 20 largest stockholders into different classes 
and found that the percentage of market value of all common stock held by 
individuals, personal holding companies, trusts and estates were highest in the 
manufacturing companies (17.7 per cent) and lowest in the railroads (1.9 per cent). 
Utilities scored a 4.3 per cent and others scored 9.6 per cent. In the utilities and 
railroads, ownership by other corporations accounted for 18 per cent and 12.7 of the 
market value of all common stock respectively.53 To Gordon, only ownership by 
individuals and other non-financial corporations represent significant ownership in 
terms of leadership and control. These two groups amounted to about 19 per cent of 
the total value of the common stock of the 176 companies in his sample.54 The non-
beneficial holdings of banks and brokers must be excluded as did the institutional 
owners because these stockholders are unlikely to exercise much control.  
 
Finally, Gordon examined the SEC’s data on stock ownership (ie (d) above) 
but disputed the SEC’s findings that control through ownership (usually minority) 
was the paradigm in the giant corporations of those days.55 Gordon pointed out that a 
number of the SEC cases of “ownership control” were actually ownership by other 
corporations, and the control of the latter corporation by some group of individuals 
was not necessarily through ownership. In addition, of the cases of “ownership 
control” by family groups, a large number (34 out of 77) represent the combined 
                                                            
52 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50, at 32. 
53 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 34. 
54 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 36,  
55 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 42. 
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holdings of two, three or even more families. And nearly two-thirds of the combined 
multi-family holdings total less than 30 per cent of the voting stock. Accordingly, 
Gordon surmised that probably in less than one-third of the 176 companies does a 
small compact group of individuals exercise “control”.56 In the end, Gordon 
advocated an analysis based on a case by case examination of the facts of each 
particular company.  
 
Case studies of the du Pont empire in General Motors, the Rockefeller’s 
interests in Standard Oil Company, Proctor and Gamble and the like revealed that 
“control” by stockholding minority may vary from almost complete passivity to 
vigorous and extensive participation in the leadership function.57 In this, Gordon 
acknowledged that minority groups, by virtue of their collective voting strength, may 
exert considerable influence on management.58 However, Gordon posited throughout 
his thesis that active business leadership had fallen into the hands of powerful 
executives, and consequently ownership had separated from control.  
 
C] Robert J Larner 
 
In 1963, using Berle and Means’ classification of stock ownership, Larner 
found that whilst 44 per cent of the 200 largest non-financial companies in 1929 were 
“management controlled”, in 1963, 84 per cent of the 200 largest non-financial 
                                                            
56  Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 43. As an example of the extreme classification of the SEC, the Chrysler 
Corporation is listed as an example of multi-family ownership control (less than 10 per cent). The Bache family 
and W.P Chrysler together owned only 3 or 4 per cent of the voting stock. Chrysler was then Chairman of the 
board and J.S Bache was a director. “Control” was thus centred on ownership interest, see Robert Aaron 
Gordon, n 50 at 43. 
57Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 184. 
58 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 186-188. 
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companies and 84 per cent of their assets were controlled by management.59 Seventy-
five per cent of the “500 largest” and 81 per cent of their assets were management-
controlled. 
 
Private ownership had almost entirely disappeared in 1963 with only five such 
firms in the top 500 firms. Of the 12 privately-held firms in 1929, eight had become 
majority-controlled, four- minority-controlled and three appeared to be controlled by 
their management in 1963.60 Only 18 firms were minority-controlled in 1963 
compared to 46½ in 1929. Control through legal device fell from 41 in 1929 to 8 in 
1963. However, the number of “management-controlled” firms nearly doubled from 
88½ in 1929 to 167 in 1963. Of the “500 largest” in 1963, 72 were minority 
controlled, 26 controlled through legal device, and 377 (ie 75 per cent) controlled by 
management.61 It was also found that the number of “management controlled” firms 
was evenly distributed amongst the largest 350 firms in 1963, unlike in 1929 where 
“management-controlled” firms were concentrated in the larger firms on the 1929 
list.62 
 
Larner thus concluded: 63 
 
“In summary, it would appear that Berle and Means in 1929 were observing the so-
called “managerial revolution” in process. Thirty-four years later that “revolution” 
seems close to complete,….”. 
                                                            
59 In view of the greater size of the companies in 1963 and wider dispersion of their stock, Larner used a lower 
limit of 10 per cent as indicative of minority control, see Robert J Larner, “Management Control and the Large 
Corporation” University Press of Cambridge, Mass. 1970 at 11. 
60 Robert J Larner, n 59 at 16. 
61 Robert J Larner, n 59 at 16. 
62 Robert J Larner, n 59 at 19-20. 
63 Robert J Larner, n 59 at 22. 
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D] P Sargant Florence 
 
Across the Atlantic, Professor Sargant Florence undertook a measurement 
of ownership concentration in the largest, medium and small sized large British 
companies in 1936 and 1951.64 Florence posited that a bloc of 20 shareholders are 
not too large as to prevent some sort of personal contact and yet large enough to 
control among companies a sufficient proportion of votes to give a virtual 
majority, so as to form the seat of control. As such, Florence measured the vote 
concentration of the 20 largest shareholders and the single largest shareholder of 
the 1936 and 1951 sample of companies.65 It was found that the 20 largest 
voteholders formed one-sixth of 1 per cent of all shareholders, but they held on 
average about 30 per cent of the votes.66 
 
To measure vote concentration (ie ownership concentration), Florence 
calibrated seven grades of vote concentration: 
 
Grade I Companies where the single largest voteholder owns more 
than 50% of the votes 
 
                                                            
64 Very large sized are those with issued capital of £3 million and over, medium large are those with issued 
capital of £1 to short of £3 million and smaller large are those with issued capital of £200,000 to short of £1 
million, see P Sargant Florence, “Ownership, Control and Success of Large Companies” Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1961 at 41. 
65 The size of holdings of each shareholder in the 20 largest shareholders showed a “tapering” fashion with the 
largest averaging 10.3 per cent of voting shares in Britain, six per cent in America, but the fifth holding in size 
has tapered down sharply to 1.1 per cent in Britain and 1.27 per cent in America. From the 5th to the 20th holding 
the rate of decrease is slower.  The 20th shareholder held 0.27 per cent in Britain but only 0.41 per cent in 
America, see P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 224. 
66 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 66. 
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Grade II Companies where the single largest voteholder owns 20 to 
50% of the votes 
 
Grade III Companies, apart from those assigned to Grades I and II, 
where the 20 largest voteholders own more than 50% of the 
votes 
 
Grade IV Companies, apart from those assigned to Grade II, where 
the 20 largest voteholders own 30 to 50% of the votes 
 
Grade V Companies, apart from those in Grade II, where the 20 
largest voteholders own 20 to 30% of the votes 
 
Grade VI Companies where the 20 largest voteholders own 10 to 
20% of the votes 
 
Grade VII Companies where the 20 largest voteholders own less than 
10% of the votes 
 
Florence found that taking a concentration of 30 per cent of votes among the 
20 largest voteholders as a dividing line, thus contrasting Grades I to IV with Grades 
V to VII, then of all the 92 companies formed in 1936, 50 were above this level of 
concentration in 1936 (ie 54 per cent), compared to 35, equivalent to 38 per cent in 
1951. Again of the older very large companies (very large both in 1936 and 1951) 31 
were found to be above this level in 1936 whilst only 22 were found to be above this 
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level in 1951. Thus there is a dilution of vote and ownership concentration between 
1936 and 1951.67 
 
A similar pattern was found in the vote concentration of the single largest 
shareholder and the median shareholding. In 1936, the single largest shareholders 
owned over 50 per cent of the shares in nine of the very large companies; by 1951 
only six such companies showed such extreme concentration. Thirteen companies in 
1936 had their single largest shareholder holding 20 to 50 per cent of the votes but 
this fell to 10 such companies in 1951.68 Similarly, the median percentage of votes 
held by the largest 20 shareholders in the 64 companies that were very large in 1936 
was, in 1936, 30 per cent; in 1951, 19 per cent. Among the 92 companies very large in 
1951 but not necessarily so in 1936, the median percentage of votes held by the 20 
largest vote-holders was in 1935, 35 per cent; in 1951, 22 per cent.69 
 
According to Florence, these data showed that a “managerial evolution” was 
in progress rather than a managerial revolution as claimed by Berle and Means and 
Larner.70 But it is submitted that data showing a more diffuse pattern of ownership 
1951 as compared to 1936 does not prove that ownership has separated from control. 
Throughout Florence’s study it was acknowledged that “a small coherent “resolute” 
group of persons determined on a certain policy or certain key appointments such as 
that of directors can win even with a concentration of a minority of voting shares as 
                                                            
67 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 71. 
68 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 71. 
69 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 72. 
70 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 230. 
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low as 10 per cent, based on the probabilities of voting outcomes” as mathematically 
analysed by Penrose:71 
 
“In a committee of three people one member will obtain the decision of his choice in 
75 per cent of the votings, if the other two members vote in a random manner. In a 
committee of five, the chance that one member will obtain the decision he wishes will 
be 11/16…Thus three resolute votes can control a committee of 23 to the same extent 
that one vote can control a committee of three. Furthermore, a bloc of 23 could 
control, again to the same extent, an electorate of over 1,000… These blocs have 
about a 75 per cent chance of carrying the decision in their respective 
electorates…Blocs three times as great…would carry the decisions they desired in 
nearly 96 per cent of the situations encountered.” 
 
A comparison was done between American companies for 1937-9 and British 
companies for 1936 to determine the extent of a dominant ownership interest in these 
companies. It was found that both in America and Britain, 58 per cent of the 
companies had a dominant ownership interest, compared to 27 per cent having no 
dominant ownership interest in America and 9 per cent in Britain. In between are the 
marginal cases, 15 per cent in America and 33 per cent in Britain.72 In view of the not 
insignificant number of companies in Britain that were in the marginal cases, Florence 
                                                            
71 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 232. Using the probabilistic-voting model, Dennis Leech sought to dispute Berle 
and Means’ computation that 44 per cent of the 200 non-financial corporations were management controlled. 
Leech argued that the doubtful category (ie the joint minority-management control group) contained as many as 
73 companies and was re-assigned to other categories of minority control based on “general street knowledge”, 
so that the number of companies which definitely fell into the management control rule based on the 20 per cent 
rule was only 21. In addition, making a distinction between “immediate control” and “ultimate control” and 
classifying a company as “management controlled” when the controlling corporate shareholder was 
management controlled naturally biases the result. Leech’s study concluded that the 20 per cent rule was too 
high for large corporations and the probabilistic-voting model clearly showed that it is possible to form 
controlling coalitions from small numbers of leading shareholders, see Dennis Leech, “Corporate Ownership 
and Control: A New Look at the Evidence of Berle and Means” (1987) 39: 3 Oxford Economic Papers, New 
Series, 534-551. 
72 P Sargant Florence, n 64 at 239. 
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investigated whether the seat of control laid with the directors.73 He found that “the 
picture of leadership by director in Britain is variegated. The situation hardly supports 
D.H Robertson’s generalization that “the directors are probably not merely paid 
officials but themselves substantial shareholders” any more than it wholly supports 
the thesis of a managerial revolution”.74 Nevertheless, Florence surmised that in both 
countries the real leadership of many large businesses will be found among executives 
and managers, particularly presidents and director-managers who do not interlock in 
their directorships too widely. Thus Florence had envisaged a managerial evolution 
rather than revolution. 
 
2.3 CONTRASTING STUDIES AFFIRMING A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF 
OWNERSHIP BY AN ENTREPRENEUR, FAMILY OR GROUPS OF 
FAMILIES AND ASSOCIATES IN THE U.S AND U.K 
 
A] The T.N.E.C Study75 
 
The most oft-cited study that contradicted Berle and Means’ hypothesis was 
the T.N.E.C Study. In this comprehensive study, it was reported that though there is 
some evidence of a smaller degree of concentration of stock ownership in the hands of 
a few persons at the end of the period (ie 1937) than at the beginning (ie 1927), the 
difference is not very substantial.76 
 
                                                            
73 Gordon found that the total of officers and directors held between them less than five per cent of the voting 
stock in the majority of corporations, and officers alone (including officer directors) own less than one per cent 
in a similar majority of 66, see Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 247. 
74 Robert Aaron Gordon, n 50 at 248. 
75 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49. 
76 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 18. 
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Using a Lorenz curve,77 it was found that it took less than the largest three per 
cent of common shareholdings-ie less than 200,000 out of 7,027,000-to account for 
one-half of the total value of shares outstanding, and less than 15 per cent of all 
shareholdings was necessary to account for four-fifths of their aggregate value.78 This 
shows a high degree of ownership concentration. But concentration varies across 
industries. The ownership of common stock is slightly more concentrated among the 
utilities than among the manufacturing and railroad corporations included in the 
sample.79 
 
An investigation into the types of shareholders among the 20 largest 
shareholders revealed that the percentage of stock held by individuals (including 
personal and family holding companies, trusts and estates) accounted for over 17 per 
cent of the value of common stock issues of manufacturing companies, compared to 
less than 3½ per cent of 47 electric, gas and water utilities and two per cent of 29 
railroad common stock issues. This difference reflected the different methods of 
growth of enterprises in these industries; where small private enterprises expanded 
into the large manufacturing corporations with few if any public offerings of common 
stock whilst the railroads and utilities companies rely largely on public financings 
from the beginning and continued to tap its capital from the open capital market.80 
 
More importantly, the T.N.E.C study conducted a Berle and Means’ type of 
test for ownership control using the following criteria: 
                                                            
77 In a Lorenz curve, the 45 degree diagonal line from left to right shows the equal distribution of every 
shareholding. The more the actual distribution deviates from the perfectly equal distribution, the more 
concentrated the ownership, The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 38. 
78 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 40. 
79 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 42. 
80 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 79-80. 




Majority control:   holding over 50% of the voting rights 
Predominant minority: holding 30 to 50% of the voting rights 
Substantial minority: holding 10 to 30% of the voting rights 
Small minority:  holding less than 10% of the voting rights 
 
Corporate control 
Same as above 
 
The study found that about 60 or less than one-third of the 200 corporations 
were without a visible centre of control. In these companies, the study surmised that 
control could lie with the chief executives through the proxy machinery.81 In about 40 
of all the corporations, ie 20 per cent, control lies in the hands of a one-family interest 
group. Another 35 corporations were controlled by ownership interest consisting of 
several families or a group of business associates. Finally, nearly 60 corporations 
were under the control of other corporations excluding family holding companies. A 
dozen of these “other corporations” were in turn controlled by an interest group which 
consisted of one or several families or a number of business associates.82 All in all, 
140 corporations out of the 200 had a visible centre of control, either arising from a 
single family, interest group comprising several families or business associates or 
from inter-corporate holdings. 
 
                                                            
81 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 103. 
82 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 104-105. 
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As regards the common stock held by directors and officers of the top 200 
non-financial corporations, it was found that a considerably higher amount was held 
by officers and directors among manufacturing companies than among railroads and 
utilities. The median percentage of ownership by officers and directors was around 
1.5 per cent of all common stock issues with the manufacturing corporations’ officers 
and directors garnering 3 per cent while the railroads garnered ¾ of one per cent and 
utilities garnered ¼ of one per cent.83 
 
B] Philip H Burch 
 
The economists’ methodology of locating control by setting up arbitrary 
statistical criteria such as the percentage of shares held by the largest holder or 20 
largest owners was severely criticized by sociologists like Steve Nyman and Aubrey 
Silberston84, Arthur Francis85, Zeitlin86 and Burch as inadequate.87 
 
It is submitted that studies of the largest holder’s or 20 largest holders’ 
shareholdings is analogous to a blind-folded form of analysis because it is indifferent 
to the dynamics of interaction between the board or senior management and the 
controlling interests or outside interests in each company. Moreover, it tends to show 
ownership concentration rather than the location of control, for it cannot be presumed 
that the owner of the bloc holds it for control purposes unless we know the identity of 
the bloc holder. A bloc holder who is an entrepreneur, or family group would 
                                                            
83 The T.N.E.C Study, n 49 at 65. 
84 Steve Nyman and Aubrey Silberston, “The Ownership and Control of Industry” (1978) 30 Oxford Economic 
Papers at 1. 
85 Arthur Francis, “Families, Firms and Finance Capital: The Development of U.K Industrial Firms with 
Particular Reference to Their Ownership and Control” (1980) 14 Sociology 1. 
86 Maurice Zeitlin, n. 2. 
87 Philip H Burch, “The Managerial Revolution Reassessed” Lexington Books, 1972. 
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probably intend to hold the bloc for control particularly if he or members of his family 
are represented on the board of directors or senior management. But a bloc holder 
which is an insurance company, pension fund or investment trust fund may hold the 
bloc for portfolio purposes rather than control. Thus the identity of the largest bloc 
holder must be identified. More importantly, the actual situation in each company 
must be examined. 
 
This led Burch to undertake a longitudinal case-by-case study of the control 
patterns of the top 300 companies in America in the mid 1960s. Due to the 
deficiencies in the SEC corporate proxy statements and SEC’s Official Summary,88 
Burch chose to rely on major sources of stock ownership and control information such 
as Standard & Poor’s Corporation Records, Fortune, Forbes, Business Week, New 
York Times, Time and  Moody’s. 
 
Burch classified the top 300 industrials (ranked in terms of volume of sales) 
into “probably family-controlled”, “possibly family-controlled” and “probably 
management-controlled” using two conditions. A corporation was considered 
“probably family controlled” if approximately 4-5 per cent or more of the voting 
stock was held by a family, group of families, or some affluent individuals according 
to those sources. The second condition was that there has been either inside or outside 
                                                            
88 Proxy statements are deficient because they only list the stockholdings of current directors and their 
immediate families, and occasionally the holdings of big trusts, but failed to reveal the existence of sizable bloc 
held by other family and economic interests. As regards the SEC’s Official Summary, it is deficient in may 
ways, namely it reports the holdings of directors and substantial holders only when a sale or purchase 
transaction takes place so that shareholdings may go unrecorded for as many as three decades, preferential 
shareholdings are not reported, only those relatives of directors living in the same address is required to report 
their shareholdings such that the holdings of the Mellon family in Koppers Co had never been recorded in the 
list, and only shareholdings of more than 10 per cent are recorded, leaving out those who may wield substantial 
control through shareholdings of less than 10 per cent, see Philip H Burch, n 87 at 21-25.  
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representation (or both) on the part of the family on the board of directors of a 
company over an extended period of time.89 
 
Taking into account the large privately owned firms, Burch found that of the 
top 300 industrials, 44.7 per cent are “probably family-controlled”, 15.3 per cent 
possibly “family-controlled” and 40 per cent “probably management controlled”.90 It 
was further found that the control pattern was influenced by region and line of 
economic activity rather than age.91  
 
Burch thus summarized that: 92 
 
“From the data assembled here and elsewhere (such as the T.N.E.C study), it would 
appear that while there has been a definite trend toward managerial control of big 
business over the years, the magnitude of this shift in economic activity has generally 
been overstated.” 
 
Burch opined that “America’s managerial revolution is still obviously far from 
complete”.93 Using the T.N.E.C’s data and his own, Burch concluded that the shift towards 
the professional form of managerial control occurred at a rate of roughly three to five per cent 
a decade, which many would argue is fairly slow.94 Burch re-examined Larner’s 128 
“management-controlled” companies and argued that approximately 17 per cent of them were 
                                                            
89 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 20-30. 
90 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 70. 
91 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 75. It was found that New York metropolitan area-based corporations are most likely 
management controlled, than the less urbanized states of the mid-west where 80 per cent of the corporations are 
family-controlled. In terms of line of business, most of the big electrical companies were management 
controlled as were the aircraft and government defense contract concerns. Family controlled firms are very 
strong in the textile and apparel and food and beverage lines, see Philip H Burch, n 87 at 73-75. 
92 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 102. 
93 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 103. 
94 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 104. 
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actually family dominated firms while another 20 per cent showed signs of being “possibly 
family controlled”.95 
 
C] Arthur Francis, Steve Nyman and Aubrey Silberston: The Oxford Growth of Firms 
Study  
 
In 1975, a group of researchers examined U.K’s top 250 industrials (in terms 
of net assets) using three criteria96 and found that 56.25 per cent of the firms were 
owner controlled.97 Steve Nyman and Aubrey Silberston thus concluded that: 98 
 
“Thus the first component of the beliefs held by managerial theorists such as 
Galbraith and Marris-that control of large corporations is by and large not in the 
hands of proprietary interests-is not true for the U.K….One interesting point to note is 
the relative lack of ownership by financial institutions. Only 9 cases were found, 4 of 
these being holdings of between 5 and 10 per cent by the Prudential Assurance 
Company. This is a very different situation from the U.S where Chevalier found 15½ 
per cent of his companies to be controlled by financial institutions: our figure is 4 per 
cent.” 
 
Following on, they opined that “there is little evidence to show conclusively 
that management control of British industry is increasing. If anything the tendency 
                                                            
95 Philip H Burch, n 87 at 106. 
96 The three criteria were (i) the percentage of votes held by a known individual, institution or cohesive group; 
(ii) the percentage of votes owned by the board of directors and their families; and (iii) the identity of the 
chairman and the managing director, and their relationship to the firm’s founder and his family, see Steve 
Nyman and Aubrey Silberston, n 84 at 11. 
97 Steve Nyman and Aubrey Silberston, n 84 at 12. Potential control is assumed to be present with a 
shareholding of more than five per cent. 
98 Steve Nyman and Aubrey Silberston, n 84 at 13. 
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may be the other way-towards a greater degree of ownership control, particularly by 
financial and other industrial interests”.99 
 
Thus Berle and Means’ hypothesis that where ownership is very diffuse, 
stockholders are generally passive and an impotent body, so that control lies in the 
hands of management forces has been ably disputed by Steven Nyman and Aubrey 
Silberston. The empirical evidence pointed toward ownership by financial and other 
industrial interests. 
 
Sociologist Arthur Francis in his study of the U.K economy postulated six 
stages of evolution of corporate control: 
 
Stage 1  Founder/group of families 
Stage 2  Family heir 
Stage 3  Non-family heir 
Stage 4  Control lost by family to industrial capital 
Stage 5  Professional management 
Stage 6  Finance capital 
 
Francis argued that the most likely transition from founding family control is 
control by other industrial owners or by financial institutions.100 He posited as 
follows: 101 
                                                            
99 Steve Nyman and Aubrey Silberston, n 84 at 14. 
100 Arthur Francis, n 85 at 6. For a detailed study on the domination of firms by finance capital, see the works of 
Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, “Who Rules the Corporations?” (1970) Part 1, 2 and 3, Socialist 
Revolution. Finance capital here refers to commercial and investment banks, insurance companies and other 
financial institutions. 
101 Arthur Francis, n 85 at 9. 
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“If we assume that industrial capitalists do perceive they have interests in 
common, and different from those of financial institutions, and if partly for this 
reason and partly through being in the business a long time there is some network 
of relationships between industrial capitalists it is reasonable to expect that they 
will be reluctant to let control of their firms out of the control of industrial 
capital..” 
 
Francis then undertook a longitudinal study of seven large UK companies and 
classified them under the various stages of growth outlined above.102 Out of the seven, 
four are still under family control. 
 
D] Maurice Zeitlin 
 
Zeitlin argued that sociologists should investigate inter-connections between 
corporations. Corporations may be “units in a class-controlled apparatus for 
appropriation; and the whole gamut of functionaries and owners of capital participate 
in varying degrees, and as members of the same social class, in its direction.103 The 
task of the sociologist is to discover whether identifiable families and other cohesive 
ownership interests continue to control the major corporations.104 To Zeitlin the 
managerial revolution is far from evident. 
 
Zeitlin cited a study by Don Villarejo, a graduate student at the University of 
Chicago, which concluded in 1961/62 that of the 232 corporations, “at least 126 
                                                            
102 Arthur Francis, n 85 at 16-23. 
103 Maurice Zeitlin, n 2 at 1079. 
104 John Scoot and Michael Hughes, “Ownership and Control in a Satellite Economy: A Discussion from 
Scottish data” (1976) 10:1 Sociology 21. 
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corporations” or 54 per cent, and perhaps as many as 141, or 61 per cent, were 
controlled by ownership interests.105 Villarejo attested that: 106 
 
“Perhaps the most obvious revelation contained in our table of large holdings is 
the fact that the propertied rich control a rather large number of corporations 
through extensive stockholdings. The Mellon family, the Dorrance family, 
Thomson family, du Ponts and Woodruffs…and Rockefeller, and a whole host of 
others representing concentrations of wealth and power which are, to say the 
least, awe-inspiring….” 
 
In addition, analyzing the same corporations that Berle and Means claimed 
were under management control, Lundberg found that “in most cases [the largest 
stockholding] families had themselves installed the management control or were 
among the directors, while several others were “authoritatively regarded in Wall 
Street as actually under the rule of J.P Morgan and Company”.107 
 
To lend further support for his thesis, Zeitlin quoted the National Resource 
Committee (N.R.C) study and the T.N.E.C study for the following findings: 
 
(a) N.R.C study which included 200 largest nonfinancial corporations 
and 50 largest banks, using accounts of corporation histories and 
information on the careers of key officers and directors and 
                                                            
105 Maurice Zeitlin, n 2 at 1084. 
106 Don Villarejo, “Stock Ownership and the Control of Corporations”, Radical Education Project. Ann Arbor, 
Mich. Reprint of articles in New University Thought (Autumn 1961 and Winter 1962) at 58. Larner had 
challenged Villarejo’s study on the ground that he had aggregated the stockholdings of directors, investment 
companies and insurance companies in each corporation without providing specific evidence, such as family or 
business relationships, to suggest a community of interests or to indicate a likelihood of either intragroup or 
intergroup co-operation. But Zeitlin countered that Larner himself did not present systemic evidence of the kind 
he required of Villarejo, see Maurice Zeitlin, n 2 at 1084. 
107 Maurice Zeitlin, n 2 at 1083. 
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primary interlocks between corporations revealed that “almost half 
of the 200 corporations and 16 banks were found to belong to eight 
different “interest groups” binding their constituent corporations 
together under a significant element of common control by wealthy 
families and/or financial associates and investment bankers”;108 
 
(b) Of the 43 industrial corporations classified as under “management 
control” by Berle and Means, the T.N.E.C study located “definite 
centres of control” in 15 of them whilst the N.R.C located such 
centres of control in 11 of them.109 
  
2.4 1999 GROUNDBREAKING STUDY BY RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL ON       
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD 
 
In 1999, a team of financial economists led by Professor Rafael La Porta set 
out to verify Berle and Means’ thesis of the widely held corporation as the epitome of 
the modern large corporation in the world. A survey of the ownership structures of the 
20 largest publicly traded firms in 27 richest economies was carried out using the 20 
per cent rule, ie corporations are widely held if they are not controlled by a controlling 
shareholder holding 20 per cent or more of the voting rights of a firm, either directly 
or indirectly. If they are not widely held, then they have an ultimate owner who can be 
classified into five types: (a) a family or an individual, (b) the State, (c) a widely held 
financial institution such as a bank or an insurance company, (d) a widely held 
                                                            
108 Maurice Zeitlin, n 2 at 1084. 
109 Maurice Zeitlin, n 2 at 1084. 
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corporation, or (e) miscellaneous, such as a co-operative, a voting trust, or a group 
with no single controlling investor.110 
 
On the 20 per cent definition of control, the results showed that 36 per cent of 
the firms in the world are widely held, 30 per cent are family controlled, 18 per cent 
are state-controlled and the remaining 15 per cent distributed in the residual 
categories. This, according to the researchers, amply refutes Berle and Means’ 
hypothesis of the widely held corporation as the predominant ownership structure in 
the world.111  
 
Alternatively, on the 10 per cent chain definition of control, only 24 per cent 
of the large companies in rich countries are widely held, 35 per cent are family-
controlled, 20 per cent are state-controlled and 21 per cent are in the residual 
categories.112 Among the medium firms, the world average incidence of dispersed 
ownership is 24 per cent, compared to 36 per cent for the large firms.113 However, it is 
to be observed that the study found that all 20 firms in the U.K, 18 out of 20 in Japan 
and 16 out of 20 in the U.S fit the widely held description. Thus it is often supposed 
that ownership concentration in the U.S and U.K are more diffuse than those of non-
U.S/U.K countries.114 
                                                            
110 Rafael La Porta et al, n 5 at 476. In addition to the 20 per cent rule, Rafael La Porta et al considered a second 
definition that relies on a chain of more than 10 per cent of voting rights. 
111 It is to be noted that Berle and Means never went quite so far as to assert the widely held corporation as the 
epitome in the worldstage. 
112 Rafael La Porta et al, n 5 at 496. 
113 Medium firms that those with market valuations above, or near the US$500 million mark, Rafael La Porta et 
al,  n 5 at 497. 
114 This seminal study formed the backbone of the legal origins thesis that common law countries with stronger 
investor protection laws than civil law countries have vibrant stock markets and dispersed ownership patterns 
because investors are more willing to purchase securities knowing that they will be protected by the law from 
expropriation by insiders. The legal origins thesis, particularly the anti-director rights index has been the subject 
of much criticism by comparatists and empiricists, see Mathias M Siems, “What Does Not Work in Comparing 
Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s Methodology” [2005] I.C.C.R Issue 7 300; Sofie Cools, “The 
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Such assertions led Clifford Holderness to debunk the myth of diffuse 
ownership in the U.S.115 Instead of solely relying on ownership data in the 20 largest 
firms of each country, Holderness hand collected US ownership data of 428 firms 
across a wide spectrum of firm sizes and age ranging from the largest with market 
capitalization of US$29 billion (Pepsico) to the smallest with market capitalization of 
US$1.8 million (Armatron International). For non-U.S firms, Holderness used the 
stock ownership databases of Faccio and Lang (2002) which encompasses 13 Western 
European countries and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) which encompasses 
nine East Asian countries, totaling 22 countries, making a study that is comparable in 
size and depth to Rafael La Porta’s.  
 
For the U.S firms, Holderness found that 96 per cent of the firms have 
shareholders that own at least per cent of the firm’s common stock. Three times as 
many firms have majority blockholders as have no blockholders. Blockholders own 
on average 39 per cent of the firm. To verify if U.S firms have more diffuse 
ownership structures than non-US firms, Holderness found that ownership 
concentration in the U.S is similar to what it is elsewhere, and on a country-by-
country basis, the U.S falls in the middle of the distribution. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers” 
(2005) 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 697; Udo Braendle, “Shareholder Protection in the USA and 
Germany-On the Fallacy of LLSV” available at <http;//www.bepress.com/gwp>; Priya P Lele and Mathias M 
Siems, “Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach” (2007) 7:1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 17; 
Mathias M Siems, “Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law” (2007) 52 Mcgill Law 
Journal 56; Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin, “Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A 
Case of Institutional Complementarity?” (2007) 41:4 Law & Society Review 865; Clifford G Holderness, “Do 
Differences in Legal protections Explain Differences in Ownership Concentration?” available at 
<http://ssrn.com.abstract=1104678>; and John Armour et al, “Shareholder Protection and Stock Market 
Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis available at 
<http:ssrn.com/abstract=1094355> 
115 Clifford G Holderness, n 4. 
58 | P a g e  
 
Rafael La Porta and Holderness’ study effectively debunked the myth of the 
widely held corporation, and called into question the research of Berle and Means and 
their followers.  
 
Nevertheless, Brian Cheffins tabulated four studies that appeared to show a 
widely dispersed ownership pattern:116 
 
Table 2: Studies Showing Widely Dispersed Ownership 
Authors (Publication 
Dates) 
Data (years) Sample Findings 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2001) 
1992 Random sample of 250 
quoted companies 
85% of sample 
companies lacked a 
shareholder owning 
25+% of the shares; the 
largest block, on 
average, was 15% 
Van der Elst (2003) 1994 1,333 publicly traded 
U.K companies 
25% of the companies 
lacked a shareholder 
owning 10+% of the 
shares, 68% lacked a 
shareholder owning 
25+% of the shares 
Faccio and Lang (2002) 1996 1,953 publicly traded 
U.K companies 
63% of the companies 
were widely held, ie   
they lacked a 
shareholder controlling 
at least 20% of the votes 
                                                            
116 Brian Cheffins, “Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed” Oxford University Press, 
2008. 
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ISS Europe et al (2007) Mid-2000s 20 “large size” publicly 
traded companies and 20 
recently listed 
companies 
15% of the “large size” 
companies and 45% of 
recently listed 
companies had a 
shareholder owning 
20+% of the shares 
Source: Brian Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed, 
Oxford University Press, 2008 
 
However, as noted above, in a widely held firm, even a five per cent ownership block 
can exert considerable pressure on management. A 10 per cent block would entitle the 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary meeting in most jurisdictions, which gives 
shareholders some indirect control over management.117 
 
In this chapter, it is sought to prove that: (a) the “Berle and Means 
corporation” does not exist in Singapore, (b) ownership structures are concentrated in 
Singapore’s top 100 companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX)118, 
and (c) ownership has not separated from control in the majority of these companies.  
 
2.5 STUDIES IN OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OF PUBLIC 
COMPANIES (INCLUDING LISTED COMPANIES) IN SINGAPORE 
 
                                                            
117 Examples of such instances are found in the boardroom tussles of Intera2000 Ltd, Isetan (Singapore) 
Limited, Pacific Internet and Yellow Pages (Singapore) Limited, see the details in Chew Heng Ching, Tan 
Chong Huat and Tan Lay Hong, “Casebook of Corporate Governance: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2009. 
118 These 100 companies comprise 86.02 per cent of the total market capitalization of the Exchange. 
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This part will examine two issues: (a) the extent of ownership concentration in 
the top 100 companies listed on the SGX in 2007-8; and (b) the extent of separation of 
ownership from control in these companies. 
 
A] Ownership Concentration  
 
To carry out an empirical study of ownership concentration119 in Singapore, 
2007-8 was selected as the base year, and the following tests were conducted on the 
top 100 companies listed on SGX by market capitalization: 
 
(a) the distribution of the number of shareholders and number of shares 
for the top 100 companies in 2007-8 and 67 companies that were in 
existence both in 2007-8 and 1998 based on net assets;120 
 
(b) the distribution of outstanding stock of the top 20 shareholders’ 
holdings of the top 100 companies in 2007-8, 67 companies that were 
in existence both in 2007-8 and 1998 based on net assets;121 
 
(c) the distribution of outstanding stock of the largest shareholder for the 
top 100 companies in 2007-8 and 67 companies that were in existence 
both in 2007-8 and 1998 based on net assets. 
 
The data were obtained from the soft copy of the annual reports of these 
companies that are located on the SGX website for the years 2007 and 2008. But for 
                                                            
119 Since one share carries one vote in Singapore, share concentration and vote concentration are in unity. 
120 The 67 companies were companies in the top 100 companies (2007-8) that were in existence in 1998.  
121 This test adopts P Sargant Florence’s and the T.N.E.C Study’s approach stated above. 
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the 1998 data, information is obtained from soft copies of the annual reports of these 
companies purchased from SGX and also collated from hard copies of the annual 
reports kept by the National Library. 
 
 B] Comparing Ownership Concentration for 2007-8 and 1998 
B.1] Data for 2007-8 
 
Figure 1: Number of Shareholders for 100 Companies (2007-8) 
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Figure 2: Number of Shares for all 100 Companies (2007-8) 
 
 
The two pie charts above represent the 2007-8 distribution of shareholdings. 
They show that for shareholdings of 1,000,001 and above, 2,561 shareholders held 
114,312,477,241 shares (figure 1 and 2), meaning that 0.19 per cent of the total 
number of shareholders held 90.68 per cent of the total number of shares whilst the 
category with the largest number of shareholders, ie shareholdings of 1,000 to 10,000 
comprise 774,171 shareholders (56.10 per cent) who held only 2.19 per cent of the 
total number of shares. This shows that ownership of the top 100 companies based on 
net assets is very concentrated.  
 
A comparison of the top 20 per cent of these companies with the bottom 20 
per cent of these companies showed that ownership concentration is more 
concentrated in the top 20 per cent of companies compared to the concentration at the 
bottom 20 per cent of companies. In the top 20 per cent of companies, the average 
number of shares held by each shareholder in the 1,000,001 and above category is 
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about 72 million (figure 4) whilst in the bottom 20 per cent of companies, the figure is 
26 million (figure 6). This shows that ownership is nearly three times more 
concentrated in the large companies than in the smaller companies. 
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Figure 4: Number of Shares for Top 20 Companies (2007-8) 
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Figure 6: Number of Shares for Bottom 20 Companies (2007-8) 
 
B.2 ] Data for 1998 
 
Next, a longitudinal study of the distribution of shareholdings for companies 
that were in existence in 1998 was conducted. It is found that of the 100 companies, 
67 were in existence in 1998. The pie charts for 1998 showed that in the category of 
1,000,001 and above shareholdings, 0.18 per cent (figure 7) of the total number of 
shareholders held 83.78 per cent (figure 8) of the total number of shares. This roughly 
showed that ownership concentration has become more concentrated in the last 10 







122 It is to be noted that 33 of the 100 companies came into existence after 1998 and the impact of their share 
concentration on the overall distribution for 2007-8 is unclear. 
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Figure 7: Number of Shareholders for 67 Companies (1998) 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of Shares for 67 Companies (1998) 
No. of shares for all 67 companies 




above Grand Total  
127,223,350 1,403,749,685
    
3,192,024,745  



















67 | P a g e  
 
In addition, the ownership concentration of the top 20 per cent of companies 
with the bottom 20 per cent of companies was compared. It is found that the top 20 
per cent of companies is twice as concentrated as the bottom 20 per cent. As 
compared to the figures in 2007-8, this again shows that ownership has become more 
concentrated for the top 20 per cent of the companies in the last 10 years. 
 










68 | P a g e  
 
Figure 10: Number of Shares for Top 20% Companies (1998) 










above Grand Total  
Nos of shares 




       
991,914,808  




Nos of shares 
per 




Figure 11: Number of Shareholders for Bottom 20% Companies (1998) 
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40,729                  4,234 138 
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Figure 12: Number of Shares for Bottom 20% Companies (1998) 









above Grand Total  
Nos of shares 26,689,996 127,404,873 206,785,449 1,904,645,007 2,265,525,325
Nos of shares 
per 
shareholder 
                         
948  
            
3,128  
               
48,839  
             
13,801,775  




B.3] The Shareholdings of the 20 Largest Shareholders and Largest Shareholder 
by Net Assets for 2007-8 






% of stock outstanding net assets< $0.5 billion $0.5b≤ net assets < $1b $1b≤ net assets< 10b $10b≤ net assets< 20b net assets ≥$20b Total
< 60% 0 0 2 0 0 2
60 ≤ x < 70% 2 1 1 1 0 5
70 ≤ x < 80% 3 3 3 0 0 9
80 ≤ x < 83% 2 3 3 1 0 9
83 ≤ x < 86% 3 3 1 0 0 7
86 ≤ x < 89% 8 3 3 0 0 14
89 ≤ x < 92% 4 5 3 1 0 13
92 ≤ x < 95% 4 0 11 1 1 17
95 ≤ x < 98% 2 1 6 1 1 11
≥ 98%  4 0 3 0 0 7
Total 32 19 36 5 2 94
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Table 4: Distribution of Largest Shareholder’s Shareholdings (2007-8) 
 
 
The medians in Table 3 and 4 showed that the size of shareholdings held by 
the 20 largest shareholders roughly correlates with the size of net assets of the 
companies, ie the higher the net assets, the bigger the medians of the shareholdings. 
The median of the 20 largest shareholders’ holdings is a whopping 89.17 per cent! 
The median for the largest shareholder’s holdings is 32.77 per cent. 
 
B.4] The Shareholdings of the 20 Largest Shareholders and Largest Shareholder by 
Net Assets for 1998 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Top 20 Shareholder’s Holdings (1998) 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of Largest Shareholder’s Holdings (1998) 





Comparing the figures for 1998 and 2007-8, it seems clear that the largest 
companies in 2007-8 have a higher concentration of shareholdings for its 20 largest 
shareholders (94.85 per cent-Table 3) than its 1998 counterparts (83.79 per cent-Table 
5). The median for the 20 largest shareholders’ holdings for 1998 is 86.51 per cent 
(Table 5). Compared to 89.17 per cent in 2007-8, this again proves that ownership 
concentration in 2007-8 is higher than in 1998. 
 
The average median of the size of the largest shareholder’s shareholdings for 
1998 and 2007-8 remains fairly constant at 30.01 per cent (Table 6) and 32.77 per 
cent (Table 4) respectively. As the next chapter, which discusses the legal 
development of early Singapore to-date shows, the ownership concentration of the 67 
companies that were in existence both in 1998 and 2007-8 became more concentrated 
even though the legal regime on the protection of minority shareholders between that 
period of 10 years had remained fairly constant. If the law is a constant, then I would 
argue that some factor(s) other than law is influencing the increased concentration of 
ownership in these firms. 
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In fact, the pattern of ownership concentration had remained generally 
concentrated in the last 40 years. This is evidenced by a 1963-4 study by Tay Watt 
Moi on vote concentration of the 20 largest shareholders of 66 public companies 
(including listed companies). The study showed that only 22.7 per cent of the total 66 
companies had vote concentration in the largest 20 shareholders of less than 50 per 
cent. Of those with 50 per cent and above vote concentration, most of them are in the 
90-100 per cent range.123 Twenty-two out of the 29 listed companies had more than 
50 per cent vote concentration in its largest 20 shareholders. The study further found 
that high vote concentration was characteristic of finance, manufacturing and trading 
firms. And these high vote concentrations are predominantly large companies and 
listed companies. 
 
C] Ownership Concentration By Industrial Sector 
C.1] The Shareholdings of the 20 Largest Shareholders and the Largest Shareholder 
for 2007-8 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Top 20 Shareholder’s Holdings By Industrial Sector (2007-8) 
Distribution of top 
20 shareholder's 
holdings  
           
  No of corporations in which the top 20 shareholder's holdings are in the 
indicated size class  
                                                            
123 Tay Watt Moi, “Ownership and Control of the Singapore Public Companies, (1940-1962)” University of 
Singapore, Department of Economics, 1963-64. Vote concentration was used instead of share concentration 
because it was quite common at that time to have one share carrying multiple voting rights. 
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< 60% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
60 ≤ x < 70% 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 5 
70 ≤ x < 80% 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 9 
80 ≤ x < 83% 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 9 
83 ≤ x < 86% 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 7 
86 ≤ x < 89% 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 14 
89 ≤ x < 92% 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 2 13 
92 ≤ x < 95% 4 3 0 3 0 0 1 3 0 3 17 
95 ≤ x < 98% 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 0 1 11 
≥ 98%  0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 
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  No of corporations in which the largest shareholder's holdings are in the 
indicated size class  












































































<5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 ≤ x < 10% 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
10 ≤ x < 20% 3 4 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 4 17 
20 ≤ x < 30% 3 1 2 3 1 1 5 2 0 3 21 
30 ≤ x < 40% 2 4 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 3 17 
40 ≤ x < 50% 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 3 11 
50 ≤ x < 60% 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 11 
60 ≤ x < 70% 2 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 9 
70 ≤ x < 80% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
80 ≤ x < 90% 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
≥ 90%  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The ownership concentration as measured by the top 20 shareholders’ 
holdings is lowest in the construction sector (77.13 per cent-Table 7) and highest in 
the agricultural sector (96.28 per cent-Table 7). The ownership concentration of the 
other sectors ranged between a narrow range of 85.12 per cent to 89.40 per cent.  The 
largest shareholder’s holding is lowest for the agricultural sector (23.53 per cent-
Table 8) and highest in the hotel/restaurant sector (56.40 per cent-Table 8). Overall 
across the sectors, the ownership concentration is generally high. 
 
D] Ownership Concentration Between Non Government-linked companies and 
Government-linked companies 
 
D.1]The Shareholdings of the 20 Largest Shareholders and the Largest Shareholder 
for 2007-8 
 
Table 9: Distribution of Top 20% Shareholder’s Holdings For Non Government-linked 
Companies and Government-linked Companies (2007-8) 
Distribution of top 20 
shareholder's holdings  
   
  No of corporations in which the top 20 shareholder's holdings 
are in the indicated size class  
% of stock outstanding Non-GLC GLC Total 
< 60% 1 1 2 
60 ≤ x < 70% 5 0 5 
70 ≤ x < 80% 8 1 9 
80 ≤ x < 83% 8 1 9 
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83 ≤ x < 86% 4 3 7 
86 ≤ x < 89% 11 3 14 
89 ≤ x < 92% 11 2 13 
92 ≤ x < 95% 9 8 17 
95 ≤ x < 98% 6 5 11 
≥ 98%  6 1 7 
Total 69 25 94 
Median 88.58% 92.14% 89.17% 
 
Table 10: Distribution of the Largest Shareholder’s Holdings For Non Government-
linked Companies and Government-linked Companies (2007-8) 
Distribution of largest 
shareholder's holdings 
   
  No of corporations in which the largest shareholder's holdings 
are in the indicated size class  
% of stock outstanding Non-GLC GLC Total 
<5% 0 0 0 
5 ≤ x <10% 1 0 1 
10 ≤ x < 20% 15 2 17 
20 ≤ x < 30% 16 5 21 
30 ≤ x < 40% 13 4 17 
40 ≤ x < 50% 7 4 11 
50 ≤ x < 60% 6 5 11 
60 ≤ x < 70% 8 1 9 
70 ≤ x < 80% 2 1 3 
80 ≤ x < 90% 1 3 4 
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≥ 90%  0 0 0 
Total 69 25 94 
Median 30.82% 48.88% 32.77% 
 
From Table 9 and 10, it can be seen that the ownership concentration for 
GLCs is higher than non GLCs. The median for the top 20 shareholder’s holdings for 
GLCs is 92.14 per cent (Table 9) compared to 88.58 per cent (Table 9) for non GLCs. 
The largest shareholder holds a median of 48.88 per cent (Table 10) of the shares for 
GLCs compared to 30.82 per cent (Table 10) for non GLCs. 
 
Thus, it is quite clearly shown that the Berle and Means’ corporation does not 
exist in Singapore, and that the ownership structure of the top 100 companies listed on 
SGX is highly concentrated. The focus will now move onto the next issue whether 
ownership has been separated from control in these companies. 
 
E] The Separation of Ownership from Control: Company-by-Company Study  
 
Following Zeitlin’s methodology, a case-by-case analysis was undertaken to 
ascertain whether ownership has separated from control in these 100 companies. In 
considering this question, four factors were examined: 
 
(a) the identity of the substantial shareholders, their families and associates and the 
percentage of outstanding stock they hold in the company; 
 
(b) whether the CEO or any other executive director is affiliated with any of the 
substantial shareholders; 
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(c) Whether any non-executive director is affiliated with any of the substantial 
shareholders; 
 
(d) The percentage of directors’ shareholdings in the company. 
 
The following is the distribution of the 100 companies by industry: 
 
Industry     Number of companies 
 
Agriculture     1 
Commerce     9  
Construction     3 
Finance      9 
Hotel/restaurants     5 
Manufacturing     18 
Multi-industries     14 
Properties      16 
Services      12 
Transport/storage/communications  13 
Total          100 
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The following classification of “control” is used: 124 
 
Majority  More than 50% of voting rights held by an individual and/or associates 
 
Minority  One individual and/or associates holding 30% to 50% of voting       
     rights  
 
Joint Minority-management controlled 
 
 One individual and/or associates holding 10% to 29% of voting rights 
and this minority interest is represented on the board 
Management controlled 
  
Ownership is widely dispersed so that no one individual or group of 
associates has a minority interest which is large enough to allow it to 
exert dominance over the company’s affairs. Specifically every 
shareholder or group holds less than 10% of the voting rights of the 
company. 
 
The 30 per cent benchmark is used as a cut-off for minority control because an 
individual or group of associates holding 30 per cent or more of the outstanding 
shares is obliged to make a takeover offer for the outstanding shares of the company 
except with the waiver of the Council, ie he is able to takeover all the outstanding 
                                                            
124 Following Berle and Means and Gordon, the definition of control means the power to change the 
management or the power to select the board of directors. 
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shares of the company.125 Shareholders holding less than 30 per cent of the 
outstanding shares are generally not in control of the company unless they or their 
nominees are represented on the board of directors. Their so-called control over the 
company comes from any pressure they may bring to bear on the board by their legal 
right to call for extraordinary general meetings.126 For this reason, it is believed that 
such persons would only enjoy joint control with the board of directors of the 
company. 
 
The results of the case-by-case study on the 100 companies classified by their 
control types are as follows (see Appendices I and II): 
 
E.1] Classification of Control in Singapore’s Top 100 Companies 
 












53 29 13 5 
 
The 100 companies are further divided into GLCs and non GLCs and their 
results are as follows: 
 
                                                            
125 Rule 14.1, The Singapore Code of Takeovers and Mergers. 
126 See sections 176 and 177 of the Companies Act, Cap.50 where members holding not less than 10 per cent of 
the total voting rights of the company may requisition for an extraordinary general meeting. 
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E. 2] Classification of Control in Singapore’s Top 100 companies: Non Government-
linked Companies 
 













38 24 9 3 
 
 
E.3] Classification of Control in Singapore’s Top 100 companies:Government-linked 
Companies 
 













15 5 4 2 
 
It is obvious that the predominant forms of control are the majority-controlled 
and minority controlled types. 53 out of the 100 companies are majority controlled 
whilst 29 are minority controlled. Nine are joint minority-management controlled 
while only three are management controlled. A deeper study of these companies also 
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revealed that ownership and control has not separated in these majority and minority 
controlled companies. The majority of companies are either state-owned or family-
owned, often with investments from investment funds, private equity investors or 
venture capitalists.  
 
Goh Chee Hiong’s study in 1963 revealed that from the years 1939 to 1962, 
the predominant form of control in a sample of colonial companies was the minority 
controlled type.127 This was followed closely by the majority controlled types. Table 
14 below sets out Goh’s findings. 
 
Table 14: Classification of Control of Singapore Companies, 1939-1962. 
Type of 
control/Year 
1939/40 1952/53 1957/58 1961/62 
Majority 3 10 11 11 
Minority 10 13 16 15 
Joint-management-
minority 
7 8 9 11 
Management 
controlled 
2 1 1 1 
Legal device 2 2 2 1 
Total 24 34 39 39 
 
Goh concluded that for a period of about 20 years (ie from 1939 to 1962), 
ownership and control in most companies under study have remained neither more 
                                                            
127 Goh Chee Hiong, “An Analysis of Large Shareholders”, University of Singapore, Department of Economics, 
1963-4. 
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separated or less separated. But it seemed that ownership and control have become 
less separated by 1961/62 than in any earlier year.  
 
It would appear from comparing Goh’s study with the present study that 
ownership has become more concentrated with the gravitation towards more majority 
controlled companies than minority controlled companies. The issues why ownership 
concentration is higher in the larger companies than the smaller companies in 2007-8, 
and why ownership has become even more concentrated in the last 40 years (from the 
time of Goh’s study) can be subjects of further research. But as a preliminary 
observation, ownership concentration could have become more condensed because of 
the higher premium that can obtain from a block purchase as the block purchaser can 
obtain the private benefits of control.128  
 
Table 15: Distribution of Directors’ Holdings in Top 100 Companies By Net Assets (2007-8) 
Distribution of 
directors' shareholdings 
      
  No of corporations in which directors' holdings are in 
the indicated size class  
    
% of shareholding owned 














< 1% 5 7 25 2 2 41 
                                                            
128 See Lucian Bebchuk’s rent-protection model of share ownership explained in John C Coffee, “The Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and The State in The Separation of Ownership from Control” (2001) 
111:1 The Yale Law Journal 1 at 5. In this respect, see the takeover saga of Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd where before the 
takeover, the stake of substantial shareholders amounted to 38.99 per cent in 1994 but after the takeover by the 
Far East Organization Ltd group was completed, the substantial shareholders held close to 85.90 per cent of the 
shares, see annual reports of Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd for 1994 and 1997. For the detailed story of the takeover saga, 
see Lan Luh Luh, “The Take-over Saga of Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd” (1999) 3 Asian Case Research Journal 169. 
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1 ≤ x < 5% 4 0 1 0 0 5 
5 ≤ x <10% 0 0 1 0 0 1 
10 ≤ x < 20% 1 1 1 1 0 4 
20 ≤ x < 30% 3 3 3 0 0 9 
30 ≤ x < 40% 7 3 2 0 0 12 
40 ≤ x < 50% 5 0 0 1 0 6 
50 ≤ x < 60% 4 1 3 0 0 8 
60 ≤ x < 70% 1 2 0 0 0 3 
70 ≤ x < 80% 0 0 1 0 0 1 
80 ≤ x < 90% 0 1 0 0 0 1 
≥ 90%  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 31 18 37 4 2 92 
Median 32.47% 20.76% 0.18% 9.02% 0.08% 6.80% 
 
 




           
  No of corporations in which directors' holdings are in the indicated size class  
% of shareholding 











































































< 1% 5 10 0 4 2 1 4 8 1 6 41 
1 ≤ x < 5% 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 5 
5 ≤ x <10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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10 ≤ x < 20% 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 
20 ≤ x < 30% 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 9 
30 ≤ x < 40% 2 1 1 3 2 0 0 1 0 2 12 
40 ≤ x < 50% 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 
50 ≤ x < 60% 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 8 
60 ≤ x < 70% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
70 ≤ x < 80% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
80 ≤ x < 90% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
≥ 90%  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
















































Table 17: Distribution of Directors’ Holdings in Non Government-linked Companies and 
Government-linked Companies (2007-8) 
Distribution of directors' 
shareholdings 
   
  No of corporations in which directors' 
holdings are in the indicated size class  
  
% of shareholding owned or 
controlled by BOD 
Non-GLC GLC Total 
< 1% 19 22 41 
1 ≤ x < 5% 4 1 5 
5 ≤ x <10% 1 0 1 
10 ≤ x < 20% 4 0 4 
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20 ≤ x < 30% 7 2 9 
30 ≤ x < 40% 12 0 12 
40 ≤ x < 50% 6 0 6 
50 ≤ x < 60% 8 0 8 
60 ≤ x < 70% 3 0 3 
70 ≤ x < 80% 1 0 1 
80 ≤ x < 90% 1 0 1 
≥ 90%  1 0 1 
Total 67 25 92 
Median 25.47% 0.10% 6.80% 
 
From Table 15, it can be seen that the directors’ shareholdings in the smaller 
companies (ie net assets of less than $0.5 billion) is higher at  32.47 per cent than in 
the largest companies (ie net assets more than $20 billion) at 0.08 per cent. It is 
surmised that the smaller companies with net assets less than $1 billion are probably 
the family firms where the family owners owned shares as well as take on executive 
positions in the company. The largest companies are probably conglomerates with 
passive owners or GLCs and professionally managed by directors who hold only 
small amounts of shares in the company. 
 
Again, family firms feature prominently in the property, construction, 
commerce and the hotel/restaurant sectors where the directors held substantial shares 
in the company (Table 16). From Table 17, it can be clearly seen that the directors’ 
shareholdings in non GLCs are much higher at 25.47 per cent than in the GLCs at 
0.10 per cent. This again shows that the majority of non GLcs is family-owned whilst 
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the GLCs are professionally managed where the directors’ hold only small amounts of 




This study is the first in the last 50 years to empirically examine the ownership 
concentration of Singapore companies. Corporate ownership is highly concentrated, 
and mainly owned by families, groups of families or interests groups and the 
Singapore government. Families held their wealth through private holding companies, 
which form companies that are publicly floated.129 Families actively exercise their 
controlling power in most of these companies even though many of these firms have 
engaged professional management in the day-to-day running of the firm.  Quite 
clearly, the majority of Singapore companies is still in stages 2 to 5 of Arthur Francis’ 
six stages of evolution of corporate control (assuming that he is correct that firms will 
follow this evolutionary path ineluctably) and the alleged Darwinian struggle for the 
widely dispersed firm, wholly controlled by managers, has yet or may never reach 
Singapore. Whether founder/owners or second generation leaders of firms will sell 
their stake to bring about a dispersed ownership structure is the subject of the 
following chapters.  
 
Overall, this thesis sought to cast serious doubts on the “law matters” theory 
whilst at the same time exploring the other factor(s) that could have infuenced 
concentrated ownership in family firms and GLCs such as culture, economic 
                                                            
129 The imputation system for taxation of dividends, see Philip N Pillai, “Company Law and Securities 
Regulation in Singapore”, Butterworths, 1987 at 133-134. 
88 | P a g e  
 
efficiency theories and politics. This author will argue that all these factor(s) can be 





























It is generally accepted that the ownership structure of Singapore’s largest 
companies is highly concentrated.130 This chapter seeks to impugn Rafael La Porta et 
al’s thesis that “law matters” in the determination of ownership and financial 
structures (hereinafter “LLSV) through: 131  
(a) firstly, examining the serious endogeneity problems in LLSV’s anti-director rights 
index;  
(b) secondly, by exposing its inherent fallacy which was caused by the failure to use a 
proper comparative law methodology; and 
(c) thirdly, by arguing that the empirical evidence on ownership structures around the 
world do not support the “law matters” thesis that strong investor protection laws 
will inevitably lead to dispersed ownership structures. 
 
Instead, it will be shown that the “law matters” thesis does not apply to East 
Asian countries where concentrated ownership structures prevail even in countries 
with strong investor protection laws. In the Singapore context, the concentrated 
ownership structure of Singapore companies, which are predominantly family-owned 
or state-owned, is better explained by path dependent theories, in particular, James 
Mahoney’s theory of self-reinforcing path dependence. The historical contingency 
that sets in motion the path of events culminating in concentrated ownership was the 
establishment of Singapore as a free port by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. The 
following series of events met in a “conjuncture” or a “critical juncture” with the 
                                                            
130 See Chapter 2 where this author has carried out an empirical analysis of the ownership concentration of 
Singapore’s top 100 companies between 1998 and 2008. The data is on hand with the author. 
131 Rafael La Porta et al, n 5 at 471. 
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inflow of immigrant labour from South China. These labour coolies worked 
strenuously for a better future with the hope of returning to China with newfound 
wealth and status. This gave rise to the corporate economy which in the early days 
was mainly composed of unregistered sole-proprietorships and partnerships 
established by the Chinese traders and entrepreneurs of those days. The process of 
capital accumulation by these entrepreneurs will be documented together with yet 
another “critical juncture” which was the influx of Western capital into the sterling 
and dollar companies caused by the rubber boom of the early 20th century. The 
evidence will show that it was not the law but the path dependent tendencies of socio-
economic factors that drove that process. Although it may be argued that Singapore 
could be an outlier, case studies on the U.S and the U.K context have similarly cast 
doubts on the validity of the “law matters” thesis. 
   
3.2 RAFAEL LA PORTA’S “LAW MATTERS”THESIS 
 
In their seminal paper on corporate ownership around the world, Rafael La 
Porta et al posited that the dispersion of ownership goes together with good 
shareholder protection, which enables controlling shareholders to divest at attractive 
prices.132 
 
In 1998, the same researchers constructed an anti-director rights index as a 
measure of shareholder protection (hereinafter “ADRI”).133 The legal regimes of 49 
                                                            
132 Rafael La Porta et al, n 5 at 496. The intuition is that where there are good shareholder protection laws, 
investors are willing to pay a higher price for the shares they buy. 
133 These rights comprise voting rights attached to shares, voting by proxy or mail, whether shares need to be 
locked up several days prior to a shareholder meeting, cumulative voting for directors, minority shareholders’ 
legal mechanisms against perceived oppression by directors and controlling shareholders, shareholders’ pre-
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countries were examined and divided into the common law tradition and civil law 
traditions, the latter originating from the French, German and Scandinavian genre. 
The ADRI of 49 countries was then regressed with dependent variables such as 
ownership concentration and size of equity markets. 
 
In respect of legal origins, the researchers found that common law countries 
afford the best legal protections to shareholders with an average score of 4 whilst 
French civil law countries the worst legal protections with a score of 2.33. The 
German civil law countries also scored 2.33 but Scandinavian civil law countries 
scored higher with a score of 3.134  
 
More importantly, the researchers reported that ownership concentration 
varies according to legal origins. The highest concentration is found in French civil 
law countries with a whopping 54 per cent, and the lowest concentration in German 
civil law countries at 34 per cent. Scandinavian countries are also relatively low, at 37 
per cent ownership concentration. Finally, common law countries are in the middle, 
with 43 per cent ownership concentration.  
 
Accordingly, it is posited that the high concentration of ownership in the 
French civil law countries is an adaptation to poor investor protection laws. Two 
reasons were proferred for this thesis: (a) large, or even dominant shareholders who 
monitor managers might need to own more capital, ceteris paribus, to exercise their 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
emptive right to new issues of shares, the percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting and lastly, mandatory dividends. 
134 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, “Law and Finance” at 
18-19, NBER Working Paper No. W5661. The paper can be purchased from SSRN at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7788>. The paper was published in (1998) 106 Journal of 
Political Economy 1113. 
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control rights and thus avoid being expropriated by the managers; and (b) when they 
are poorly protected small investors might be willing to buy corporate shares only at 
such low prices that make it unattractive for corporations to issue new shares to the 
public. Such low demand for shares would indirectly stimulate ownership 
concentration.135  
 
3.3 LATER STUDIES EXPANDING LLSV-THE ANTI-SELF DEALING 
INDEX AND SECURITIES LAWS 
 
LLSV was further refined by revising the ADRI to address the treatment of 
enabling provisions. In addition, the net of laws that matter for financial development 
was cast wider to include a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders 
against expropriating corporate insiders, ie the anti-self dealing index together with 
ex-ante and ex-post disclosures of such transactions under securities laws and 
corporate laws.136 It is to be noted that henceforth later studies have shifted the focus 
from ownership concentration to capital market development. The study concluded 
that both the anti-self dealing index and disclosure requirements matter for the 
development of stock markets.137  
 
In “What works in Securities Laws?”, the same researchers found little 
evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets but strong evidence that laws 
                                                            
135 Rafael La Porta et al, n 134 at 28. 
136 Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing” paper available at SSRN at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=864645>, published in (2008) 88:3 Journal of Financial 
Economic 425.   
137 Incidentally, the study found that the anti-self dealing index is more robust predictor than the ADRI for the 
development of stock markets, indicating that both disclosure and the power to enforce contracts through private 
litigation are more important than shareholder rights in the development of stock markets. 
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mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules 
benefit stock market development.138 
 
The researchers reiterate that the economic consequences of legal origins are 
pervasive. Compared with French civil law countries, the common law family of 
countries is associated with (a) better investor protection, which in turn is associated 
with improved financial development, better access to finance and higher ownership 
dispersion; (b) lighter government ownership and regulation, which in turn is 
associated with less corruption, better functioning labour markets and smaller 
unofficial economies; and (c) less formalized and more independent judicial systems, 
which in turn is associated with more secure property rights and better contract 
enforcement.139  
 
However, this thesis will not focus on law and stock market development but 
will rather test the “law matters” thesis in respect to the formation of ownership 
structures, ie whether law or other factors was the driver of the formation of capital 
and companies in early 19th century Singapore to the present. A fortiori, if the law did 
not drive capital and ownership formation, then it cannot be a cause of the ownership 
concentration/dispersion in Singapore companies.140  
 
At this stage, it can be seen that the definition of “law” in LLSV (which only 
covered the black letter laws) had taken on an expanded meaning of “legal origin” in 
                                                            
138 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “What Works in Securities Laws?” (2006) 
61:1 Journal of Finance 1. 
139 Rafael  La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins”, paper available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=102808>, published in (2008) 
46:2 Journal of Economic Literature 285. 
140 Brian Cheffins investigated why ownership structures are dispersed in U.K through the “sell” and “buy” side 
of securities trading in his latest book, see Brian Cheffins, n 116. 
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these later studies. The latter, embodies a board conception of law covering a legal 
system’s historical background and development; its predominant and characteristics 
mode of thought in legal matters; distinctive institutions such as judge-made law in 
common law countries versus legislative codes in civil law countries; the kind of legal 
sources it acknowledges and the way it handles them and its ideology.141 In fact, these 
later studies on legal origin have obscured the original “law matters” thesis (ie the six 
sub-indices of shareholder protection) to an extent that its significance has been lost. 
In effect, these studies ironically illustrate that there are many other broader 
determinants of financial development such as judicial independence, government 
regulation and even endowments;142 
 
3.4 DEBUNKING THE “LAW MATTERS” THESIS 
 
A] Do strong investor protection law (ie “good law”) countries only support 
dispersed ownership structures? Checking the Empirical Evidence 
 
                                                            
141 Rafael La Porta et al, n139 at 4 (SSRN paper). 
142 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt and Ross Levine, “Law, Endowments and Finance” (2003) 70 Journal 
of Financial Economics 137 where the authors found that the disease environment encountered by colonizers 
(whether settles or extractors) influences the formation of long lasting institutions that shape financial 
development explained more of the cross-country variation in financial intermediary and stock market 
development than the law and finance theory. The endowments theory originates from Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation” (2001) 91:5 
American Economic Review 1369 where it is posited that settlers as opposed to plunderers stayed and brought 
their institutions with them into the colonies and these imported institutions had long-term beneficial effects on 
the security of property rights and economic growth. Curiously, the proxy used was settler mortality rates on the 
ground that settles stayed where their mortality was low and plundered where their mortality is high. But it is 
submitted that there are surely other more plausible reasons why Europeans settled rather than plundered as 
shown by the history of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia where the mortality rates are arguably high because 
they are situated near the Equator with its accompanying diseases like Malaria and yet the British and Dutch 
conquerors chose to settle and build successful colonial economies.    
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 Generally, studies on ownership structures around the world have reported that 
a variety of ownership structures can be found in most countries.143 The types of firms 




 Widely-held financial 




A.1] LLSV (sample size: 20 largest firms in 27 countries) 
Looking at the ownership structures of large publicly-traded firms, the LLSV 
data shows that one-half of 12 countries classified as having strong investor 
protection laws (ie “good law” country) has a preponderance of widely-held 
companies, of which three, namely, U.K, U.S and Japan have up to 80-100 per cent 
widely-held companies. At the medium-sized level, the companies exhibited 
ownership structures that are more nuanced, and the highest percentage of widely-
held firms was found to be 60 per cent with the exception of the U.S at 90 per cent.144  
 
In respect of countries classified as having weak investor protection laws (ie 
“bad law” country), four out of 15 countries have preponderance of widely-held 
                                                            
143 Rafael La Porta et al n 5, Stijin Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry H.P Lang, “The Separation of 
Onwership and Control in East Asian Corporations”, (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 81 and Mara 
Faccio and Larry H.P Lang, “The Ultimate Onwership of Western European Corporations” (2002) 65 Journal of 
Financial Economics 365. 
144 Rafael La Porta et al n 5 at 492. Ownership was measured at the 20% cutoff  level. 
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companies, but only at the 60 per cent level for large publicly-traded firms. For the 
medium-sized firms, only Switzerland was found to have an equal number of widely-
held firms and family-owned firms.145 Family ownership featured strongly in these 
medium-sized firms. So, conclude LLSV that strong investor protection laws support 
dispersed ownership corporate structures. 
 
A.2] Faccio and Lang (sample size: 5,232 firms in 13 Western European 
countries) 
 
Faccio and Lang’s study of ownership data of 5,232 listed firms in 13 Western 
European countries reported that widely-held firms are especially important in the 
U.K and Ireland while family firms are mostly found in continental Europe. On the 
whole, 36.93 per cent of the sample companies are widely-held while 44.29 per cent 
are under family control. It was further found that mostly financial and large firms are 
widely-held whilst non-financial and small firms are mostly family-controlled.146  
 
Widely-held firms comprise 63.08 per cent of U.K firms and 62.32 per cent of 
Irish firms. Ostensibly, U.K and Ireland, being common law countries would have 
strong investor protection laws. In continental Europe, the highest percentages of 
widely-held firms are found in the Scandinavia countries but at a lower percentage 
than the U.K and Ireland (Sweden 39.18 per cent, Norway 36.77 per cent and Finland 
28.68 per cent). The lowest percentages of widely-held firms are in Germany (10.37 
per cent), Austria (11.11 per cent) and Italy (12.98 per cent).147 
                                                            
145 Rafael La Porta et al n 5 at 494. Ownership was measured at the 20% cutoff  level. 
146 Mara Faccio et al n 143 at 366. Ownership was measured at the 20% cutoff  level. 
147 Mara Faccio et al n 143 at 378. Ownership was measured at the 20% cutoff level. 
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Family firms in these 13 countries are in the reverse position. U.K and Ireland 
have the lowest percentages at 23.68 per cent and 24.63 per cent respectively. Family 
firms comprise 38.55 per cent in Norway, 46.94 per cent in Sweden, 48.13 per cent in 
Switzerland and 48.84 per cent in Finland. In all other Western European country, 
family firms dominate.148 
 
A.3] Claessens, Djankov and Lang (sample size: 2,980 firms in 9 East Asian 
countries) 
 
In these nine East Asian countries, pyramids and cross-holdings are commonly 
found in firms, where voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights. For all 
companies where the largest control holder has at least 5 per cent of the vote, Thai 
firms displayed the highest concentration of cash-flow rights at 32.84 per cent on 
average, followed by Indonesian firms at 25.61 per cent and Hong Kong companies at 
24.30 per cent.  Japanese and Korean firms have the least concentration of ownership 
rights at 6.9 per cent and 13.96 per cent respectively.149 In respect of control rights, a 
similar pattern ensues. Thai and Indonesian firms have the highest concentration at 
35.25 per cent and 33.68 per cent respectively, followed by Malaysian and Hong 
Kong firms at 28.32 per cent and 28.08 per cent respectively. The least concentration 
of control rights is found is Japan (10.33 per cent), Korea (17.78 per cent) and Taiwan 
(18.69 per cent) respectively.150 
 
                                                            
148 Mara Faccio et al n 143 at 378. Ownership was measured at the 20% cutoff level. 
149 Claessens et al n 143 at 99.  
150 Claessens et al n 143 at 99. 
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At first cut, Faccio and Claessens’ studies on the Western European countries 
and East Asian countries appear to support the “law matters” thesis. In Faccio’s study, 
U.K and Ireland, being “good law” countries have the highest percentages of widely-
held firms. In contrast, Germany, Austria and Italy, being “bad law” countries have 
the least percentages of widely-held firms.151 But Claessens’ study on ownership 
structures in nine East Asian countries turns the “law matters” thesis on its head. 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, being “good law” countries, displayed 
concentrated ownership structures which are mostly family-owned and controlled.152 
So where does the empirical evidence point to?  
 
Firstly, the “law matters” thesis appears to be supported in Western countries 
but not in East Asian countries where family-owned and controlled firms prevail. So, 
the question arises whether there are some attributes of family-owned and controlled 
firms that cut-down the “law matters” thesis, such as culture or other path dependent 
theories? This question will be discussed in chapter 4. So the interim conclusion to be 
reached at this stage is that the “law matters” thesis cannot be universally applied to 
every country.  
 
Secondly, Dan Puchniak’s Ph.D thesis on the Japanese lifetime employment as 
a corporate governance tool to achieve efficiency in Japanese firms, found that 
contrary to LLSV’s classification of Japan as a “good law” country, the opposite is 
true. In fact, post-war Japanese corporate governance is extremely weak on investor 
                                                            
151 Rafael La Porta et al n 134 at 1137 denoted 2.33 in respect of antidirector rights for these countries. 
152 In “Law and Finance”, Rafael La Porta et al n 134, these countries were given a score of 4 in respect of 
antidirector rights. 
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protection.153 In other words, a “bad law” country can support dispersed ownership 
structures as well. This again turns the “law matters” thesis on its head.  
 
B] Other Reasons for Dispersed Ownership 
 
Thirdly, Brian Cheffins and John Coffee have identified other reasons to be 
the cause of the dispersed ownership structures found in the U.K and U.S 
respectively. 
 
B.1] The United Kingdom 
 
Cheffins rebuted the “law matters” thesis by undertaking a historical survey of 
the development of corporate law vis-à-vis the evolution of the widely dispersed 
corporation in the U.K. He suggested that the widely dispersed corporation evolved 
into existence probably by the mid 20th century, but definitely by the mid to late 
1980s.154 However, the law had little to do with the evolution of the widely held 
corporation.  
 
Prior to 1950s, Britain’s legal system adopted a laissez-faire approach to the 
protection of investors in the stock market. Firstly, although there were certain 
safeguards for minority shareholders as early as 1929, English judges declared that 
they were reluctant to interfere in the internal business affairs of the corporation, 
preferring to reside the ultimate power to the majority shareholders. For instance, a 
conflict of interest transaction can be ratified by the shareholders, and the directors 
                                                            
153 Dan W Puchniak, “Rethinking Corporate Governance: Valuable Lessons from Japan’s Post-bubble Era”, 
Kyushu University, 2008. 
154 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 467-468. 
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who were potentially at risk were entitled to vote their shares on any such 
resolution.155 More importantly, the law could be relaxed by companies adopting 
exculpatory clauses in their corporate constitution. Secondly, minority shareholders’ 
action for oppression was not available in the first half of the 20th century. Derivative 
actions were also relatively uncommon and the statutory derivative action remedy was 
not adopted until 2007. Thirdly, insider dealing was unregulated and in fact quite an 
acceptable practice. Lastly, the regulation of business disclosure was lax by 
contemporary standards. 156 
 
If the widely dispersed firm became firmly established in the 1970s or 1980s, 
then the law could potentially have had an impact on its development as it became 
more complex and intricate from the late 1940 onwards. However, the key changes to 
shareholder protection laws such as insider dealing, applications to court for relief by 
oppressed shareholders and the statutory derivative actions came very late, in the last 
20 years of the century to the early part of this century and could not have had much 
of an impact.  
 
In addition, the London Stock Exchange was a self-regulatory organization 
and did not become a statute-based regulator until the mid-1980s. Rather it was the 
reputational capital of the financial intermediaries such as the merchant bankers in the 
City coupled with the London Stock Exchange’s integrity and stringent regulation that 
ensured that only high quality firms got listed on the Exchange. These alternative 
institutional safeguards were the determinants of the vibrant stock market that Britain 
                                                            
155 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 470. 
156 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 471. 
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boasts of, not its legal regime.157 Cheffins undertook a more complete evaluation of 
why ownership patterns became dispersed in UK in his recent book, Corporate 
Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed,158 wherein he explored the 
“sell” side of securities and the “buy” side of securities to show how ownership 
patterns in U.K became dispersed. 
 
B.2] The United States 
 
Coffee also tested the “law matters” thesis with respect to stock market 
development in the US context and concluded that the critical role of law was not that 
it fostered minority shareholders’ rights but rather that the common law world, unlike 
civil law countries is hospitable to private self-regulatory institutions, and private 
contracting through bonding and signaling measures contributed to stronger securities 
markets.159    
 
In short, in France and Germany, the state intervened incessantly in the 
development of the securities markets, either to protect the Paris Bourse’s monopoly 
in France or to favour the development of commercial banks in Germany. Hence, the 
securities markets were regulated into oblivion. In contrast, the U.S and U.K’s 
common law system and laissez-faire economy favoured a private sector that 
                                                            
157 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 472-476. 
158 Brian Cheffins, n 116. 
159 John C Coffee, n 128 at 9. For a study of the correlation between common law and economic growth, see 
“Paul G Mahoney, “The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right” (2001) 30 Journal of 
Legal Studies 503. Basically, Mahoney’s thesis postulated that the common law tradition produces better 
property rights and contract enforcement against government rent-seeking actions and this fostered economic 
growth. However, if the developing countries are considered alone, the correlation disappears. Hall and Soskice 
have shown that civil law countries enjoyed faster economic growth than common law economies in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and the two groups have roughly equivalent economic growths from mid-1970s to mid-
1980s.Although the position reversed from mid-19080s to later 1990s, the period of the LLSV study, GDP per 
head was still slightly higher, on average in the civil law countries, see Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin, n 114 
at 889. 
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innovated its securities markets through self-regulatory institutions and private 
contracting.160 The factors that drove the development of the U.S securities markets 
largely resemble those of the U.K; namely, the role of investment bankers in allaying 
investors’ fears and the function played by the New York Stock Exchange as a 
champion of investors’ interests by listing only high quality issuers, mandating 
disclosure standards on its listed firms and protecting shareholders through refusing to 
list nonvoting common stock.161 
 
Coffee further refuted the “law matters” thesis by invoking historical evidence 
which seem to suggest that legal developments have tended to follow, rather than 
precede economic change. In other words, “while markets can arise in the absence of 
strong, mandatory legal framework, they neither function optimally nor develop to 
their potential in the absence of mandatory law that seeks to mitigate the risks of 
crashes”.162 A “crash-then-law” cycle had characterized the history of securities 
markets. Citing the U.S’s experience of enacting the Securities Act of 1933, Coffee 
opined that the creation of the SEC gave public investors a public guardian to 
champion their rights and the prevention of fraud.163 In this regard, the US corporate 
governance era of the 1920s which appeared to be replayed in the Asian Financial 
crisis, showed that law was a consequence rather than a catalyst to the development of 
the securities markets. During the 1920s, holding companies and investment trust 
                                                            
160 John C Coffee, n 128 at 58-64. First-class merchant bankers such as J.P Morgan & Co had participated 
actively in bringing on public offerings, and whilst the laws were meager and judicial corruption did little to 
protect investor, the taking of a board seat by a J.P Morgan representative on the issuer’s board did much to 
allay the fears of investors of the risk of buying a lemon or against the risk of a takeover bid by an incoming 
bidder without the payment of a control premium. It was said that the presence of a J.P Morgan & Co 
representative on an issuer’s board added approximately 30 per cent to the value of the firms’ common stock 
equity, see John C Coffee, n 128 at 29-30. 
161 John C Coffee, n 128 at 26-39. 
162 John C Coffee, n 128 at 66. 
163 John C Coffee, n 128 at 68. The article reported that the Securities Act’s passage had led to greater pricing 
accuracy, see John C Coffee, n 128 at 66. 
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assembled vast pyramids in which the control rights and cash flow rights separated, 
particularly in the utility, railroad and entertainment industries. Following the 1929 
crash, Congress legislated the leveling of these pyramids.164  
 
To summarise, the empirical studies on ownership structures around the world 
show that: (a) “good law” countries may support both concentrated and dispersed 
ownership structures. Conversely, “bad law” countries may also support concentrated 
and dispersed ownership structures; (b) the “law matters” thesis does not apply in the 
East Asian context; (c) anecdotal studies by Brian Cheffins and John Coffee argued 
that other reasons than the law better explains the dispersed ownership structure in the 
U.K and U.S.  
 
In other words, the logical syllogism goes as follows: firstly, “good law” 
country supports dispersed ownership structures; but “bad law” country like Japan 
also supports dispersed ownership structures- so the “law matters” thesis is debunked. 
Secondly, looking at LLSV, the family of “good law” countries support a parity of 
dispersed and concentrated ownership structures- again “law matters” thesis is 
debunked.   Thirdly, anecdotal studies by Brian Cheffins and John Coffee have 
convincingly proven that “other reasons or factors” can better explain the dispersed 
ownership structure in the U.K and U.S. Fourthly, the “law matters” thesis must be 
qualified by firm size. In LLSV, dispersed ownership structure is found in only five 
out of 12 “good law” countries. With the excpetion of the U.S, widely-held firms 
comprise only about 60 per cent in the other four countries. The remaining firms were 
mostly family firms. Lastly, the “law matters” thesis is entirely irrelevant to the East 
                                                            
164 John C Coffee, n 128 at 70. 
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Asian context, where “good law” countries like Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia 
predominantly support the concentrated ownership structure in the guise of the 
family-owned firms. 
 
C] NOT Law but Ronald Gilson’s Controlling Shareholder’s Trade-off 
 
Ronald Gilson posited the controlling shareholder’s trade-off as an alternative 
explanation to the empirical evidence. On the comparative taxonomy front, control 
structures are commonly divided between the widely-held genre found in the U.K and 
U.S and the controlling shareholder genre found elsewhere. Sometimes, this is known 
as the “outsider” system versus the “insider” system.165 Professor Gilson finds such 
“coarse” classification to be wrong, although I would rather call it inaccurate. Instead, 
he proposed a more nuanced approach to classification of control structures by 
taxonomising (a) systems that support a diversity of shareholder distributions; and (b) 
systems that essentially support only controlling shareholder distributions.   
 
As an alternative to the “law matters” thesis, Professor Mark Roe 
hypothesized the “politics matter” thesis. Roe identified social democratic politics as 
the driving force towards concentrated ownership as was found in Germany. In 
contrast, America’s fear of concentrated political and economic power disintegrated 
the banking industry into small banks, investors into atomistic shareholders lacking 
the power to exercise supervision over the managers, leaving the market for corporate 
control and independent directors as checks on managerial powers.  
 
                                                            
165 Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, “Capital Markets and Corpoarte Control: A Study of France, Germany and 
the U.K” (1990) 5 Economic Policy 189. 
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However, the empirical evidence debunks both the “law matters” and “politics 
matters” thesis. Countries without any social democratic traditions support 
concentrated ownership structures as well, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Malaysia. These countries were former colonies of the U.K and have adopted the 
English common law system, including its corporate law regime and democratic 
institutions and norms; yet they predominantly support the concentrated ownership 
structure. Therefore, we conclude that “something else” is at work in these countries 
to support the concentrated ownership structure, which often has a controlling 
shareholder(s). Again, the “law matters” thesis is debunked on grounds that these 
three countries which share similar legal and political institutions as the U.K, which is 
the hotbed of the thesis, went the opposite way and displayed the concentrated 
ownership genre.  
 
Thus, Gilson, who explored a wider context than law and politics alone, 
surmised that:166 
“In the end, institutions are shaped by a form of corporate governance plate 
tectonics, in which the demands of current circumstances grind against the 
influence of initial conditions. Thus, a more complete explanation for the 
distribution of shareholdings must incorporate politics, law and efficiency, 
together with the serendipity of each country’s initial condition”. 
 
Gilson argued that the cause-effect exposited by the “law matters” thesis is not 
supported by the empirical evidence. Both Mexico (“bad law” country) and Sweden 
(“good law”) country have controlling shareholder systems with concentrated 
                                                            
166 Ronald Gilson, n 32 at 1644-1645. 
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ownership structures. In addition, he observed that controlling shareholder systems 
yielded different levels of private benefits of control. Mexican controlling 
shareholders purportedly expropriate more than ⅓ of the company’s value, whilst its 
Swedish counterpart only expropriate 1 per cent of the company’s value.167 
 
Furthermore, controlling shareholders come in different guise, some are 
family owners and some state owners. It is also observed that controlling shareholders 
leverage their control using various devices such as dual class stock, pyramids and 
cross-holdings. Noting that Sweden is an advanced economy and Mexico is also an 
economically successful country, it is clear that countries should not join the 
Darwinian race towards the widely-held ownership structure, as prescribed by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the panacea to the 1997-8 Asian 
financial crisis. As controlling shareholder structures have been stable structures in 
these countries for many decades, Arthur Francis’ seven stages of corporate evolution 
of family firms may not apply outside of U.K. Even so, Arthur Francis’ longtitudinal 
study found that four out of seven family firms remained under family control. Thus, 
the reality on the ground is that both the widely-held and controlling shareholder 
ownership structures can be stable, and none is more superior than the other.168 
 
Gilson argued that from the corporate governance’s perspective of controlling 
agency costs in firms, the controlling shareholder structure is an alternative corporate 
governance tool, which is more nuanced than the controversial independent 
                                                            
167 Ronald Gilson n 32 at 1649. 
168 In fact, each system adapts to features of the other system functionally to cope with changes in the economic 
circumstances, see Dan W Puchniak, “The Japanization of American Corporate Governance? Evidence of the 
Never-Ending History for Corporate Law” (2007) 9:1 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 7 and  Douglas G 
Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, “Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance” (2006) 154 U. 
Pa. L Review 1209.  
107 | P a g e  
 
directorship system and the blunt market for corporate control. The controlling 
shareholder’s trade-off, which has been explained in chapter 1, addresses both the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers and majority shareholders vis-à-
vis minority shareholders. Equilibra is obtained when benefits from the reduction in 
managerial agency costs exceed the detriment of the controlling shareholder’s 
extraction of private benefits. Seen in this broader perspective, the widely-held system 
and controlling shareholder system are not the end-points in the evolution of corporate 
forms but devices/tools developed by stakeholders to address agency problems in 
firms. Furthermore, the foregoing arguments have shown that law is not the prime 
driver of ownership structures. 
 
According to Gilson, the role of the law lies in minimizing the extraction of 
private benefits of control. So, “good law” countries lower the extraction of private 
benefits of control, and result in efficient controlling shareholder structures. On the 
other hand, “bad law” countries support inefficient controlling shareholder structures 
where the costs of private benefit extraction exceed the benefits of monitoring 
management. Thus, the taxonomic dichotomy should be between (a) “good law” 
countries that support a diversity of widely-held firms and efficient controlling 
shareholder structures; and (b) “bad law” countries that only support inefficient 
controlling shareholder strcutures.169 This dichotomy better explains the position of 
the U.S170 and Sweden, as both are “good law” countries that support both widely-
held and controlling shareholder structures. Thus, the “law matters” thesis, which puts 
“good law” countries with dispersed shareholder structures, and “bad law” countries 
                                                            
169 Ronald Gilson, n 32 at 1656-1657. 
170 Holderness in “The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States” applied regression techniques and 
concluded that 96 per cent of U.S public firms have blockholders and these blockholders in aggregate own an 
average of 39 per cent of the common stock, see n 4. 
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with controlling shareholder structures is debunked again by the case of Sweden and 
even the U.S itself. 
 
3.5 CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH LLSV AND ADRI 
A] Problems with Quantitative Analyses and the ADRI  
A.1] Cause-and-effect 
 
Firstly, one must be mindful that a statistical test showing correlations 
between an independent variable and a dependent variable does not establish a cause-
and-effect relationship between the predictor and response variable, though it may be 
good evidence of cause-and-effect if carried out in a controlled experiment in research 
on finance and economics. There could be other variables that are not in the 
regression model.171  
 
A.2] Illogical Results 
 
Firstly, the problem with quantitative studies such as LLSV is that they can be 
taken to illogical and absurd results such as was shown by West who examined 
whether legal origin influences success in the World Cup of Soccer!172 He found that 
a legal order influenced by French civilian tradition correlated with World Cup 
Success in a statistically significant way: 173 
 
                                                            
171 Michael H Kutner et al, “Applied Linear Statistical Models” McGraw-Hill International Edition, 2005 at 77. 
172 Mark West, “Legal Determinants of World Cup Success”, Discussion Paper No 009, University of Michigan, 
John M. Olin Centre for Law and Economics, 2002, online at 
<http://www.law.umich.edu/CENTERSANDPROGRAMS/OLIN/abstracts/discussionpapers/2002/west02-
009.pdf> 
173 Mark West, n 172 at 5. 
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“Perhaps teams from countries with systems based on the French model (such 
as 1998 champion France and 2002 champion Brazil) perform well due to the 
remaining vestiges of the Napoleonic Code that somehow remove discretion 
from coaches and managers in the same manner that the civil law system 
curtails judicial activism. Or maybe-just maybe-some other forces are at 
work”. 
 
A.3] Problems in Endogeneity and Consistent Coding of the ADRI 
 
Holger Spamann carried out an extensive study into the coding of the ADRI 
and found fundamental problems therein. Some of these conceptual problems can be 
summarized as follows: 
(a) Underspecification of the rules, i.e there are hardly any legal rules without 
exceptions, qualifications and varying nuances. For example, with respect to 
the variable of pre-emptive right, Hong Kong was coded as 1 because its laws 
require shareholders’ vote for new issue of shares except for pre-emptive 
issues. But Nigeria was coded 0 because its laws similarly require 
shareholders’ vote for new issues but with no exception for pre-emptive 
issues. This scoring is erroneous for two reasons: (i) in voting for new issues, 
shareholders in Nigeria could always state their choice to whom shares should 
be issued to174; and (ii) using pre-emptive rights as a measure of stronger 
shareholder protection is entirely incongruous since the top 20 companies 
surveyed were publicly listed companies, where pre-emptive rights are absent 
in the articles of association. Hence, to code Nigeria 0 is illogical.  
                                                            
174 Holger Spamann, “On the Insignificance And/Or Endogeneity of La Porta et al’s ‘Anti-director Rights Index’ 
Under Consistent Coding”, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301> 
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(b) Which rules to include? The ADRI did not distinguish law from practice; thus 
resulting in serious endogeneity problems. For instance, in Germany before 
2001, corporations were always allowed to solicit proxy voting. But 
commentators considered such a practice illegal until the courts in 1997 ruled 
in the Deutsche Telekom case that such practice was legal. Hence, the coding 
rule that Germany did not allow proxy voting before 1997 was clearly wrong. 
More importantly, the use of practice rather than the black letter law will be 
entirely useless to determining the effect of law on financial outcomes- for 
example, the coding for share blocking is mostly based on standard charter 
clauses (ie practice) rather than mandatory anti-blocking rules.175 In addition, 
serious conceptual problems arise with respect to circularity when practice is 
measured instead of the law in a study of the influence of law on practice.176 
Lastly, including stock exchange rules as part of the law is a problem as well 
because this would mire the outcome such that one cannot be sure whether law 
or private contracting (arising from stock exchange rulings) is the cause of the 
financial outcomes.177 
 
(c) For coding consistency, a choice has to be made between counting only 
mandatory rules, default rules or optional rules (ie specific enabling provisions 
or general enabling provisions) for each given variable, both within and across 
countries. For instance, U.S Delaware law’s specific enabling provisions and 
not default rules provide for pre-emptive rights and cumulative voting. Yet, it 
                                                            
175 Holger Spamann, n 174 at 31. 
176 Holger Spamann, n 174 at 13. 
177 Holger Spamann, n 174 at 13. LLSV explicitly excludes stock exchange rules but Djankov et al, n 136 
explicitly includes them. 
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is coded as 0 for pre-emptive rights and 1 for cumulative voting. Similarly, if 
optional rules are counted, then most countries in the world should have been 
coded as 1 for this variable, including the Scandinavian countries.178  
 
(d) LLSV utilized foreign lawyers in the coding process and this may cause 
endogeneity problems because different lawyers may understand the coding 
process differently and treat mandatory, default or optional rules in an 
inconsistent manner.179 
 
More importantly, Spamann’s regression results showed that the recoded 
ADRI predicts neither stock market size, nor ownership concentration, nor block or 
control premia.180 
  
B] Problems with the ADRI’s Treatment of Law 
B.1] Law is Dynamic as Opposed to Static 
  
The final objection to the ADRI is that it provides us only with a cross-
sectional view of the law as it stood, roughly, in the second half of the 1990s. As we 
all know, the law is never static, nor does it stand on its own, but rather has to be 
contextualized within the wider social, economic and political environment.181  
 
                                                            
178 Holger Spamann, n 174 at 6-8 and 35. 
179 Holger Spamann, n 174 at 19-21. 
180 Holger Spamann, n 174 at 55. It is, however, to be noted that Djankov’s ADRI (n 136) remained robustly 
significant in ownership regressions even after recoding. The two variables driving the significant results were 
the “shares not blocked/deposited” and “vote by mail”. However, these two variables were subject to serious 
endogeneity problems, see Holger Spamann, n 174 at 23-34. 
181 Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “The Development of Singapore Law: Historical and Social-Legal 
Perspectives”, Butterworths, 1990. 
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A longitudinal study of, inter alia, shareholder protection laws over the period 
1995-2005 for 20 countries was undertaken to identify a period of time when these 
countries were liberalizing their economies and strengthening shareholder protection 
laws was on their agenda.182 The empirical results showed no significant positive 
relationship between the various stock market indices and the shareholder protection 
index.183 There was no such link even across the English-law origin countries and 
developed countries, which have higher levels of shareholder protection laws 
compared to civil law countries and developing countries respectively. Whilst 
common law countries are ahead in legal innovation for shareholder protection, the 
civil law countries are catching up. The researchers concluded that the findings are 
compatible with the “institutional channel” explanation for legal origin.184 
 
A later study by Harvard academics appear to confirm that law is not 
exogenous to financial development.185 The study showed that decreases in the 
blockholding of companies occur more often in “good law” countries.186 However, 
another important variable in this equation is the extent of growth opportunities. It 
was found that decreases in blockholding among firms with poor growth opportunities 
are similar across countries with low or high investor protection, but decreases are 
particularly prevalent among firms with strong growth opportunities in countries with 
strong investor protection.187 The results can be summarized as follows: 188 
 
                                                            
182 John Armour et al, n 114. This would be a more accurate test to see if changes in shareholder protection laws 
have an impact on stock market development. 
183 John Armour et al, n 114 at 32. 
184 John Armour et al, n 114 at 38. 
185 C. Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood, “The Evolution of Corporate Ownership After IPO: The Impact of 
Investor Protection” (2008) available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018362> 
186 This indicates the extent of separation of ownership from control. 
187 C Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood, n 185 at 17. 
188 C Fritz Foley and Robin Greenwood, n 185 at 29. 
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“Ownership concentration of newly public firms is high and does not vary with the 
level of investor protection. In countries with strong investor protection, firms are 
more likely to experience decreases in the share of ownership of blockholders. Why? 
In these countries, firms with attractive growth opportunities are more likely to issue 
equity, diluting their blockholders in the process..” 
 
B.2] Modern Legal Systems-A Mixture of Laws and Influences 
 
Matthias M Siems has ably exposed the fallacy in LLSV’s simplistic 
classification of the legal systems of countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and 
Latin America into discrete categories of French, German, Scandinavian civil law and 
common law origins. For most of these countries, they have inherited a mixture of 
different influences and exhibit features dissimilar to those of Western Europe. For 
instance, legal traditions beyond the German and French had influenced Latvian and 
Lithuanian law, specifically both legal systems have been influenced in recent years 
by the Nordic countries, the U.S and the implementation of European directives. 
Similarly, Taiwan and China’s company law, though originally based on German and 
Japanese law, are now hybrids having been heavily influenced by U.S securities 
laws.189 
 
In addition, the LLSV’s classification of countries in Africa is particularly 
problematic as it failed to take into account the interaction of chthonic and Islamic 
traditions with the European legal traditions that were adopted by these countries 
                                                            
189 Mathias M Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, n 114 at 65-66. 
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through colonization or conquest.190 Lastly, LLSV treated the Latin American 
countries as being of French legal origin. Yet there are differences between the 
European “parent tradition” and its Latin American “offspring”. It has been said that 
the export of the Napoleonic Code had pernicious effects in French, Belgian, Dutch, 
Spanish and Portugese colonies that it did not have in France itself.191 As a result, the 
fact that the French legal family performs the worst is mostly a reflection of the Latin 
American countries performance. The Latin American countries’ poor performance 
appears to have been the result of the social and economic impacts of colonization 
rather than the transplantation of foreign laws.192  
 
Even the classification of the “parent” countries is problematic. The use of 
Roman law as a determinant of the civil law tradition is misleading as various traces 
of Roman law can be found in common law countries. What required proportion of 
“Roman law” would suffice to render a country as coming from a civil law tradition?  
 
Next, LLSV assumed that countries that adopted either the French or German 
civil codes would have identical codes with them. This is simply untrue as 
transplanted codes often have different structure, language and legal concepts.193 
Hence, LLSV’s classification of legal systems is clearly arbitrary and spurious. A 
leximetric approach to measuring shareholder protection laws over a period of time 
                                                            
190 Mathias M Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, n 114 at 68. In Islamic 
commercial law there are Islamic partnerships but no corporations because the concept of separate legal 
personality is unknown. It is thus spurious to try and measure shareholder protection laws in these countries.  
191 John Henry Merryman, “The French Deviation” (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 109 at 
116. 
192 Mathias M Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparartve Law, n 114 at 69. 
193 Mathias M Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative, n 114 at 71. 
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would then be a better gauge of the relative strengths of such laws in the common 
law-civil law dichotomy.194 
 
Lastly, comparative securities laws hardly fit the common law-civil law 
dichotomy. In fact, the US model of securities laws through codified regulation and 
disclosure has been adopted in civil law countries such as Europe, Japan and China.195   
 
B.3] ADRI through Proper Comparative Law Methodology 
 
Sofie Cools undertook a re-examination of the ADRI using proper 
comparative law methodology196 of the U.S, France and Belgium legal systems and 
found that the scores for France and Belgium had to be changed to 5 or 6 for France 
and 4 for Belgium.197 In contrast to LLSV’s thesis, Cools proferred an alternative 
thesis that what matters for ownership structure is the distribution of power in a 
corporation. In US, power resides the board and so founders do not need to retain 
substantial voting rights to wield control but instead will take board seats. Founders 
are hence more willing to dispose off their shares, leading to a dispersed ownership 
structure. In Europe however, the board is relatively weak and so founders needed to 
retain control through a concentrated ownership structure to avoid being expropriated 
by management.198  
 
                                                            
194 Priya P. Lele and Matthias M Siems, Shareholder protection: A Leximetric Approach, n 114. 
195 Mathias M Siems, What does not work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s 
Methodology, n 114 at 304. 
196 Proper comparative law methodology looks at the whole legal system of that particular country taking into 
account legislation, case law, legal culture, history and functionality.  
197 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers, n 114. 
198 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers, n 114 at 760. 
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Secondly, the ADRI is flawed because it is entirely U.S biased (ie the home 
biased problem) and has failed to consider “equivalent” shareholder protection law in 
the civil law countries.199 Not surprisingly, the US countries scored better than the 
civil law countries. Secondly, where the ADRI included procedural laws as another 
layer of shareholder protection, it becomes necessary to examine all aspects of civil 
procedure laws in order to make a fair assessment of how shareholder rights are 
protected.  Next, with respect to the index of criminal sanctions, LLSV’s reasoning is 
again flawed because “sanctions” for a criminal offence need to take into account the 
severity of the penalty meted out. Surely a minor or severe penalty should not be 
similarly scored as 1.200  
 
Thirdly, LLSV’s methodology failed to consider the test of functionality of 
different legal tools. Which legal instruments the U.S used to regulate a particular 
problem may find other legal solutions in other countries.201  For example, a 
consideration of case law would change the score for France and Belgium from zero 
to 1 with respect to the sub-index on cumulative voting or proportional 
representation.202 Basically, LLSV failed to understand the “law in context” because 
the legal system is a subsystem of the whole society and the comparative lawyer has 
to evaluate the legal rules in context of its particular history, social, cultural, political 
and economic developments. 
 
                                                            
199 Mathias M Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s 
Methodology, n 114 at 301. 
200 Mathias M Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s 
Methodology, n 114 at 302. 
201 Mathias M Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s 
Methodology, n 114 at 303. 
202 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers, n 114 at 717-720. 
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Fourthly, there is a fundamental problem with transplanting quantitative 
research and mathematical/economic modeling to comparative law research. Though 
assigning quantitative values appear attractive and logical at first sight, a closer 
analysis shows that it is flawed. For instance, regarding executive compensation, if 
exact compensation was to be reported in the prospectus, it was 1; if only the 
aggregate compensation was reported, it is 0.5; if there is no requirement, it was zero. 
This scoring system assumes that full disclosure of key director and officer’s 
compensation is a better or stronger rule than disclosure of aggregate compensation? 
This reasoning is flawed because: (i) such a classification is culturally-blind and 
erroneously apply a one-size-fits-all criteria to all the countries. Full disclosure may 
work well in U.S because Americans demand transparency but in Asian countries like 
Singapore, aggregate compensation works better because Asians are not comfortable 
disclosing their personal salaries;203 and (ii) scholarly research has shown that full 
disclosure has had pernicious effects on executive compensation as it has led to 
ratcheting of CEO compensation.204     
  
Fifthly, Pakistan’s overall score for the quality of disclosure rules was 
1+0.5+0+0.5+1+0.6/6=3.5/6=0.58333.205 This calculation is problematic because it 
assumes that all the proxies are of equal weightage? It could be argued that the 
delivery of a prospectus prior to an issue of securities is more important than the 
disclosure of material contracts, as more information needs to be disseminated to 
investors on a newcomer than an existing listed company which investors have 
                                                            
203 See interview by this author with Mr. Lim Chee Onn, ex-Minister and Chairman of Keppel Corporation Ltd 
in Chew Heng Ching et al, n 117 at 106.  However, the latest Code of Corporate Governance, 2012 has 
recommended exact disclosure of directors’ remuneration. 
204 James D Cox, “Fair Pay for Chief Executive Officers” Law and Class in America: Trends Since the Cold 
War, Chapter 6, NYU Press, 2006; Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 119. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=926369>  
205 See the data available at <http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/Securities_data.xls> 
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monitored for some time.206 On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain as a matter of 
law which investor protection law/regulation is more important than the others, in the 
sense of being better able to protect investors. Yet, to assign all the proxies an equal 




This chapter sought to cast serious doubts on the “law matters” thesis. First, it 
examines the empirical evidence on ownership structures around the world and found 
that “good law” countries support both the dispersed and concentrated ownership 
structures. At first cut, this evidence already casts aspersions on the “law matters” 
thesis which seemed to imply that “good law” countries only support dispersed 
ownership structures. On the other hand, “bad law” countries tend to support 
concentrated ownership structures, although the dispersed ownership structure was 
found in Japan (a “bad law” country).  
 
Furthermore, Brian Cheffins and John Coffee have ably argued that other 
factors, than the law, had caused the dispersed ownership structure in the U.K and the 
U.S respectively. On the other hand, Mark Roe posited that social democratic politics 
was the cause of the concentrated ownership structure in Germany. As regards the 
U.S, Mark Roe has argued that American politics and its fear of concentrated power, 
both politically and economically, have caused the dispersed ownership structure in 
the U.S.    
 
                                                            
206 Mathias M Siems, What does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s 
Methodology, n 114 at 305. 
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Secondly, extant studies have shown the ADRI to be seriously flawed in terms 




























4.1 THE “LAW MATTERS” THESIS REFUTED IN SINGAPORE  
 
This thesis will further debunk the “law matters” thesis by showing that path 
dependence rather than the law better explains Singapore’s concentrated ownership 
structures, focusing on family firms. Path dependence will show that a country’s 
initial social-economic and political conditions determined the ownership structures 
of its companies. In other words, “history matters”, and those historical contingencies 
set forth a sequence of events that determine the final outcome.  
 
The study will be confined to listed companies that are family owned or 
owned by interests groups but will not cover listed GLCs whose genesis is the subject 
of chapter 5 and 6. 
 
A] The Reception of English Law into Singapore 
 
The period between 1819 (the founding of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles) 
and 1826 (the date of the grant of the Second Charter of Justice) was one of legal 
chaos.207 The legitimacy of Raffles claiming the right of the English East India 
Company setting up a “factory” in Singapore was even more suspect, considering that 
there were disputes as to who was the rightful ruler of the Johor-Lingga empire.208 
                                                            
207 Andrew Phang, n 181 at 34. 
208 Singapore was part of this empire and there were two claimants to this empire, namely Abdul Rahman and 
his elder brother Tungku Husain, see G.W Bartholomew et al, “Sesquicentennial Chronological Tables of the 
Written Laws of The Republic of Singapore 1834-1984” 1987 Malaya Law Review at xix. The regulations 
purportedly issued by Raffles during this period were quite clearly ultra vires his powers and disputed by the 
Dutch (see xxii). 
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Thus, it was a historical contingency when Raffles established Singapore as a 
free port in 1819. This event can neither be predicted nor foreseen by anyone at 
that time. This historical contingency triggered a series of events that are path 
dependent. 
 
English law was finally received into the colony of Singapore in 1826 through 
the Second Charter of Justice dated 27 November 1826 through these words: “…to 
give and pass Judgment and Sentence according to Justice and Right”.209 As far as 
Company Law is concerned, the earliest statute to apply to Singapore was the Indian 
Act No 43 of 1850.210 This Act was repealed and replaced by Indian Act No. 10 of 
1866. The 1866 Act was superseded by the Straits Settlement Ordinance No. 5 of 
1889. The 1889 Companies Ordinance was repealed and replaced in 1915, 1923, 
1940, 1967, 1979, 1985 until it reached its modern form as Cap. 50.211 In addition, 
English company law was imported through section 5 of the Civil Law Ordinance 
1878.212 
 
B] Little or No Governing Law in Pre-independent Singapore (ie before 1965) 
 
                                                            
209 G.W Bartholomew, n 208 at xxviii. In R v Willans [(1858) 3 Kyshe Mag. App. 16], Maxwell R interpreted 
these words to mean the reception of English law into the Colony as it stood in 1826. However, Mohan Gopal 
has argued that English law had never been received in Singapore, see Mohan Gopal, “English Law in 
Singapore: The Reception that Never Was” [1983] 1 MLJ xxv. This contrary view is untenable and has been 
ably disputed by Andrew Phang in “English Law in Singapore: Precedent, Construction and Reality or ‘The 
Reception That Had to Be’” [1986] 2 MLJ civ. 
210 In 1833, under the Indian Charter Act of that year, the Governor General of India in Council was vested with 
legislative power over all the territories administered by the East India Company, namely, the Straits 
Settlements, and therefore Singapore, see G.W Bartholomew, n 191 at xxxix. 
211 G.W Bartholomew, n 208 at 34, 69, 88, 115, 153, 225. 
212 There is debate as to whether when a mercantile issue arises, the whole law of England was imported or only 
English mercantile law was imported into Singapore arising from contrasting cases of Seng Djit Hin v Nagurdas 
Purshotumdas & Co [1923] AC 444 and SST Sockalingam Chettiar v Shaik Sahied Bin Abdullah Bajerai [1933] 
SSLR 101. Further see Andrew Phang, n 181 for his analysis of these cases at 45-48. 
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The Second Charter of Justice provided for a Recorder for the Straits 
Settlement. The first Recorder Sir Thomas Claridge, became embroiled in disputes 
with his lay colleagues soon after his arrival, and was recalled to England on charges 
of insubordination in 1829.213 The East India Company was in financial difficulties 
and the administration of the colonies evolved into the hands of the Bengal 
Presidency, which brought about legal chaos of epic proportions. Governor Fullerton 
ruled that since the Recorder was recalled, no one was entitled to administer justice 
until a new charter was granted, and so he closed the courts and dismissed the court 
establishment. The mercantile community felt threatened as business came to a 
standstill.  A temporary court was opened by the First Assistant but closed down, and 
matters escalated to the extent that petitions were sent to the British Parliament. A 
second Recorder, Sir Benjamin Malkin, finally arrived on 12 February 1856. 214  
 
During the period of Indian administration, the mercantile community was 
generally dissatisfied with the administration of the law. Visits by the Recorders were  
infrequent and the judgment of the lay judges were of such poor quality that the press 
and European merchants agitated for a separate judge for Singapore.215 With such 
judicial upheaval that existed before 1867, it was unlikely that the “law” could be 
the selected institution that triggered the development of the corporate sector. 
 
In any case, early colonial judges were Europeans from England, trained in 
English legal norms and culture and hence, often took a “hands-off” approach to the 
                                                            
213 Kevin Y.L Tan, “Essays in Singapore Legal History” Marshall Cavendish Academic 2005 at 34. 
214 Kevin Y.L Tan, n 213 at 34-35. 
215 Kevin Y.L Tan, n 213 at 36. 
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operations of companies (if there were any) and the development of company law. 
During this period, the law afforded little protection to minority shareholders.216  
 
For example, the Indian Acts mentioned above that applied to Singapore, did 
not provide for a prospectus to be delivered to investors when subscribing for shares. 
The requirement for a prospectus only came vide the 1889 ordinance, but no liability 
attached to misleading and false statements made in the prospectus until the 
Companies Ordinance of 1923.217  
 
In terms of membership rights, the early Indian Acts of 1850, 1857 and 1886 
provided for the minimum level of shareholder protection against the directors; 
namely, holding of annual general meetings, the requisition of an extraordinary 
meeting by one-fifth of the members, the inspection of companies’ affairs by 
inspectors appointed by the local government or the company itself, accounts and 
balance sheets in prescribed form to be laid before the general meetings and the 
default adoption of Table A (in those days called Table B) by the companies.218  
 
In respect of conflicted transactions, a director of a company who is a 
shareholder of another company which has a contract or work done with the first-
mentioned company shall not vote with respect to the contract or work done, but he 
shall not vacate his office. Incidentally, Table B provided for staggered boards, thus 
entrenching the positions of directors. On the other hand, the company may by special 
resolution in general meeting remove a director before the expiration of his office- 
                                                            
216 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 469. 
217 See Indian Companies Acts 1850, 1857, 1866 and Straits Settlement Ordinance 1889 and 1923. 
218 See Indian Companies Act, n 217. 
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this appears to entrench directors. The minimum number of persons to form a 
company was seven until 1923.219  
 
These provisions were clearly very rudimentary rules for the protection of 
members and one has to look to the common law of breach of trust when suing errant 
directors under the investor unfriendly common law derivative actions regime. The 
culture of judicial laissez-faire that was prevalent in that era in England was imported 
into Singapore. Basically, the courts eschewed interfering into the internal affairs of 
the company, deferring to the majority shareholders’ rights to run the company in any 
way they deem fit unless minority shareholders’ rights are egregiously infringed.220 
The earliest Act with any semblance to the modern Companies Act was the 
Companies Ordinance of 1923. But even in that Act, there were no provisions for 
minority shareholder oppression actions because England until the second half of the 
20th century did not confer upon a minority shareholder such rights of actions.221 
 
C] Few Companies were Incorporated in Pre-independence Singapore 
 
Between 1850 and 1866, the registration of a joint stock company had to be 
procured through a petition to the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras or 
Bombay or from 1857, the Registrar appointed by the local government.222 It was no 
accident then that no companies were registered prior to 1881. The first company that 
                                                            
219 For example, section 6 of the 1889 Company Ordinance. 
220 An example of when the majority shareholders’ rights are curbed by the courts is when the majority wants to 
alter an article. It has been held that a member must vote bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole 
when altering an article, see Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656. Other than that, a member 
is free to vote as he pleases, and to consider his own personal interests first in the exercise of his membership 
rights. 
221 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 470. And basically Singapore lagged behind England in revising its laws. 
222 Section 11 of the Indian Companies Act, 1850. It is unlikely for small and medium size European companies 
and Chinese partnerships to spend the costs of presenting a petition to the Supreme Court of Judicature at 
Calcutta, Madras or Bombay.  
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was registered in Singapore was in 1881. In each year thereafter only a handful of two 
to three companies were registered with a spike of 15 companies registered in 1900.223 
The table below documents the relevant data: 
 
Table 18: Number of Companies Registered Between 1881 And 1950 
 
Period    Number of companies Registered 
1881-1891   19 
1892-1901   33 
1902-1911   193 
1912-1921   386 
1922-1931   458 
1932-1941   576 
1942-1950   811 
1881-1950   2,476 
Source: Accounting and Regulatory Authority of Singapore 
 
In addition, between the period 1894 and 1939, there had been only 10 
reported cases on company law disputes in the Straits Settlements.224 The hiatus of 
30 years between the first Indian Companies Act in 1850 and the registration of 
the first company in Singapore clearly showed a weak link between the “law” 
and corporate ownership. At that stage, Singapore could be classified as a “no-
                                                            
223 Records obtained from the Accounting and Companies Regulatory Authority, Singapore. Data on hand with 
the author. Partnerships and sole-proprietorships existed in unregistered forms and became registered entities 
after the enactment of Straits Settlement Ordinance No. 23 of 1940, which was the predecessor of the Business 
Names Act.  
224 CH Withers Payne, “The Malayan Digest”(1936) The Malayan Law Journal, and the Straits Settlement Law 
Reports from 1894-1939. 
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law” rather than a “bad law” country. The ownership structures were 
predominantly not of the concentrated genre but unregistered sole-
proprietorships or partnerships.225 If in corporate form, these businesses are likely 
to be private investments and were closely held because there was no stock market at 
that time.226 It is therefore argued that given there were no investor protection laws or 
weak shareholder protection laws at best, and there was no stock market in existence, 
there was no opportunity for ownership to become dispersed but it had to be closely-
held. But the closely-held or concentrated form was not the result of the law. It was 
the result of a stochastic choice made by the entrepreneurs of that time. At the 
“critical juncture” when the entrepreneurs had to choose what form they should 
use for their business vehicle, they chose the concentrated ownership 
structure.227 Choosing a concentrated ownership structure is like picking the 
first colour in the Polya urn experiment. The process is self-reinforcing and with 
increasing returns, it became progressively more difficult for ownership 
structures to take on other trajectories.  
 
The next chapter will show how Chinese culture reproduced the pattern of 
concentrated ownership. Furthermore, the utilitarian and functional explanations of 
                                                            
225 A.H.C Ward et al, “The Memoirs of Tan Kah Kee” Singapore University Press where philanthropist Tan Kah 
Kee narrated his personal business undertakings. 
226 Informal deals were struck around brokers in The Arcade, just as in the earlier times in the coffee houses of 
the City of London or Wall Street. Trading was primarily done on the tin and rubber industries. It was not until 
the rubber boom in 1910, the subsequent decline of 1912 and crash of 1929 that some 15 firms formalized 
themselves as the Singapore Stockbrokers Association in 1930 to regulate trading activities in the interests of 
the public, see speech by Mr. Ng Soo Peng, Chairman of the Stock Exchange and Mr. Hon Sui Sen, Minister of 
Finance at the opening of the Stock Exchange of Singapore. 
227 It is pertinent to note that the Chinese culture of keeping control of the business within the family is not the 
causa causans of concentrated ownership in Chinese family-owned firms. Choosing the concentrated ownership 
structure was entirely stochastic. The Chinese entrepreneurs could well have “selected” the dispersed model 
such as was seen in the rubber sterling companies formed by the Europeans. For example, the Tanjong Malim 
Rubber Co Ltd, with an authorized capital of £500,000 had purchased 20,400 acres in Selangor. It was floated 
with the assistance of the Belgian registered Societè Financière des Caoutchoucs (Socfin). The Belgian agency 
house applied for £100,000 worth of shares, underwrote the issue of £283,000 worth of shares and was 
appointed the company’s agents in Malaya, see J.H Drabble, “Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922: The Genesis of the 
Industry” Oxford University Press, 1973 at 65.  
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self-reinforcing path dependence can be used to succinctly demonstrate why 
concentrated ownership structures persist. Further facts will show that ownership of 
the companies did not become more dispersed even as Singapore developed a stronger 
legal framework for investor protection and a vibrant stock market after her 
independence in 1965. Again, this turns the “law matters” thesis on its head. Overall, 
the concentrated structures owes its origins to various “critical junctures” in history 
such as the establishment of Singapore as a free port in 1819, the influx of immigrant 
coolie labour from South China and the rise and fall of the rubber boom rather than  
corporate law. 
 
4.2 CHINESE CAPITAL IN THE FORMATION OF CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP-Choosing the concentrated form 
A] The Chinese Middlemen 
 
Raffles founded Singapore in part to create a free trade post in South-East 
Asia. Country traders setting up small agency houses in places where goods were to 
be sold, established a network of agents in India, Singapore, Batavia and China. 
European goods were either sold or bartered with good, specie or bills discounted at 
any of the four places mentioned in exchange for native produce like spices, pepper 
and gambier. However, the Europeans were unable to trade directly with the natives 
due to language and cultural barriers, and hence they found the Chinese to be a useful 
middleman in this exchange process.228  
 
                                                            
228 Lee Poh Ping, “Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore” Oxford University Press, 1978 at 14-15 
and Carl A Trocki, “Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910, Cornell University 
Press,1990. 
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On receiving a consignment, the European agent would seek a Chinese to 
dispose of all or part of his goods on a barter-cum-credit system where the Chinese 
could either exchange the goods with other native produce immediately or the agent 
would give the Chinese credit of three to six months. In turn, the Chinese would trade 
these goods with the natives who came to Singapore in their prahus/boats or at the 
market or bazaar established in Singapore.229 From this structure, a Chinese 
mercantile class emerged and numbered about 105 in 1873.230  
 
B] The Gambier and Pepper Society 
 
Before 1819, there was an indigenous settlement of old Chinese planters who 
cultivated the pepper and gambier plantations extensively.231 The system of plantation 
involved a financier, the pioneer planter and the workers who were paid wages by the 
pioneer. The pioneer planter often approached a financier (usually one of the 
merchants from the Hokkien speech group) for funding in return for pledging his 
crops on terms favourable to the latter.  Often times, the financier takes almost half of 
the crops and owned the monopoly to supply provisions to the pioneer. Labour could 
be found among the Chinese who came from Southern China by junk. 
 
Europeans paid little attention to gambier until 1835 because of tariff barriers 
in the West. Once the tariffs were removed, a brisk gambier trade developed with the 
                                                            
229 Lee Poh Ping, n 228 at 14-15 and Carl A Trocki, n 228 at 58. 
230 For an example of Singapore’s role as a middleman in the international rice trade between 1870-1939, see 
W.G Huff, “Bookkeeping, Barter, Money, Credit and Singapore’s International Rice Trade, 1870-1939” (1989) 
26 Explorations In Economic History 161. 
231 These Chinese apparently came from Rhio and Siam, see Lee Poh Ping, n 228 at 28. It has been said that 
these Teochew gambier and pepper farmers adopted the Kangchu system, see Carl A Trocki, n 228 at 64. The 
Kangchu was probably also a triad headman. Even in Singapore today, there exists street names with vestiges of 
this system such as Lim Chu Kang, Chao Chu Kang and Yeo Chu Kang. 
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West. Due to this growing Western demand, gambier planting expanded on a grand 
scale with leaders like Seah Eu Chin being a major force in the business.232 
 
C] Revenue Farmers 
 
The wealthy shopkeepers and merchant class belonged mainly to the Hokkien 
community. These merchants represented the top of the pyramids of middlemen and 
traders, trading with the Europeans extensively if they were the English-speaking 
Straits-born Chinese. At the same time, they were also the revenue farmers. 
 
Due to the shortage of administrative support from the authorities, Farquhar 
licensed four opium shops for which the government collected $395 per month. 
Similar arrangements were made for spirits and gambling. Though Raffles 
disapproved of this arrangement, it was continued when Crawford took over as it was 
felt that the only way to control gambling was not to outlaw it but establish a proper 
licensing system for it.  
 
By the 1840s, revenue farming contributed 40-50 per cent of the total local 
revenue. The revenue farmer was often a syndicate of kongsi shareholders, which 
existed as a crucial liaison between the laissez-faire colonial authorities and the self-
governing Chinese population. A network of farms spread throughout Johore, Riau 
and Melaka. These revenue farmers were some of the most prestigious members of 
                                                            
232 Carl A Trocki, “The Origins of the Kangchu System 1740-1860” (1976) 49 JMBRAS 132 at 141. 
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colonial society; they served as Justices of the Peace, municipal commissioners and 
legislative councilors, giving them legitimacy in the colonial power structure.233  
 
Stiff competition in the revenue farm sector forced many tax farmers to 
diversify into modern banking. Wee Kay Poh and Wee Kay Siang, partners in the 
1907-09 Singapore and affiliated farms were intimately involved in the establishment 
of the Kwong Aik Bank. Chee Swee Cheng, the first Chairman of the Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation in 1932, who also helped incorporate the Ho Hong 
Bank in 1913, was formerly a partner in the British North Borneo spirit and opium 
farm.234   
 
D] Development of the Banking Industry 
 
Whilst the large western banks mainly supplied capital to European 
businesses, the smaller ones like the Mercantile Bank relied almost entirely on Asian 
business. The Hong Kong Bank’s clientele in Singapore was 40 per cent Chinese in 
1920 and 60 per cent in 1960. The banks were lax in their credit policies and had 
made loans to customers based solely on their high standing in society, with 
disastrous consequences.235 Another channel of financing for Chinese enterprise came 
from the Chettiar networks (ie Indian moneylenders), who borrowed from the western 
banks at 6-7 per cent and lent at 15-23 per cent. 
                                                            
233 For a short account of the tussle between the colonial government and the revenue farmers, see Lee Poh Ping, 
n 228 at 167-181. At the same time, it was suspected that some of these revenue farmers were heads of Chinese 
secret societies, for an account of revenue farms’ involvement in the secret society uprisings in 19th century 
Siam and the Malay States, see Jennifer Cushman, “Revenue Farms and Secret Society Uprisings in 19th century 
Siam and the Malay States”, (1989b) 23 Review of Indonesian & Malayan Affairs 1. 
234 John Butcher and Howard Dick, “The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence 
of the Modern State in Southeast Asia” St Martin’s Press, 1993 at 98. 
235 See the case of Beng Hwat in Burma in Rajeswary Ampalayanar Brown, “Capital and Entrepreneurship in 
South-East Asia”, St Martin’s Press, 1994 at 158-159. 
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The period 1903-41 saw the emergence of the local Chinese banks, largely to 
serve the needs of the Chinese business community.236 Some of these Chinese banks 
were the Kwong Aik Bank, which failed in 1913 and the Sze Hai Tong Bank 
(incorporated in 1906 in Singapore) founded by the Teochew community. With strong 
cash reserves and prudent lending policies, the Sze Hai Tong Bank survived the 
financial crisis brought by the First World War, and existed from 1907 to 1972, when 
it was absorbed by the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (“OCBC”). Most 
importantly, however, were the three Chinese banks, namely the Chinese Commercial 
bank in 1912, the Ho Hong Bank in 1917 and the Oversea-Chinese bank in 1919, 
which were forced to amalgamate in 1932 to form the OCBC. The latter has survived 
up to this day as a stalwart of the banking sector in Singapore.237  
 
In fact, the Lee family’s equity holdings in OCBC had remained at 20 per 
cent, even to this day. Again, this proves that even as Singapore’s legal regime for 
investor protection improves significantly, it has not caused the Lee family to dilute 
its equity stake in OCBC, or brought about a dispersed ownership structure in OCBC. 
It will be argued later that the Lee family maintained its position as controlling 
shareholder for reasons of keeping control within the family, as part of the Chinese 
culture of preserving family wealth, and for economic efficiency reasons as well. 
 
The socio-economic developments in early Singapore threw the Chinese into 
the forefront of business. They were the scions of the business community, and many 
                                                            
236 One of the risks of early banking was the over-lending to directors and major shareholders. For example, Tan 
Kah Kee’s borrowings from the Chinese Commercial bank were sufficient to lead to a run on the bank in 1931, 
see RajeswaryAmpalayanar Brown, n 235 at 166. 
237 S.Y Lee, “The Development of Commercial Banking in Singapore and the States of Malaya” (1966) 11:1 
Malayan Economic Review 84 at 87-88 and Rajeswary Ampalayanar Brown, n 235 at 161. 
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Chinese operated their businesses through the family-owned firms. Up to this day, 
despite a vibrant stock market and strong investor protection laws, corporate 
ownership is still held in concentrated forms, either held by families or the state. Up 
to half of Singapore’s corporate sector remained in family hands.238 It is argued that 
the aforesaid survey of the initial conditions, ie the Chinese becoming the middle-
men for the European traders; and later becoming successful gambier and pepper 
farmers and revenue farmers; and eventually setting up family-owned banks which 
stochastically chose the concentrated form showed that initial conditions set forth a 
path dependent trajectory, that becomes difficult to be reversed. Again, not the law 
but path dependent conditions had caused the concentrated ownership form to emerge 
rather than the dispersed form. 
 
4.3 WESTERN CAPITAL INFUSION INTO TIN MINING AND RUBBER 
ESTATES- shows that the initial condition reproduced increasing returns 
and positive feedback 
A] Tin Mining 
 
When Western capital infused into the tin mining and rubber business, 
they also adopted the concentrated ownership form, with the exception of the 
sterling and dollar companies. Early tin mining in the Malay Peninsula was often 
financed by the wealthy Straits Settlement merchants. Under the system, there was the 
Chinese capitalist from the Straits Settlement who provided capital to the tin miner 
through the advancer who resided close to the tin miner.239 These advancers secured a 
                                                            
238 CGIO 
239 These rich Chinese capitalists included Yap Ah Loy, Loke Yew and Yeap Kwang Seng. Loke Yew was 
responsible for five-sixths of the total tin output in Negri Sembilan and two-thirds of the tin production of 
Selangor. It is to be noted that many of these Chinese advancers were also revenue farmers.  
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monopsonistic hold on the ore deposits in return for supplying capital and all 
provisions to the tin miner under a system called the labour system. The miners were 
often part of a kongsi that came to the Straits through the credit-ticketing system.240  
 
Early tin mining by the Chinese was extremely successful because the 
Malayan alluvial deposits, unlike the lode at Cornwall, could quite easily and cheaply 
be tested before mining operations were undertaken. In addition, these Chinese 
advancers and capitalists were often revenue farmers and could cross-subsidise their 
losses from tin mining from the handsome profits made from the opium, gambling 
and spirit farms. Thus, Western mining enterprises with their high costs structure 
could not compete with the Chinese.241  
 
Although Western enterprise could not compete with the Chinese in tin 
mining, they triumphed over the Chinese in tin smelting with their superior modern 
technology and technical skills. Western tin smelting enterprise could be said to be 
synonymous with the Straits Trading Company, which exists to this very day. 
  
Herman Muhlinghaus, a German by descent, who had worked with Volkart 
Brothers of Ceylon and West India for some time, started the business of tin-ore 
                                                            
240 Wang Tai Peng in his book, “The Origins of Chinese Kongsi”, Pelanduk Publications, 1994 opined that the 
Chinese Kongsi that emerged in South-East Asia in the 18th century, though rooted in partnership and 
brotherhood traditions, evolved from small partnerships, either in commerce or mining. They were called hui or 
union, and often had been misunderstood in early colonial days to be associated with the secret societies. Large 
huis were called kongsis, such as the Ngee Ann Kongsi in Singapore today, see Wang Tai Peng at 3-4. The 
credit ticketing system of labour  immigration is described in detail in Yip Yat Hoong, “The Development of the 
Tin Mining Industry of Malaya”, University of Malaya Press, 1969 at 89-94. For another account of tin mining 
in Malaya, see Wong Lin Ken, “The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914” The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 
1965. 
241 There were only 47 British Tin Mining companies registered in the Federated Malay States between 1882-
1900, and it is not certain if these companies started mining operations at all, see Yip Yat Hoong, n 240 at 98. 
Examples of Western tin mining enterprises established during this period were the Melbourne Tin-Mining 
Company, the Sandhurst Mining Company and the Larut Tin-Mining Company, Gopeng Mining Company, 
Société des Étains de Kinta and Malay States Tin Mining Company. 
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smelters and general merchants in Teluk Anson, a port in Perak to break the 
monosopny of the labour system by dealing directly with Chinese tin miners, and 
offering them immediate cash for their ore. As problems of finance became obvious, 
they obtained financing from the Chartered Bank of India.  
 
On 8 November 1887, this business was incorporated into a limited liability 
company with an initial capital of $150,000 divided into 1,500 shares of $100 each, 
and styled the Straits Trading Company. The original subscribers of the company 
included Messrs Samuel Gilfillan, W Adamson, HW Wood, James Miller and TE 
Earle.242 One would note that even the Europeans adopt the concentrated form in their 
businesses. The initial conditions set the stage for entrepreneurs to choose the 
concentrated form as part of increasing returns because the supporting institutions 
favoured the concentrated form. At that time, informal deals were struck by brokers in 
the Arcade, trading mainly in British rubber and tin companies. As there was no stock 
exchange until 1930, there was no opportunity for the dispersed form to arise. 
 
From the path dependence perspective, the “critical junctures” of the 
establishment of Singapore as a free port and the influx of Chinese immigrant labour 
through the credit ticketing system set in motion the development of the corporate 
sector where these immigrants slaved and saved enough to become revenue farmers. 
After accumulating their wealth from revenue farming, they ventured into tin mining 
and even the banking business. Though the Chinese dominated in the tin mining 
industry, they lost out to the Europeans in tin smelting. The likes of the Straits 
Trading Company were formed by the Europeans at that time.  
                                                            
242 Ong Theng Hong, “The Straits Trading Company 1887-1937” History Department, University of Malaya, 
1958. 
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It is argued that path dependence caused the promoters of the Straits Trading 
Company to select the concentrated ownership structure over the dispersed structure 
at that point in time. Between 1881 and 1891, there were 19 companies registered 
with the Registry of Companies. They chose the concentrated form because other 
entrepreneurs had also selected concentrated ownership, ie increasing returns and 
positive feedback. The practices of other entities, institutions and skills of the 
professional communities such as lawyers and accountants probably favoured 
concentrated ownership.243 As a result, the meeting of two concurrent sequences of 
events, namely the development of Chinese tin mining and the infusion of Western 
technology into tin smelting converge in the establishment of business entities that 
“selected” the concentrated ownership form.  
 
As alluvial deposits became exhausted, Chinese dominance in tin mining 
gradually lost out to Western capital and technology, particularly the gravel pump and 
bucket dredge. The high concentration in the industry led to domination by cartels, the 
largest of which was the Anglo-Oriental group. It was set up in 1925 by the London 
Tin Corporation, and quickly consolidated their position by owning mines in Malaya, 
Siam, Burma and Nigeria. Anglo-Oriental took stakes in at least 20 Western 
companies in Malaya in the 1920s. In 1930, Anglo-Oriental’s smelters Penpoll Tin 
Smelters, joined the Eastern Smelting Company and the Cornish Smelting Company 
to form the Consolidated Tin Smelters, the world’s largest tin smelting company. The 
horizontal and vertical integration amongst Western tin mining enterprises in the 
1930s were characterized by interlinking shareholdings and interlocking 
                                                            
243 Lucian A Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, n 29 called this phenomenon “complementaries”. 
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directorships244- again, the interlinking shareholdings evidenced the concentrated 
form rather than the dispersed form. Despite the existence of a rudimentary stock 
exchange at that time, the Western companies did not raise capital from the stock 
market but from private capital.    
 
 B] The Rubber Boom NOT the LawDrove Concentrated Ownership  
   
Table 19: Total Number of Registered Companies and Types of Businesses, 1916 
Total Number of Registered Companies and Types of Businesses, 1916 
 
Types of Businesses    Number of Registered Companies 
Rubber companies    21 
Insurance companies    32 
Banks      4 
Trading companies    11 
Shipping companies    5 
 
Source: Helmut G Callis, “Foreign Capital in South-East Asia” Arno Press, 1976 
 
Table 20: Outstanding Capital in Malaya, 1936 
Outstanding Capital in Malaya, 1936 
      Thousand £  Percentage of Total 
Rubber companies    55,271    52 
Tin-dredging companies   13,789    13 
Miscellaneous       9,719    9.1 
                                                            
244 Rajeswary Ampalayanar Brown, n 235 at 90. 
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Government debt outstanding   27,427    25.9 
Total Outstanding Capital   106,206   100 
Source: Helmut G Callis, “Foreign Capital in South-East Asia” Arno Press, 1976 
 
The composition of the types of businesses carried on by the registered 
companies in 1916 reflected the economic profile of Malaya at that time- mainly an 
entrepot trading centre, supported by the insurance companies and a major rubber 
producer. The 1936 data paints a similar picture.  
 
Unlike in tin mining where Western capital took a secondary role, British 
interests performed a pioneering role in the rubber industry. Briefly, the capitalization 
of the industry came from the sterling companies and dollar companies that were 
floated by agency houses in London, thereby raising capital from Britain for 
investment into the rubber industry in Malaysia and Singapore.245 The number of 
sterling and dollar companies established in 1909-1910 was as follows: 
 
Table 21: Number of Sterling and Dollar Companies, 1909-1910 
Number of Sterling and Dollar Companies, 1909-1910 
Year  Number of Sterling Companies  Number of Dollar Companies 
1909    65       16 
1910    80      23 
Source: J.H Drabble, Rubber in Malaya, 1876-1922, The Genesis of the Industry, Oxford University 
Press, 1973 at 64 and 66. 
 
                                                            
245 These companies had sometimes been styled the “free-standing company” by authors, see Mira Wilkins, 
“The Free-Standing Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct Investment” (1988) 
41:2 The Economic History Review 259. 
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The spate of sterling companies registered in the U.K followed the rise and fall 
of the rubber market. During the boom of 1909-1910, there were numerous flotations 
of sterling and dollar companies. In 1912, 206 large corporations held 453,000 acres 
of rubber estates. Dollar company shareholders were mainly Europeans resident in 
Asia. In 1923, the London-based Rubber Growers Association, formed in 1907 to 
represent sterling companies’ interest to the U.K government, had 295 corporate 
members in Malaya. The driving force behind the infusion of Western capital into 
Malaya was the agency houses.246 
 
Agency houses were essentially British merchant firms operating in Singapore 
and Penang, of which the principal ones were Guthrie and Co, Edward Boustead and 
Co, Harrisons and Crosfield and Barlows and Bro. Unlike the Chinese indigenous 
businesses, the sterling and dollar companies, which were floated with the help of the 
agency houses, took on the dispersed form. For example, the Tanjong Malim Rubber 
Co. Ltd was a company incorporated with an authorized capital of £500,000 and 
floated by the Belgian registered agency house. The agency house applied for 
£100,000 worth of shares and underwrote £283,000 worth of shares- this was 
arguably the dispersed form of ownership structure that the sterling companies 
adopted.247  But Chinese businesses held onto their concentrated ownership structures.  
 
In other words, the rubber boom was another “critical juncture”, but it could 
not break the ingrained mindset of the Chinese business to adopt the concentrated 
ownership form. If the same legal infrastructure supports both the concentrated form 
(used by the Chinese firms) and the dispersed form (used by the sterling and dollar 
                                                            
246 Rajeswary Ampalayanar Brown, n 235 at 101. 
247 J.H Drabble, “Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922: The Genesis of the Industry” Oxford University Press, 1973 at 
65.   
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companies), then something else other than the law was influencing ownership 
structure. The answer lies in path dependence. 
 
With the declaration of self-government in 1959, Western capital (or corporate 
ownership) gradually declined in Singapore viś-a-viś Chinese capital as shown by the 
following table: 
 
Table 22: Distribution of Ownership of Large Personal Shareholdings Among the 
Races 
  Distribution of Ownership of Large Personal Shareholdings Among the Races 
 
Year  1939-40  1952-53  1957-58  1961-62 
Race   
(a)    (b)  (a)       (b)   (a)     (b)  (a)     (b) 
Chinese 333   56.5  469    50.9  1,103 64.8  1,249 73 
European     252   42.7  441    47.9              561    33  427    25 
Other races 5         0.8  11        1.2     37      2.2  35        2 
Total  590    100  921     100  1,701 100  1,711  100 
 
Source: Goh Chee Hiong, “An Analysis of Large Shareholders”, University of Singapore,1963-64. 
  
From the path dependence viewpoint, the Chinese dominated the economy in 
the form of family businesses using concentrated ownership structures. The next 
chapter will show how informal institutions such as culture, in particular the Chinese 
culture of keeping control of businesses within the family, seeing the family business 
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as wealth to be inherited by their descendents; and economic efficiency theories 
explain the concentrated ownership structure of family businesses better than the law. 
 
Key:  (a) the number of shareholdings 
(b) the percentage of the total  
 
4.4 POST-INDEPENDENCE SINGAPORE: LAW AND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURES  
A] Post-independence Company Law 
 
Company Law in Singapore after independence in 1965 developed closely 
along the lines in the U.K and Australia. The statutory oppression protection provision 
of minority shareholders was adopted in the Companies Act of the 1970s.248 The 
regulation of directors’ fiduciary duties, honesty and reasonable diligence was based 
both on the Companies Act of 1970 and the common law.  The ghost of the traditional 
subjective approach to directors’ duties enunciated in Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance249, was only finally laid to rest in the mid-1990s in the cases of Daniels v 
Anderson250 and Re D’Jan of London251.  
 
The Singapore High Court took the opportunity to adopt these more stringent 
approaches to the regulation of directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence in the case 
of Lim Weng Kee v P.P.252 The statutory derivative action regime was instituted in 
                                                            
248 Section 216, Companies Act, 1970 Edition. 
249 [1925] Ch 407 (High Court, England) 
250 (1995) 16 ACSR 607, (Court of Appeal, New South Wales) 
251 [1994] 1 BCLC 561 (Chancery Division) 
252 [2002] 4 SLR 327 (High Court, Singapore) at paragraph 28 of the judgment. 
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1993253, but did not apply to listed companies for fear that unscrupulous people would 
make frivolous applications to harass companies and thereby attempt to manipulate 
the share price.254 On the other hand, the directors’ fiduciary duties continued to be 
governed by the common law, supplemented by sections 156, 157, 158, 162 and 163 
of the Companies Act, Cap 50. 
 
It is clear that post-independent Singapore is a “good law” country. Chapter 2 
has shown, by and large, that ownership structures of Singapore firms have remained 
concentrated, despite Singapore’s strengthening legal regime for protecting minority 
shareholders. If the “law matters” thesis is correct, then as Singapore gravitates 
toward a “good law” country, ownership structures should “shadow” the law and 
become more dispersed. Yet, many family firms that raised capital via IPOs remained 
concentrated structures. Even in the GLC sector, the divestment of state assets to 
deepen the stock exchange via listed GLCs in the 1990s, should have brought about a 
more dispersed ownership structure, but it has not.  
 
The following chapters will argue: (i) that the familiaristic Chinese culture has 
significantly influenced the management of Chinese family firms, such that their 
ownership structures mirror the distinctive Chinese trait and desire of keeping control 
within the family. It is part of Chinese culture that wealth should be preserved within 
the family, rather than sold to outsiders; (ii) that family firms favour concentrated 
ownership structures because of the efficiency gains to be obtained; and (iii) that 
                                                            
253 Companies (Amendment) Act, 1993 (No 31 of 1993). The statutory derivative action legislation is modeled 
along the Canadian legislation. 
254 The Steering Committee for Review of Companies Act, 2009 has recommended that the statutory derivative 
action under section 216A be extended to listed companies to harmonize the position, see Shareholders’ Rights 
and Meetings, Chapter 2, June 2011. A copy can be obtained at 
<http://www.acra.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/44B1B8C5-29D8-4DD8-A8FA-
7982DD5D5DOC/O/SCReportChpt2Shareholders.pdf> 
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politics and government policy are path dependent agents that set forth the trajectory 





This chapter introduces path dependent theory as an explanation for the 
concentrated ownership structures of Singapore family firms. It uses an in-depth 
analysis of Singapore’s socio-economic and legal history to show a path dependent 
pattern in the formation of ownership structures. Clearly, “history” rather than law 
matters in the formation of ownership structure. At the “critical juncture” of Raffles 
founding a free port in Singapore in 1819, followed by another “critical juncture” of 
the immigration of Chinese coolies from South China, and the building up of business 
sectors in pepper and gambier, pineapples and other cash crops by some of these 
coolies, the Chinese chose a concentrated ownership structure for their businesses. 
Even European business firms used the concentrated structure during the “critical 
juncture” of the rise of the rubber and tin mining in Malaya. The choice of the 













 This chapter continues with the exposition of self-reinforcing path dependence 
as the alternative explanation for concentrated ownership structures in Singapore. 
This chapter will focus on family firms while chapters 7 will focus on GLCs.  
 
5.2 FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES IN SINGAPORE 
 
 Generally speaking, listed firms in Singapore comprise two main types: either 
they are owned by the state, ie the GLCs or they are owned by families or groups of 
families in partnership with varying amounts of involvement by private equity, hedge 
funds and venture capitalists (in recent years). Amongst the 100 largest firms listed on 
the SGX in 2007/8, 69 were family-owned firms. Of these, 62 firms (ie 89 per cent) 
were owned by Chinese families.255 Assuming that the control block is held by a 
family or groups of families, the mean percentage of shares held by a control block 
and a blockholder (ie a family member) were 69.52 per cent and 16.22 per cent 
respectively. The median for a control block and a blockholder was 51.14 per cent and 
6.18 per cent respectively (see Appendix 3). 
 
 There is no singular definition of a family business, although experts in the 
field have used many different criteria to define family businesses, such as percentage 
                                                            
255 This author researched the identity of the owners of the 100 SGX-listed companies from their Annual 
Reports. From their Chinese surnames or last names, I deduced that they are of Chinese enthic origins. In cases 
where the company is owned by foreign owners, for example, the Indonesians, I will google their last name to 
get details of their family businesses.  
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of family ownership, strategic control, involvement of many generations and the 
intention for the business to remain within the family. Astrachan and Shanker have 













Source: Handbook of Research on Family Business, 2006 
 
 A family business could be any of these definitions. At the broadest, the outer-
circle of the “bull’s eye”, a family business exists where the family participates in 
setting strategic direction. At the middle layer, the family owner intends the business 
to remain in the family and the founder or his descendent plays a key role in running 
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are running the business with the founder as chairman, siblings and descendents 
occupying middle and top management positions.256  
 
 Essentially, family businesses can be categorized into different classes 
depending on the extent of direct involvement in the business by family members. In 
order not to adopt too inclusive a definition or be unnecessarily exclusive, it is 
proposed to classify family businesses into three categories as follows:257 
 
Table 23: Criteria for Classification of Extent of Family Control 
Types of Family Control Criteria 
Strong family control (i) Family owns majority stake and 
holds key executive positions such 
as CEO or CFO 
(ii) Family owns majority stake and 
holds executive positions 
Moderate family control (i) Family owns majority stake and 
holds non-executive positions or 
no board seats 
(ii) Family owns a minority stake of 
between 30% and 50% and holds 
board seats 
                                                            
256 Joseph H Astrachan and Melissa Carey Shanker, “Family Businesses’ Contribution to the U.S Economy: A 
Closer Look” in Panikkos Zata Poutziouris et al, “Handbook of Research on Family Business” Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2006 at 56 and 57. 
257 Adapted from Henry Wai-chung Yeung’s classification in “Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards 
Hybrid Capitalism” Routledge, 2004 at 195-196. Family members are identified through a common surname as 
well as from affiliations with substantial shareholders, who are often the founders or their descendents holding 
stakes in the company. 
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(iii) Family owns a minority stake of 
between 10% to 29% but holds 
key executive positions such as 
CEO or CFO 
Weak family control (i) Family owns a minority stake of 
between 10% and 29% and holds 
non-executive positions 
(ii) Family owns a minority stake of 
between 10% and 29% with no 
board seats 
Source: Henry Wai-chung Yeung, “Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards Hybrid capitalism, 
Routledge, 2004. 
 
 Out of 74 non-GLCs, 69 were family-owned. The sample of 69 companies 
was categorized according to the criteria set out in Table 23. The data was obtained 
from the annual reports of these companies in the year 2007/8. It is found that out of 
69 family-owned firms, 32 were under strong family control, 32 under moderate 
family control and five under weak family control. Hence, 93 per cent of family-
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Figure 13: Pie-chart For Classification of Family Control 
 
 
5.3  “CULTURE” AS SELF-REINFORCING PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
A] Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
 
 “Culture is the mother of all path dependence”, so says Amir N. Licht.258 I 
would argue that culture plays an important role in the corporate ownership trajectory. 
In the last chapter, we saw how at various “critical junctures” when entrepreneurs 
formed business firms, they “selected” concentrated ownership over the dispersed 
ownership structure even though efficiency theories have touted the dispersed 
ownership structure as the more efficient of the two.259 This chapter will argue that 
institutional patterns once formed will persist and reproduced itself so that it becomes 
progressively more difficult for entrepreneurs to revert back to other alternative 
trajectories, assuming other trajectories to be more efficient.  
                                                            
258 Amir N. Licht, “The Mother of All Path Dependence: Toward a Cross-cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance systems” (2001) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 147. 
259 Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, n 6 and Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and 
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But first, we examine what culture is. Culture has been variously defined for 
different fields of study. For example, anthropologist, Clifford Geertz defined 
“culture” as “the historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward 
life”260   
 
Cross-cultural psychologist, Geert Hofstede described culture as the “software 
of the mind”. To Hofstede, every person carries with him certain patterns of thinking, 
feeling and potential acting that are learned throughout a person’s lifetime. The 
learning and conditioning comes from the family in early childhood, and as one grows 
up one’s mental programming comes from the social environment and one’s life 
experiences.261 This mental software is culture. But culture is always a collective 
phenomenon because it is shared with people who lived within the same social 
environment. Thus culture consists of the social rules of the game. To quote Hofstede, 
it is the “collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one 
group or category of people from others”.262 
 
 Hofstede identified four value dimensions of a nation or society’s culture that 
reflect how members of a nation or society cope with particular problems. They are: 
 
(a) Power Distance 
 
                                                            
260 Clifford Geertz, “The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays “ Fontana Press, 1973 at 89. 
261 Geert Hofstede et al, “Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind” McGraw Hill, 2010 at 4-5. 
262 Geert Hofstede, n 261 at 6. 
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The extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations 
within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. A country high 
on the power distance index would mean that its members accept inequality in 
positions and wealth as legitimate, and the converse is true. Countries low on the 
power distance index viewed equality in relationships such as father-son, boss-
subordinate, teacher-student etc. In this regard, Singapore scored 74, which is rather 
high on the power distance index.263 
 
(b) Individualism v Collectivism 
 
Individualism exists in societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the 
other hand, collectivist societies are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which 
throughout the person’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty. In this regard, Hofstede’s study categorized Singapore as a 
collectivist society.264  
 
(c) Masculinity v Femininity 
 
Masculine cultures value achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material success 
over secure relationships, modesty, caring for the weak and interpersonal harmony, 
the latter of which are the hallmarks of a feminine culture. In this regard, Singapore 
occupied about mid-point between a masculine and feminine culture, scoring 48.265 
 
                                                            
263 Geert Hofstede, n 261 at 57. 
264 Geert Hofstede, n 261 at 103. 
265 Geert Hofstede, n 261 at 141. 
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(d) Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
Strong uncertainty avoidance societies eschewed uncertainty and demand for more 
formal rules and institutions. Low uncertainty avoidance societies are accustomed to 
ambiguity and uncertain outcomes. In this regard, Singapore was the lowest in the 
uncertainty avoidance index.266 
 
B] Schwartz’s Cultural Dimensions 
 
In the early 1990s, Professor Shalom Schwartz identified three value 
dimensions upon which national cultures can be compared. He tested his value 
dimension on 35,000 respondents from 122 samples in 49 countries gathered between 




This measures the interaction between the individual and the group. Embeddedness 
represents a culture that emphasizes the status quo, propriety and restraint of actions 
or inclinations that may disrupt group cohesiveness or the traditional order. Autonomy 
represents cultures where the individual pursues self-fulfilment and autonomy.267 
Quite clearly, this dichotomy corresponds to the individual/collectivists dimension of 




266 Geert Hofstede, n 261 at 194. Singapore was accorded a score of eight. 
267 Shalom H Schwartz, “A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work” (1999) 48:1 Applied 
Psychology: An International Review 23 at 27. 




Hierarchy is a cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of 
power, roles and resources whereas the opposite pole which is egalitarianism 
emphasizes the transcendence of selfish interests in favour of equality, social justice 
and the promotion of the welfare of others over self.268 Obviously, this corresponds to 




Mastery refers to the cultural propensity of self-assertion and getting ahead in social 
status, wealth, competence and daring. The opposing pole is Harmony which is the 
cultural value of fitting in harmoniously with the environment.269 This dichotomy 
corresponds to the Masculine/feminine cultural dimension of Hofstede. 
 
C] Why Culture is Important 
 
 In 2005, Amir N Licht et al derived testable hypotheses that link the LLSV 
scores of countries to specific aspects of the cultures of these countries.270 Using 
Hofstede’s and Schwartz’ cultural dimensions, which are explained above, the study 
hypothesized that greater reliance on concrete legal rules enforceable in the courts is 
stronger in nations high on the Swartz cultural dimension of Mastery and low on his 
Harmony value dimension. The Mastery value dimension encourages self-
                                                            
268 Shalom H Schwartz, n 267 at 28. 
269 Shalom H Schwartz, n 267 at 28. 
270 Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom H. Schwartz, “Culture, Law and Corporate Governance” 
(2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 229. 
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assertiveness, and determination of one’s destiny- and so encourage investors to stand 
up and fight for their rights. The Harmony dimension eschewes head-on collision, and 
so discourages investors to stand up for their rights.271  
 
 The study further hypothesized that investor legal rights are stronger in 
countries high on Hofstede’s Individualism dimension and low on his Uncertainty 
Avoidance dimension. Individualism is compatible with asserting investor rights. 
High Uncertainty Avoidance means giving power to authorities to resolve conflicts 
whilst low Uncertainity Avoidance means a readiness to challenge other corporate 
constituencies in meetings, the media nd the courts.272 
 
 As hypothesized, the study found that Individualism correlates positively with 
LLSV’s ADRI, and Power Distance correlates negatively with the ADRI. Thus, it was 
posited that legal rules are framed according to how compatible they are to the 
national culture that tolerates or even enourages them. In other words, if minority 
shareholder rights are protected through litigation in the courts, with indeterminate 
outcomes, in “good law” countries, then these countries’ national culture probably 
exhibits Hofstede’s Individualism dimension.  
  
 At this point, I would argue that since there are significant overlaps between 
LLSV and Hofstede and Schwartz’ cultural value dimensions, it is possible that the 




271 Amir N. Licht et al, “Culture, Law and Corporate Governance” n 270 at 236. 
272 Amir N. Licht et al, “Culture, Law and Corporate Governance” n 270 at 236. 
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  Licht’s study further cross-tabulated cultural regions with legal families. 
LLSV classified legal families into the common law regimes (with the strongest 
minority protection laws), French civil law group (with the weakest minority 
protection laws) and the German and Scandinavian groups (the in-between groups). 
LLSV countries and Schwartz and Hofstede cultural regions overlap only partially. 
The English-speaking countries are legally homogenous, with a common law system. 
The Latin American/Less developed Latin regions are also homogenous with a French 
civil law origin. The other cultural regions have a variety of legal systems, and the Far 
Eastern/Asian region comprises a mixture of common law and civil law systems.273 
 
 In another study, Licht found that countries with high scores for the 
prevalence of the rule of law and non-corruption are also high on affective and 
intellectual autonomy and on egalitarianism, and low on embedddedness and 
hierarchy.274 The study further showed that national culture alone explains half the 
variance in the level of law-abidingness and absence of corruption and nearly ⅔ of the 
variance in democratice accountability. Thus, I would argue that formal institutions 
like democracy with its concomitant values of upholding the rule of law and 
eschewing corruption are culture-sensitive.  
  
 LLSV has argued that countries with a common law tradition have stronger 
minority protection laws; and hence a dispersed ownership structure. But this 
                                                            
273 Amir N. Licht et al, “Culture, Law and Corporate Governance” n 270 at 247. 
274 Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt and Shalom H. Schwartz, “Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule 
of Law and Other Norms of Governance” (2007) 35 Journal of Comparative Economics 659 at 669.  In this 
study, (a) Intellectual Autonomy denotes a cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently 
pursuing their own ides and intellectual directions; (b) Affective Autonomy means a cultural emphasis on the 
desirability of individuals pursuing affectively positive experience; (c) egalitarianism refers to a culture which 
emphasizes on transcendence of selfish interests in favour of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of 
others whom one sees as moral equals as opposed to “hierarchy” which refers to a culture where there is a 
legitimate unequal distribution of powere, roles and resources, see 662. 
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proposition is highly questionable in light of Licht’s finding that the association 
between the cultural dimensions of embeddedness (autonomy) and hierarchy 
(egalitarianism), and the rule of law is thus unrelated to a heritage of British colonial 
rule and to other factors such heritage may reflect, like a common law system or bio-
ecological circumstances.275 
 
Looking specifically at the Asian region, it was, prima facie, found that the 
ADRI means of countries with a common law system rank higher both for the 
countries in the Schwartz and Hofstede studies. But the researchers doubted that the 
common law heritage was the reason for the higher scores. Elsewhere, the same 
researchers have shown that “the law on the books” played a minor role in 
determining shareholder protection in practice in East Asian countries.276  
 
D] Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions for East Asian Countries 
 
In 1987, Hofstede constructed a survey of Chinese values which were 
administered to university students in 22 countries around the world.277 The cultural 
values that were so-called “Chinese” can be divided into (a) Integration; (b) 
Confucian Work Dynamism; (c) Human-heartedness; and (d) Moral Discipline. Of 




275 Amir N. Licht et al, n 273 at 670. 
276 Amir N. Licht et al, n 270 at 249.  
277 Geert Hofstede, “Chinese Values and the Search for Culture-Free Dimensions of Culture” (1987) 18:2 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 143. 
155 | P a g e  
 
“Integration” embraces values such as tolerance of others, harmony with 
others, solidarity with others; non-competitiveness, trustworthiness, contentedness, 
being conservative, a close and intimate friend, filial piety, patriotism and chastity in 
women. In this respect, Singapore scored 0.21 which is the 14th position out of the 22 
countries. For “Confucian Work Dynamism” which embraces ordering relationships, 
thrift, persistence, having a sense of shame, reciprocation, personal steadiness, 
protecting your “face” and respect for tradition, Singapore scored -0.04, occupying 8th 
position out of 22 countries.278  
 
Juxtapositioning the above findings with Hofstede’s 1973 global study,  it 
would appear that Singapore scored low on Integration, which is to be expected given 
her multi-racial society. However, being predominantly a Chinese society, its business 
community is dominated by the Chinese. Out of 74 non-GLC companies listed on the 
SGX, 62, ie 83.7 per cent are owned by Chinese families. The four major races in 
Singapore are the Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians. The first three races are 
deeply steeped in traditions that display a high power distance culture with a 
collectivist tendency. When these three races enter into business, they tend to bring 
their culture into their businesses.  
 
Thus, this explains why Singapore occupied 8th position in respect of 
Confucian Work Dynamism, as the majority of businesses (83.7 per cent) are run by 
the Chinese. By and large, Chinese families and businesses embrace the high power 
distance and collectivist nature of their culture, which emanate from the Confucian 
values of paternalism, hierarchy and control within the family. In Singapore, as in 
                                                            
278 Geert Hofstede n 277 at 150. 
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many other cultures, the family is the basic unit of society and many businesses are 
started out by families or close friends in a cohesive in-group context. This family 
setting is often transposed into the business context; and thus, we see that many 
family businesses are reluctant to surrender control of their businesses to outsiders, 
leading to concentrated ownership structures with ownership and control tightly in the 
hands of the family. Now I would present anecdotal evidence to verify the culturally 
embedded foundations of Chinese businesses in Chinese-dominated countries such as 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. 
 
5.4 THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM 
A] Confucianism 
 Confucianism is partly a political ideology of achieving order through linking 
the individual to the state. The Chinese state is in essence the super-family of Chinese 
people. Within this structure, the maintenance of order depends on the morally 
enriched prescription of relationships. The individual finds dignity and meaning in the 
maintenance of harmony in his own social context. The starting point for building 
such enduring relationships is the family.  
 
Confucian state ideology is designed to concentrate people’s loyalties to the 
family as a means of stabilizing the state. A set of virtues are extolled: namely, filial 
piety, honesty, hard work and resilience. These attributes can be founded on two 
crucial virtues which lie at the heart of Chinese character building, namely jen and li, 
which roughly translate to “human-heartedness”. Jen is humaneness, ie a person’s 
humanity depends on community and reciprocity. This is very similar to the Christian 
157 | P a g e  
 
ethic of “loving your neighbor as yourself”. Li, on the other hand, means good 
manners or gentlemanly conduct.279 
 
 Confucian values impact the Chinese business firm in two ways: (a) the rules 
that govern the stabilizing and legitimizing of authority or the vertical dimension of 
order; and (b) the rules that govern the stabilizing of co-operation, the horizontal 
dimension of things. Firstly, in the vertical order, the style of leadership often adopts a 
paternalistic flavour. There is a lack of formality in terms of bureaucratic processes 
and employees enrolled in the system understand the hierarchy instinctively. The 
paternalistic tone set by the owner is emulated by his subordinates towards the line 
workers. It ranges from benevolent paternalism to harsh authoritarianism. But the 
power relationship is clear; it rests on ownership and is legitimated by father-like 
behavior.  
 
Secondly, similar considerations typify the horizontal order. The Confucian 
prescription for role behavior and Li in a person’s social interaction with others where 
losing one’s reputation for trustworthiness is a most serious threat and to achieve a 
high reputation is a basis of much honour.280 It is said that these two organizational 
characteristics of the Chinese business firm limited its growth into the league of the 
Fortune 500. A third feature of Chinese tradition that has had a marked effect on 
organizations is the custom of partible inheritance. The Chinese tradition of constantly 
breaking up the family wealth amongst male heirs, unlike the Japanese primogeniture 
                                                            
279 S Gordon Redding, “The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism” Walter de Gruyter, 1990 at 44-46. See further Gary G 
Hamilton, “The Organizational Foundations of Western and Chinese Commerce: A Historical and Comparative 
Analysis” in “Asian Business Networks” Walter de Gruyter, 1996 at 50-54 for another culturalist’s exposition of 
the Chinese business firm. 
280 S Gordon Redding, “What is Chinese about Chinese Family Business? And How Much is Family and How 
Much is Business?” in Henry Wai-chung Yeung and Kris Olds, “Globalization of Chinese Business Firms, 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000 at 42-43. 
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inheritance system, has led to regular break-up of business dynasties, which had 
limited the growth and expanse of the Chinese firm.281 In addition, problems of 
succession have similarly contributed to the demise of a family business such as in the 
Yeo Hiap Seng case. Such culturally-embedded behaviour of Chinese family firms 
have caused them to remain in concentrated ownership form. 
 
 The impact of Confucianism on Chinese businesses can be readily observed in 
Redding’s interview with selected business entrepreneurs in Hong Kong. He collated 




“I think Confucianism is rather important-its sets a moral code for the Chinese people. 
Frankly speaking, even though we don’t consciously know that we are following 




“My style under a microscope is basically Confucian. I always take the middle of the road. I 





281 S Gordon Redding, n 280 at 45. 
282 S Gordon Redding, n 279 at 84-85.  
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“There used to be on my grandfather’s desk a Chinese sign-“tolerance”. I have this on my 
desk now…Chinese say “if you can be tolerant a hundred times you will become gold”. Now 
I have done so; this company earned $36 million last year (US$4.6 million)”  
 
B] Chinese Entrepreneurial Drive 
 
 Redding’s study of Chinese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong in the 1980s revealed 





When you work for a big company, it’s somebody else’s company. You are just one of the 
staff, one of the tools. I would say to myself, “I work hard for this company, and the majority 
goes to the company, so the ultimate benefit to myself is very little. If I have my own 




I don’t like to work for others, be controlled by others. It’s the freedom that attracts 
me, not making more money”. 
 
 In chapter 3, we saw how the southern Chinese from the Fujian and 
Guangzhou regions emigrated to the Nanyang in search of a better future than the one 
China maps out for them in the late 19th and early 20th century. It can be observed that 
                                                            
283 S Gordon Redding, n 280 at 89-90. 
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the overseas Chinese psyche has a deep-seated and culturally embedded desire for 
self-ownership and autonomy. The Chinese entrepreneur prefers to be own boss. 
There is a famous Chinese proverb: “Better be the beak of a cock than the rump of an 
ox”. Chinese familism have an unwritten cultural rule that a senior (often a former 
employer) is obliged to help a junior set up his own business if the latter is proven to 
be entrepreneurial enough.284 For instance, under the support of the late Lee Kong 
Chian, Ng Kong Beng who started as a clerk in Lam Aik and rose to the position of 
cashier in Fu Dong Company, set up the Anson Company with Yeo Hong Lian, the 
manager of Fu Dong company to act as commission agents for Fu Dong and other 
rubber companies. Fu Dong did not see such conflicted relationships as harmful to its 
business but instead thought Anson to be of help as it had large quantities of rubber 
for export to Singapore.285 
 
 Owing to centrifugal forces radiating from the core Chinese business firm, 
such as when a former trusted employee leaves to set up his own business or when 
due to the cultural tradition of desiring to leave an equal inheritance for all the male 
heirs, Chinese business firms internationalized on an unprecedented scale with 
outposts of their firms spanning the length and breadth of South-east Asia. However, 
these firms are often part of a group structure where control of the business is always 
kept within the family, with sons of the founder rising through the organization to 




284 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 27. 
285 Chan Kwok Bun and Claire Chiang See Ngoh, “Stepping out: The Making of Chinese Entrepreneurs” 
Prentice Hall, 1994 at 72. 
286 Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, “The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs 
Are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia” Martin Kessler Books, 1996 at 5. 
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“Even today, it is common for the founder-CEO to be stationed in Hong Kong, 
Bangkok or Singapore to send one son to Shanghai, another to Taipei, a son-in-law to 
Manila and a nephew to Kuala Lumpur”. 
 
 The massive cross-investments among these countries are evidence of a new 
economic power in the region which possesses tremendous financial strength and 
ability to capture large profits from emerging and developed markets despite political 
alienation and economic uncertainty. This power is referred to as the bamboo network 
of Chinese entrepreneurs who have relocated to the South-east Asia diaspora.287 
Although Chinese business empires are directed by a new generation of leaders that 
have often received Western management training from top business schools such as 
Harvard or Stanford, the Chinese business firm is essentially reluctant to admit 
professional outsiders into the top management of their firms. Y.K Pao’s Hong Kong-
based shipping and property empire was divided amongst his four sons-in-law 
because he had only daughters, and apparently he never thought of turning over the 
business to professional management.288 
 
 In essence, the organizational foundation of Chinese businesses is the family 
business. It is the instrument by which wealth is accumulated by families. This family 
fortress is guarded against outside influence because of a strong distrust of outsiders 
and its workings are not publicly known. It is usually run nepotistically with 
paternalism strongly embedded in its corporate culture. Efficiency is achieved through 
intense managerial loyalty to the founder-CEO and his heirs. In the words of Redding, 
                                                            
287 John Kao called this entrepreneurial network the “Chinese Commonwealth” in his article “The Worldwide 
Web of Chinese Business” (1993) Harvard Business Review 24 at 33. 
288 Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, n 286 at 9.  
162 | P a g e  
 
it is a cultural artifact.289 This organizational creature called the “bamboo networks”, 
“Chinese commonwealth”, “guanxi capitalism” or “Chinese global tribe” transcends 
political and national boundaries. Redding’s research has been overtaken by later  
studies which examined the impact of globalization on Chinese capitalism. According 
to Henry Yeung, a new form of capitalism called “hybrid capitalism” has emerged. 
(see Part V on the professionalization of Chinese family-owned businesses).290  
 
C] Family Monopoly on Strategy-making 
 C.1] Anecdotal Evidence 
 
 A stark feature that emerged in studying Chinese business firm is the Chinese 
entrepreneur’s urge to control. Sociologically, this urge to control could have arisen 
from mistrust, a sense of threat arising from the political turmoil of the last century in 
China, and the Chinese tradition of perpetuating the family name. The question that 
arises is whether the urge to keep control within the family is ethnically determined or 
is it just every entrepreneur’s instinctive or intuitive desire to keep the business for 
himself, regardless of enthicity? A few anecdotes gathered from Redding’s interview 
of Hong Kong entrepreneurs would serve to highlight the instinctive culture of the 




“I think the Chinese are rather obsessed with power, personal power, and the Chinese 
managers and owners are very afraid to let go and lose control” 
                                                            
289 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 5. 
290 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 9. 
291 S Gordon Redding, n 280 at 88. 





“I think it has something to do with the family tradition. In the Western world, family is not a 
coherent factor, so companies are not handed down; for various reasons, conglomerates takes 
place easier. But then particularly for the southern Chinese, the independent spirit of owning a 
company is somehow very strong. Conglomerates will not take place in Hong Kong because 




“I have this idea of building a large corporation and to hand it over to my child. I just cannot 
accept the idea of having a professional man to take care of the company which I have started. 
I don’t know why. I may even think of getting a son just for this purpose” 
 
 Whilst the late Kwek Hong Png was still alive, control of the Hong Leong 
empire rests within a small group of family members. Professional managers are 
employed for middle level management posts but family members are put in charge of 
the subsidiaries. Decision-making, particularly on financial matters remains 
centralized.292 As one of the sons put it:293 
 
“My father just says “go there” and we go. He will decide who to transfer, who to go 
where. He is the head of the family. Though I am given charge of an outlet, I still 
refer to my father and uncle for direction and instructions. My father and uncle visit 
                                                            
292 Tong Chee Kiong, “Centripetal Authority, Differentiated Networks: The Social Organization of Chinese 
Firms in Singapore” in Gary G Hamilton, “Asian Business Networks” n 279 at 144. 
293 Tong Chee Kiong, n 292 at 144. 
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each of the branches once or twice every week. At the end of the month, the family 
meets to report on sales and other matters.” 
 
Even after the company became a listed entity, one company director noted:294 
 
“The board of directors made decisions only in name. My father (owner and 
chairman) made most of the decisions: he only consulted the directors on technical 
matters….It is slightly dictatorial; and even if he asks you, you may say something, 
but he will still go ahead with what he wants anyway.” 
 
Kwek Hong Png’s successor Kwek Leng Beng was inducted into the family 
business for more than 30 years before he could take over the reins. As Fortune 
magazine described it, “Leng Beng was kept on a tight leash. It’s gone now”.295 Even 
today, the Hong Leong group is controlled by senior family members working from a 
central management committee.296 
 
On the occasion of the Kuok Group’s 60th anniversary on 10 April 2009, 
Robert Kuok Hock Nien commemorated how the business group was run along 
Chinese tradition with cultural values and morality that hark back to Ru-Jiao: 297 
 
“My brothers and I owe our unbringing completely to Mother. She was 
steeped in Ru-Jiao, the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, Laozi and other Chinese 
sages. Ru-Jiao teaches the correct beaviour for a human being on his life on earth. 
                                                            
294 Tong Chee Kiong, n 292 at 145. 
295 Fock Siew Tong, “Dynamics of Family Business: The Chinese Way, Cengage Learning, 2009 at 135. 
296 Fock Siew Tong, n 295 at 145. 
297 Robert Kuok Hock Nien’s “Success Notes” delivered on the occasion of the Kuok Group’s 60th anniversary 
on 10 April 2009, a copy can be obtained from 
<https://group.google.com/forum/#!msg/bizassociate/GLAgS3yA/JEO2OuZwyswJ> 
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Mother gently, and sometimes strongly, drummed into the minds of her three boys the 
values of honesty, of never cheating, lying, stealing or envying other people their 
material wealth or physical attributes…Mother was the captain of our ship. She saw 
and sensed everything, but being a wise person she didn’t interfere. Yet she was the 
background influence, the glue that bound the Group together. She taught my cousins 
and my brothers and me never to be greedy, and that in maing money one practice 
high morality. She stressed that whenever the firm does well it should make donations 
to the charities operating in our societies. She always kept us focused on the big 
picture in business. For example: avoid businesses that bring harm, destruction or 
grief to people. This includes trades like gambling, drugs, arms sales, loan-sharking 
and prostitution”. 
 
  C.2] Empirical Studies Confirm Anecdotal evidence/Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
 
This paradigm of concentrated ownership with ownership and control tightly 
kept in the family hands fits neatly into Hofstede’s value dimension of a high power 
distance and collectivist society. Generally, Singapore employees view inequality in 
wealth and position as legitimate and respect authority as a given. The authority of 
their employers emanates from ownership and hardly would a Singapore employee 
hope to penetrate the highest echelons of management in a family business. The 
family is an in-group that protects their own property (ie the firm) vigorously against 
outsiders. The converse would therefore hold true and Hofstede indeed found a 
positive correlation between dispersed ownership and individualism.298 
 
                                                            
298 Geert Hofstede, n 261 at 320. In this regard, Hofstede posited that the relationship between the individual and 
the organization is calculative and based on self-interest, so that the individual’s utility function became the 
seedbed for the invisible hand of the market, which in turn spurred the growth of capitalism.  
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As regards uncertainty avoidance, Russian economist, Semenov postulated a 
negative correlation between uncertainty avoidance and the development of the stock 
market.299 High uncertainty avoidance cultures will find its investors seeking a higher 
uncertainty premium and pay a lower price for shares. As a response to uncertainty, 
these investors will seek a close relationship with the firm. They will try to take 
positions of control of the firm, probably through concentrated minority or even 
majority stakes in the firm. As such, there will not be many shares offered to the 
public and with low prices for the shares, its stock markets will not be vibrant.  
 
In this regard, Hofstede categorized Singapore within the low end of the 
uncertainty avoidance index, meaning that its people are comfortable with ambiguity 
and risk. Then why doesn’t Singapore have a vibrant stock market with discrete 
shareholders holding small holdings?  
 
As chapter 5 will set out the political and economic development in Singapore 
from its post-independent days, I would argue that the tight-control by the PAP 
regime over its citizens under Lee Kuan Yew’s iron fist, has build a largely compliant 
population that is risk-averse and extremely “kiasu”. Many Singaporeans preferred 
safe investments in real estate rather than risky investments in the equity markets, 
particularly in family firms where control is kept within the family and outsiders find 
it difficult to perform stock analysis on the firm due to information asymmetry. As a 
result, investors will require a discount to the price they are prepared to pay as a guard 
against the uncertain value of the family-owned stock they are buying. This is indeed 
                                                            
299 Eelke de Jong and Radislav Semenov, “Cross-country Differences in Stock Market Development: A Cultural 
View” available from SSRN at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=301374> at 22. 
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evidenced by the IPO underpricing of the family firms, which are on average 
underpriced by 12 per cent more than non-family firms.300 
 
I would further argue that the Confucian tenets of a hierarchical relationship 
between boss and subordinate, distrusts of outsiders and keeping control within the 
family are mirrored within the broader cultural dimensions of Hofstede’s value 
dimensions. Regardless of whether Singapore’s cultural mores arose from 
Confucianism, her high power distance and collectivist culture supports a 
concentrated ownership where ownership and control reside in the same hands, 
namely the family or groups of families that form an in-group cohesive structure. 
Thus, up to this point, culture is an important explanation of why ownership is 
concentrated and why ownership has not separated from control in Singapore’s 
Chinese family businesses. As entrepreneurs increasingly “select” concentrated 
ownership structures, increasing returns set in motion a self-perpetuating cycle of 
concentrated ownership.  
 
5.5 WHITHER THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION? 
A] Professionalizing Management 
 
On the other hand, one may see glimpses of institutional forces chipping away 
at the edge of the cultural “block” to form organizations that are increasingly 
professionally managed. Henry Wai-chung Yeung termed such Chinese firms “hybrid 
capitalism”. This phenomenon is claimed to be the beginning of the end for 
concentrated ownership. It is argued that government policies and intervention and the 
                                                            
300 Toh Shaowei, n 388. 
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“westernization” of our educational system have “coerced” some of our Chinese 
family firms to embrace meritocracy rather than nepotism in the choosing of second-
generation leaders for their companies, so that control of these firms is slowly taken 
away from the hands of family members and put into the hands of professional 
managers. The dynamics of these processes have caused family control to weaken in 
some companies to the extent that a professionally managed board had taken over 
strategic control of the company.  
 
 A.1] Global Level 
The World Bank estimated that the combined economic output of ethnic 
Chinese outside mainland China was about US$400 billion in 1991 and up to US$600 
billion in 1996. Even after the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, ethnic Chinese 
conglomerates accounted for an overwhelming majority of market capitalization in 
Indonesia (73 per cent), Malaysia (60 per cent), the Philippines (50 per cent), 
Singapore (81 per cent) and Thailand (90 per cent).301 Li Ka-shing’s Hutchinson 
Whampoa ranked as the world’s 14th largest transnational corporation (TNC). In 
addition, there are 13 large ethnic Chinese TNC originating from Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan.302 Internal and external forces have led 
many Chinese business firms to professionalize top level management quickly as 
explained below: 
  
(a) As these Chinese business empires grew to enormous sizes and became 
succeeded by second generation leaders, who being the privileged sons of the 
                                                            
301 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 12-13. 
302 According to Forbes’ list of billionaires in 2008, nine ethnic Chinese businessmen occupied the top 200 
places including Li Ka-shing, Stanley Ho  and Lee Shau Kee of Hong Kong, Robert Kuok of Malaysia, Ng Teng 
Fong and Kwek Leng Beng of Singapore and Y.C Wang of Taiwan, see 
<http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/10/billionaires08_The-Worlds-Billionaires_Rank.html> 
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founders (and having received a foreign education in prestigious overseas 
universities), are driven to professionalize their management. There may also 
be a shortage of able and competent family members to helm the enterprise. 
As Fukuyama argued, “a single family, no matter how large, capable or well 
educated, can only have so many competent sons, daughters, spouses and 
siblings to oversee the different parts of a rapidly ramifying enterprise”.303  
 
(b) Many Chinese firms having gained their wealth and capital base through real 
estates and trading, had no choice but to internationalize and diversify their 
businesses when state intervention put a stop to these rent-seeking behavior 
and monopoly positions. For instance, Robert Kuok’s dominant position in 
sugar and flour obtained through political alliance in Malaysia and Liem Sioe 
Liong’s monopoly rights in cement and commodities in Indonesia had been 
severely curtailed after the Asian financial crisis.304  
 
The result is that many Chinese conglomerates have professionalized their 
middle level management and co-opted non-family members into the highest echelons 
of their firms. For instance, two former managing directors of Hutchinson Whampoa 
were British expatriates: namely, John Richardson and Simon Murray.305 The Salim 
Group’s First Pacific Group in Hong Kong is entirely flanked by professional 
management and a former financial controller remarked: 306 
                                                            
303 Francis Fukuyama, “Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity” Hamish Hamilton, London, 
1995 at 64 
 
304 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 78. For a detailed discussion of rentier entrepreneurs, also called “ersatz 
capitalism”, see Yoshihara Kunio, “The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-east Asia” Oxford University Press, 
1988. 
305 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 70. 
306 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, n 280 at 111. 
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“We are very unusual for a Hong Kong company in that the shareholders do not 
involve themselves actively in the management of the company….But First Pacific is 
very distinctive. We have in Hong Kong this head office; we don’t have any 
Indonesians at all. There is not one Indonesian involved in the operations. So there is 
a real divorce between management and ownership.” 
  
 A.2] Singapore 
Having surveyed the international scene on Chinese businesses, what about 
the Singapore scene? Have local Chinese businesses professionalize their top level 
management? We look at the example of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation 
Limited, which it is submitted is an appropriate case study because it is a third 
generation Chinese family business where the “forces” acting to separate ownership 
from control are likely to have begun. One such “force” is the state-driven policy for 
the development of the banking sector where the government cajoled banks to 
professionalize their boards and senior management in a bid to make our banking 
institutions competitive on the world stage, which it is submitted is a “critical 
juncture” that may possibly cause ownership to separate from control in the banks. 
 
B] The Case Study of Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (OCBC) 
 
OCBC was “born out of the instinct to overcome economic depression”.307 In 
the early 1930s, the banking industry in Singapore was in the doldrums because of the 
global economic recession. Many bank customers were unable to service their debts, 
and there was a run on the banks. This dire condition was caused by the lack of proper 
                                                            
307 Wilson Dick, Solid As a Rock: The First Forty Years of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation 
(Singapore: The Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, 1972) at 1. 
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management practices within banks where loans were extended on the basis of 
personal relationships rather than based on credit-worthiness of the customers. There 
were no internal controls and banks were essentially maintained as family businesses. 
 
Three Hokkien banks — the Chinese Commercial Bank, the Ho Hong Bank 
and the Oversea-Chinese Bank —were in desperate finances and so an amalgamation 
was proposed. The bank that emerged from this amalgamation is what we see today as 
the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited, better known as OCBC. It came 
into being on 31 October 1932 with an authorized capital of $40 million and a paid-up 
capital of $10 million.308 Among OCBC’s three predecessor banks, the oldest was the 
Chinese Commercial Bank, which was established on 4 September 1912, followed by 
the Ho Hong Bank, set up in 1917. The Oversea-Chinese Bank was established on 28 
June 1919. 
 
The merged bank became the strongest in the region with a total of 17 
branches in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, China, Hong Kong and Burma. Lee Kong 
Chian was the largest shareholder holding 20 per cent of the shares and he was vice-
Chairman until 1938 and then Chairman until 1965. He initiated the modernization of 
the bank’s operations, and instilled high standards in management practices. Personal 
relationships and nepotism gave way to impartiality and objectivity in the conduct of 
the bank’s business. Thus, good corporate governance practices were sown in OCBC 
several decades before corporate governance became something of a buzz-word in the 
corporate room.309  
                                                            
308 Loh, Grace, Goh Chor Boon and Tan Teng Lang, “Building Bridges, Carving Niches” Oxford University 
Press, 2000 at 22. 
309 Chew Heng Ching et al, n 117 at 139. 
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In the early days, despite relinquishing management to non-family members, 
the Lee family insisted on top managers being promoted from within the bank rather 
than recruited from outside. Thus, Tan Chin Tuan, who was known to Lee Kong 
Chian’s father-in-law was brought in as an assistant manager at the incorporation of 
OCBC and promoted from managing director to Chairman in 1966 and helmed OCBC 
for 30 years.310 
 
In preparing for succession, Lee Kong Chian nurtured his three sons by 
sending them overseas to North America for their tertiary education. Even after his 
retirement, Lee Kong Chian intervened in key decisions while leaving daily 
management to his sons and managers. From 1966 to 1995, the position of Chairman 
was entrusted to trusted insiders. The Lee family kept a close watch over the bank and 
whilst Tan Chin Tuan was Chairman, Lee Kong Chian’s third son, Seng Wee was 
always the “man behind the scene”. Seng Wee consulted his eldest brother Seng Gee 
for critical, strategic decision-making.311  
 
After the Asian financial crisis, the bank succumbed to the government’s 
pressure for more professional governance, and appointed its first professional non-
family Chief Executive Officer, Alex Au in 1999, who was then succeeded by David 
Connor in 2002. Dr. Cheong Choong King became a non-executive Chairman in 
2003. In April 2012, David Conner retired and was succeeded by Samuel Tsien. As of 
31st December 2011, there are 12 non-family professional directors on OCBC’s board 
and two non-executive directors who are nominees of the family’s interests, namely, 
                                                            
310 Lai Si Tsui-Auch, “The Professionally Managed Family-ruled Enterprise: Ethnic Chinese Business in 
Singapore” (2004) 41:4 Journal of Management Studies 693 at 709. 
311 Lai Si Tsui-Auch, n 310 at 709. 
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Lee Seng Wee and Lee Tih Shih.312 Although, the Lee family members may have 
perceptibly become passive owners and allowed the board to take the strategic 
direction for the firm,313 it is my hunch that the Lee family is still very much in 
control of the bank through its influence on the selection of senior management 
personnel and board members. Thus, I would argue that the OCBC case study affirms 
the cultural dimension of concentrated ownership, ie despite becoming a modern bank 
and one of the biggest in Singapore, it is still a family concern with strategic control 
firmly kept by Lee Kong Chian’s descendants. 
 
There are three banks in Singapore only. The United Overseas Bank Ltd 
remained a family business, owned and controlled by the elder Wee Cho Yaw and his 
son, Wee Ee Cheong. The third is the Development Bank of Singapore Ltd, which is a 
state-owned bank. In 2013, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) legislated 
that insurance companies should adopt the Code of Corporate Governance. Basically, 
the Code sought to strengthen the independent element in the board and senior 
management. 
 
Apart from the financial services industry, the profile of the 69 family firms in 
Singapore shows that 93 per cent of family firms are under moderate to strong family 
control. This means that family members still occupy board seats, thus suggesting that 
family owners are still in control of the firms. I would argue that the majority of 
family firms in Singapore have “locked-in” concentrated ownership. The next section 
will show how institutional forces, particularly a Western education system where 
                                                            
312 Lai Si Tsui-Auch, n 310 at 710 and OCBC Annual Report, 2011. Further, see Business Times, 19 January 
2011 for the report on David Conner’s retirement and Samuel Tsien’s succession as CEO. 
313 This author interviewed Dr. Cheong Choong King who confirmed that the board takes charge of strategic 
directions of OCBC for her book, Chew Heng Ching et al, n 117. 
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English is the main language of instruction are at tension with deep-seated cultural 
tendencies to keep ownership and control tightly in the hands of the family. However, 
these institutional forces are unable to direct ownership structure into the dispersed 
model because concentrated ownership has become “locked-in” by Chinese culture in 
the family firms.  
 
5.6 INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 
A] Political Desire for Confucianism as a Societal Foundation Defeated 
 
Douglass C North defined “institutions” as “the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction”. These constraints may be 
informal, ie sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct (level 1); or 
may be formal, coming from the constitution, laws, property rights (level 2).314 Using 
this framework, (a) the “westernization” of our education system that leads our CEOs 
to adopt Western techniques of leadership and management; and (b) state intervention 
to influence the way in which companies should be organized and managed are part of 
the institutional environment that impact upon the ownership trajectory of Singapore’s 
Chinese family businesses. 
 
It is clear that the highest echelons of Singapore’s political leaders embrace 
some aspects of Confucian ideology and are keen to imbibe these values into our 
young. Former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, when he was Prime Minister of 
Singapore, had stressed in 1982 the urgent task of preserving the three-generation 
family (and this is reflected in the public housing policies of Singapore) and said that 
                                                            
314 Douglass C North, “Institutions” (1991) 5(1) The Journal of Economic Perspectives  97 at 97. See further 
Oliver E Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead” (2000) 38:3 Journal 
of Economic Literature 595 at 596 and 598. 
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“anyone brought up in the Confucian tradition will be ashamed to let his or her old 
parents live by themselves in loneliness and desolation. Our task is to implant these 
traditional [Confucian] values into our children when their minds are young and 
receptive, so that when they grow out of their teenage years, these attitudes harden 
and, are forged for a life-time”.315  
 
In the early 1980s, the Singapore government’s attempt to introduce the study 
of Confucian ethics in the secondary schools to stem the erosion of traditional values 
was unsuccessful. It was met with such strong opposition from the other ethnic groups 
like the Malays and Indians that the movement died a premature death in 1988. Only 
17.8 per cent of students at secondary three level opted for Confucian studies 
compared to 44.4 per cent for Buddhist studies, 21.4 per cent for Christian (Bible 
Knowledge) and 13.4 per cent for Islamic religious knowledge.316  
 
The failed attempt to introduce Confucianism as a national ideology led 
Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to initiate a set of “shared values” as national 
ideology in 1989. Four sets of core values were identified: (a) community over self, 
(b) upholding the family as the basic building block of society, (c) resolving major 
issues through consensus instead of contention, and (d) stressing racial and religious 
tolerance and harmony.317 These shared national values seem to mirror those of a 
traditional society, underpinned by Confucianism or some other traditional ethnic 
values. 
                                                            
315 John Wong, “Promoting Confucianism For Socio-economic Development: The Singapore Experience” at 
288 in Tu Wei-Ming, “Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture 
of Japan and the Four Mini-dragons” Harvard University Press, 1996 at 298. 
316 John Wong, n 315. 
317 These “shared values” were debated in Parliament on 14 January 1991, see Official Records of Parliamentary 
Debates, 14 January 1991 at 832. 
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Despite the failure to introduce Confucian studies in the schools, aspects of 
Confucian ideology have crept into the legal infrastructure in the form of the 
Maintenance of Parents Act, Cap. 167B. This Act provides an avenue for elderly 
parents to claim financial support from their children.318 Against the pockets of 
assimilation of Confucian ideology within Singapore’s social and economic fabric is 
an open economy which has adopted the English language as its primary language of 
education and commerce, youths who assimilate Western “pop-culture” and political 
leaders and top management executives who have received overseas education at 
prestigious U.K and U.S universities. How does that translate into with regards to 
ownership structure of Singapore companies? 
B] Impact of a Western Education System and “pop-culture”  
The impact of Western culture is shown in the following trends:  
(a) From 1996 to 2008, there had been 1,411 applications for maintenance by 
parents who are mostly fathers, Chinese and either widowed or divorced. 
There has also been an upward trend in the increasing numbers applying for 
maintenance, from an annual rate of 100 to 172 in 2008;319  
(b) YouthCare reported that today’s youths are image-conscious, dress to look 
“cool”, watches MTV shows and Youtube videos regularly, are sexually active 
from an earlier age, and engage in drugs and drinking. 49 per cent of 
secondary schools students have consumed alcohol with 6.1 per cent 
                                                            
318 One of the central tenets of Confucian ideology which is particularly emphasized by the Chinese is filial 
piety. In Singapore, it is prevalent for working children to give monetary support to their elderly parents. 
319 Maintenance of Parents Act, Singapore Infopedia, see <http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1614_2009-11-
30.html> 
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consuming it daily, and five per cent had tried drugs.320 As of 2 July 2009, 
there are 1,384,760 Facebook users in Singapore with a 12 month growth rate 
of 198 per cent.321 Forty-six per cent of youths are on the Internet for five 
hours or more a day. As such, the erosion of traditional family values and the 
assimilation of Western liberalism, individualism and pop culture is obvious: 
46 per cent of youths between ages 15 and 29 think that pre-marital sex is 
acceptable, with the gay community constantly clamouring for more political 
space and recognition in Singapore through the “People Like Us” forum, The 
Singapore Gay News List(SigNel), RedQuEEn! and Yawning Bread 
website;322  
(c) The family, which is the pivot of the social structure according to Confucian 
tenets, is also slowly disintegrating as shown by the increase in the number of 
divorces from 6,904 in 2005 to 7,405 in 2010 with roughly one in three 
marriages ending in divorce.323 Teenage abortions have also remained high at 
about 2,600 per year from 1995 to 1999;324  
(d) To top it all, the Chinese language schools have all but disappeared in 
Singapore by the end of the 1980s, although the importance of the study of 
Chinese as a second language by the Chinese has been continuously 
emphasized in the education system, albeit at a lower proficiency level.   
                                                            
320 “Youth Culture in Singapore”, see <http://www.youthcare.sg/issues/13.php> 
321 Nick Burcher, “Latest Facebook Usage Statistics by Country: 12 Months of Extraordinary Growth” see 
<http://www.nickburcher.com/2009/07/latest-facebook-usage-statistics-by.html> 
322 “LGBT History in Singapore”, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_history_in_Singapore> 
323 Statistics on Marriages and Divorces, 2010, Department of Statistics, at 
<http://www.singsat/gov.sg/stats/themes/people/marriages.pdf> 
324 Getforme, Singapore, see <http://www.getforme.com/health_abortions.htm> However, a survey of 1,500 
Singaporeans and permanent residents polled by the National Family Council reported in The Sunday Times on 
27 June 2010 showed that 98 per cent of respondents believe that children should regularly spend time and 
provide financial support to elderly parents, 87 per cent would not consider placing their parents in a nursing 
home and 68 per cent would prefer to have their parents stay with them whilst 91 per cent regard family as their 
top priority-more important than work, friends, interests and politics. The survey results appear to confirm the 
author’s belief that there is a constant tension between traditional value and Western liberal value in the 
Singapore society, see Kor Kian Beng “Families ‘Worth the Investment’” The Straits Times, 27 June 2010. 
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This changing value system finds expression in the way our CEOs choose 
their successors. Although Jannie Tay of The Hour Glass Limited had expressed a 
deliberate plan to groom her children to grow her family business, her former 
husband, Henry Tay has made clear that “it is the best man who will run the company, 
it may or may not be one of them”.325 Similarly, Kwek Leng Beng, the second 
generation CEO of the Hong Leong Group said in reply to questions on succession: 326 
“I think those (ie the children) who are able and capable should at least sit on the 
board but who should become the chairman is a subject that has to be assessed in the 
right context. If a suitable person is found, whether family-related or not, he will 
become [the] chairman….” 
The Tays and Kwek Leng Beng had received Western education in Australian 
and British universities respectively. Evidently, the owners of Chinese family 
businesses in Singapore are responding to institutional forces and globalization. In 
addition, the strong hand of the government is seen to be at work in organizing the 
industries of our nation. The government is keen to see our indigenous companies 
take to the world stage. In the eyes of the government, this may only be achieved if 
our companies relinquish themselves from the clutches of family control. 
C] State Intervention 
In the 1950s, the Chinese community coalesced to form the Chinese Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce and the Nanyang University to preserve the Chinese 
language and culture. After self-government was obtained in 1959, the Chinese 
community became increasingly critical of the PAP’s policies of forging a multi-
                                                            
325 Fock Siew Tong, n 295 at 104. 
326 Fock siew Tong, n 295 at 150. See further Kenny Yap of Qian Hu Corporation Limited who also said that the 
company’s future leader need not be a Yap family member, at 179. 
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racial and multi-cultural society. They felt that the “Chineseness” of Singapore was 
undermined by the PAP’s educational and cultural policies. As such, the Chinese 
community openly backed the opposition Socialist Front. The Chinese business 
community felt the alienation by the PAP government when it adopted its two prong 
policy of firstly, encouraging foreign multinationals to invest and spearhead 
Singapore’s industrialization drive; and secondly, setting up GLCs such as 
INTRACO, DBS and JTC to undertake a wide-range of business activities in 
competition with the private sector.327 
As a result, Chinese businesses remained small and medium sized enterprises 
with little or no support from the government. After the 1985 recession, the 
government realized that it cannot depend on foreign multinationals to drive the 
industrialization process. The state realized it needed to nurture the state-owned 
companies into global enterprises as well as develop the SME sector to form the core 
economy. To do this, the government had to bring about its own managerial 
revolution.  
 
Former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew once remarked: “the old family 
business in Singapore is one of the problems in Singapore…business is kept within 
the family. And the idea of sinking money into an anonymous corporation run by 
professionals over whom they have no direct personal control is foreign to them… So 
we have to accelerate this process”.328 
 
                                                            
327 Chan Kwok Bun and Ng Boey Kui, “Singapore” at 41-42 in Edmund Terence Gomez and Hsin-Huang 
Michael Hsiao, “Chinese Business in Southeast Asia: Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching 
Entrepreneurship” Curzon, 2001 
328 Lai Si Tsui-Auch and Yong-Joo Lee, “The State Matters: Management Models of Singaporean Chinese and 
Korean Business Groups” (2004) 24 Organization Studies 507 at 513. 
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The state’s intervention was particularly strong in the banking and insurance 
sector. The Banking Act stipulates that banks and insurance companies have to seek 
the MAS’s approval for the appointment of their CEO, directors and principal 
officers. It was once reported that MAS rejected a small bank’s major shareholder’s 
appointment of two of his family members as directors to the bank.  
 
In 2000, the three family-owned banks, UOB, OUB and OCBC bowed to the 
government’s call for self-renewal and retired a total of 10 long-serving directors who 
were in their 70s.329 As part of the government’s push to consolidate the banking 
sector, in June 2001, DBS made a hostile bid for OUB’s shares in a $9.4 billion cash-
and-share deal that brought OUB’s founder Lien Ying Chow and his chief executive, 
Peter Seah down to tears.330 This attracted a rival bid from UOB for a $10 billion 
cash-and-share deal, which 98.46 per cent of OUB’s shareholders overwhelmingly 
accepted.  
 
Around the same time, OCBC made an unsolicited bid for Keppel Capital 
which was also successful. To further drive home the point that banks and big insurers 
should have professionally managed boards, the MAS on 19 March 2010 announced 
that financial institutions would be barred from appointing an immediate family 
member of the chief executive as board chairman. In addition, independent directors 
should form more than half of the key board committees instead of the one-third 
recommended by the Code of Corporate Governance. And the definition of 
                                                            
329 Lai Si Tsui-Auch and Yong-Joo Lee, n 328 at 512 and 519. 
330 The Straits Times, 28 June 2001. But the government through Temasek’s chairman S Dhanabalan, who also 
happened to be DBS’s Chairman denied that the government has had a hand in the bid. 
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“independence” was tightened to deem anyone as non-independent if he has served 
more than nine years on the board.331 
 
Given the state-driven institutional isomorphic pressure on professionalism 
and the presence of professionally managed multinationals, some have argued that 
Chinese business families perceived that legitimacy will be gained from regulatory 
authorities, financiers, shareholders and other stakeholders if they professionalize 
their management.332 This explains why many of the largest Chinese family firms 
listed on the SGX have professionalized their management. These businesses are also 
faced with state-driven institutional pressures to relinquish control of their family 
businesses as, rightly or wrongly, the state perceives that for our family-owned 
companies to reach the world stage, they have to be rid of the shackles of family 
control.  
 
Contrary to these researchers, it is argued that apart from the banking and 
insurance sectors, the other sectors of industry are inducting professional managers 
into the top echelon at an extremely slow pace. This means that concentrated 
ownership have persisted despite the institutional pressures exerted by the 
government, a Western education system and “pop-culture”. The next part will argue 
why “culture” rather than other forces is the enduring reason ownership structures in 
the Chinese family firms remain concentrated, despite the institutional pressures to 
develop the “Berle and Means” corporation. 
 
5.7  WHY “CULTURE” AND NOT OTHER REASONS? 
                                                            
331 The Straits Times, 19 March 2010. 
332 Lai Si Tsui-Auch and Yong-Joo Lee, n 328 at 514. 
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A] Trust and Social Capital 
 
Francis Fukuyama in his book, “Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity” examined the cultures of many developed economies through the concept 
of trust and social capital. The ideas of trust and spontaneous sociability are 
intertwined in the sense that members of communities that trust one another are more 
likely to form voluntary associations and co-operate with each other without the 
sanction of legal rules and regulations.333 By contrast, people who do not trust one 
another will end up co-operating only under a system of formal rules and regulations, 
which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated and enforced, sometimes by coercive 
means. In economic terms, the cost of enforcing an agreement or co-operation 
amongst members of a company or association is called “transaction costs”.334 
 
Social capital is not distributed evenly among communities and societies. 
Some societies such as Germany and the U.S show a greater inclination towards 
forming voluntary associations outside of the family; whilst Chinese dominated 
societies like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore and Italy are mostly familiaristic, so 
that in the latter countries, we tend to see the preponderance of family firms. On the 
other hand, the U.S and Germany boast of large organisations that are publicly-owned 
or owned by other institutions respectively.335  
 
                                                            
333 Fukuyama, n 303 at 23-32.   
334 Fukuyama, n 303 at 27. 
335 In the Fortune Global 500 List, 2013, the largest companies in terms of revenue and profits are European and 
American companies, see <money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full-list/?iid=G500_sp_full> 
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Fukuyama posited that familiaristic societies have greater difficulty in creating 
large economic institutions, including publicly-listed companies.336 There are three 
levels of sociability that correspond to three forms of economic organization:337  
 
(a) Family and kinship which produced the family business; 
(b) Voluntary associations outside kinship which produced the professionally 
managed firm; 
(c) State which produced the state-owned or sponsored firm. 
 
Fukuyama’s theory of trust as an important catalyst in creating large economic 
organizations was confirmed by an empirical study carried out by the LLSV’s 
researchers.338 It was found that the effect of trust on large firms’ share of the 
economy was significant; a one-standard deviation increase in trust raises that share 
by seven percentage points. The study further affirms Fukuyama’s central theory that 
strong familiaristic cultures are detrimental to the growth of large firms.339 
 
B] Relationship between culture and economic organization 
 
Cultures in which family and kinship ties are strong will face a great deal of 
difficulty forming large and durable economic organizations. In these cultures, the 
state often has to step in to initiate the creation and support of large economic 
organizations. On the other hand, cultures that tend towards forming voluntary 
                                                            
336 Fukuyama, n 303 at 62. 
337 Fukuyama, n 303 at 62. 
338 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, “Trust in Large 
Organizations” (1997) 87:2 The American Economic Review 333. 
339 Rafael La Porta, n 338 at 336. 
184 | P a g e  
 
associations have little problems creating large economic organzations spontaneously 
and often the state does not need to interfere.340 
 
From preindustrial agricultural societies to modern economies, almost all 
economic endeavours begin as family businesses. The family members owned and 
managed the firm. As the firm expanded and the economies grew in size and wealth, 
they adopted joint-stock corporations and limited liability partnerships which allowed 
unrelated people to co-operate in business. The family firm, albeit in corporate form, 
was pretty enduring and existed in the U.S until the 1830s.341  
 
But it was believed that all family businesses will eventually evolved into the 
“Berle and Means” corporation. U.K social scientists such as Arthur Francis 
postulated the evolution of the family business from unity of ownership and control 
by family members to non-family members, industrial capital, professional 
management and finally to finance capital. Thus, keeping the business within the 
family was an obstruction to economic development. Max Weber, in “The Religion of 
China” argued that the strong Chinese family created “sib fetters” ,ie overly 
restrictive family bonds, that constrained the development of universal values and 
impersonal social ties that are necessary for the modern business organization.342 In 
other words, it was thought that there is an embedded path where all businesses will 
take: from the family firm (concentrated ownership) to the large “Berle and Means” 
organization of diffused ownership. 
 
                                                            
340 Fukuyama, n 303 at 62-63. 
341 Fukuyama, n 303 at 64. 
342 Fukuyama, n 303 at 65. 
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Such conventional wisdom or what I would term the “Darwinian struggle” has 
been questioned in recent years by economic historian like Alexander Gerschenkron. 
Gerschenkron observed that countries like Germany and Japan followed a different 
path to its industrial modernization. In the U.K and U.S, private entrepreneurship led 
the path to economic modernization, but in later modernizers like Germany and Japan, 
the government took an active role in promoting economic development.343 In the last 
50 years, Asian tigers like Singapore and South Korea developed their economy 
largely by government fiat.  
 
Furthermore, in this very modern era of the 21st century, we still see many 
advanced economies like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Italy dominated by family 
businesses. Why is this so?  
 
C] Familiaristic Cultures Produce Family firms- the case of Chinese-dominated 
societies 
 
A common thread that connects these economies is the familiaristic culture 
that its citizens carry within themselves which ultimately spilled into the economic 
sphere, when they enter into business. 
 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore’s private sectors are largely dominated by 
the Chinese. Although Chinese-owned coprorations may grow to very large sizes like 
Wang Laboratories of the U.S or the gigantic Li Ka-shing empire (Hong Kong), the 
Lippo Group and Salim Group (Indonesia) or Kuok Group (Malaysia), or the Hong 
                                                            
343 Fukuyama, n 303 at 66. 
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Leong Group (Singapore), they remained family owned and managed businesses. The 
pace at which family ownership separates from family management is much slower 
than in Japan or the U.S.344 These conglomerates with many subsidiaries and branches 
that span many jurisdictions are often controlled by a single family. 
 
The distinctive trait that stymies their progression to the “Berle and Means” 
corporation is “Chinese familiarism”. There is a very strong proclivity on the part of 
the Chinese people to trust only people related to them, and conversely to distrust 
anyone outside their family and kinship group”.345 
 
The Chinese family is very atomistic and not group oriented. The lack of trust 
between non-kins prevented the formation of voluntary associations between 
unrelated people. Most Chinese voluntary associations are clan-based with its 
members often related by the same surname or region. Within the Chinese family 
firm, there is a high power distance between the owners/employers and the 
employees. Most non-family employees aspire to break free form the firm and start 
their own businesses. In contrast, the Japanese banto, ie the professional manager, is 
often brought in to run the family business. The Japanese company is the surrogate 
family and Japanese employees form spontaneous association with non-kins much 
more easily, which led to the diffuse ownership structures of the large Japanese 
corporations. These Japanese corporations are part of a network of interlocking firms 
called the keiretsu. 
 
The typical trajectory of a Chinese family firm went as follows: 
                                                            
344 Fukuyama, n 303 at 74. 
345 Fukuyama, n 303 at 75. 
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Stage 1:  the firm is founded and managed by its founder/entrepreneur who will 
often co-opt and hire the family members to work in the business. Within four to five 
decades, this first-generation firm may grow to a large size in terms of revenue, 
number of employees, and lines of businesses; but it is essentially controlled by a 
single patriarch. For example, the Li Ka-shing group (Hong Kong) and the United 
Overseas Bank Group (Singapore) are first-generation family firms. 
 
Stage 2: this stage occurs upon the death of the founder. It is Chinese culture and 
tradition to divide up the family wealth and distribute an equal stake to all the 
founder’s sons. Centralized authority, which previously lies in the hands of the 
patriarch, faces potential break-up when siblings struggle for power and control over 
the business empire. The family firm may only survive into the 3rd stage if one of the 
siblings recentralized control by buying the others out, or power is shared in an 
amicable way. 
 
Stage 3: Family firms that have survived into the 3rd stage will tend to disintegrate 
further as the grand-children’s share of the business is unequal. The 3rd generation, 
having been brought up in considerable prosperity and comfort are less motivated to 
sacrifice for the family business and often developed interests outside the family firm. 
 
Although it has been argued that this phenomenon occurs in virtually all 
family businesses, regardless of ethnicity,346 it is strenuously argued that something 
exists in the Chinese psyche that prevents even a 5th generation firm such as Eu Yan 
                                                            
346 This phenomenon is called the “Buddenbrooks” phenomenon. In the U.S, it was estimated that only a third of 
family owned business survived into the 2nd generation, see Fukuyama, n 303 at 78. 
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Sang from evolving into the “Berle and Means” corporation. In contrast, American 
firms are quick to bring in professional management soon after the demise of the 
founder, or even during the tenure of the founder such as Microsoft Inc or Facebook 
Inc. 
 
D] Low-trust Societies, Familiaristic Cultures and Concentrated Ownership 
 
D.1] Chinese-dominated Societies v Italy 
In this part, I will argue that low-trust societies comprising Chinese-dominated 
economies like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore’s private sector and Italy tend to 
embrace familiaristic cultures that organized themselves as family-owned firms rather 
than the “Berle and Means” corporation when participating in the economic sphere. 
 
   The behaviour of the Chinese family firm has been fully discussed above. The 
Italian culture is closely akin to the Chinese. It is family-centred with a pervasive 
distrust of people outside the family. Social studies carried out on Italy showed that 
there are roughly three regions in Italy: (a) the impoverished South, including the 
islands of Sicily and Sardinia; (b) the industrial North formed by Milan, Genoa and 
Turin and (c) the central regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and the 
Marche called Terza Italia.  
 
The private sector in the South composd of small scale family-owned 
businesses, and there was a stark absence of voluntary associations. Fukuyama 
reiterated findings that “such attitudes…can only be understood in the context of a 
society which was dominated by distrust”. An interesting feature of low-trust societies 
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or communities is the preponderance of delinquent elements like the mafia and 
Chinese secret societies. Post-communist Russia and American inner cities were 
plagued with highly organized crime. The South was rural and peasant-based. 
 
Most of Italy’s multinationals such as the Agnelli family’s FIAT or Olivetti 
are clustered in the northern region of Italy. In contrast to other European countries 
such as Sweden, Holland and Switzerland, Italy has fewer large sized multinationals, 
even though the gross domestic product of these countries is smaller than Italy.347 The 
Terza Italia is the part of Italy that most resembles the industrial structure of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. In this region, small family-owned and managed businesses which 
are innovative and export-oriented dominated the industry landscape. Yet, this region 
could produce high-tech machine tools that served the German auto-makers. The 
industrial networks in this region are more akin to the Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore’s scenario of small and nimble family-owned businesses servicing the 
larger and foreign multinationals, than the Japanese keiretsu. 
 
The families in Terza Italia were denoted as “complex families” by 
Fukuyama.348 They were similar to the Chinese joint family where the parents lived 
together in close proximity to their married sons and their families. In contrast, the 
nuclear family structure preponderates in the North and South of Italy. In complex 
family structures, they can call upon the sons, daughters, uncles, grandparents and 
even distant relative to run the family enterprise. One sees this kind of familiarism 
replicated in the Chinese family firm. In summary, these low-trust communities failed 
to forge intermediate associations or voluntary organizations, and their lack of social 
                                                            
347 Fukuyama, n 303 at 101. 
348 Fukuyama, n 303 at 106. 
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sociability resulted in small and medium sized family-owned enterprises in the 
economic sphere. Even when these SMEs grew into publicly-listed firms, they 
remained family-owned. 
 
 D.2] Chinese-dominated Societies v Japan 
 
To reiterate my argument, Chinese culture and tradition have throughout the 
centuries embraced some forms of Confucianism and the teachings of Mencius, Laozi 
and other sages. So did the Japanese. Confucianism was introduced into Japan around 
285 AD when it was the Jin dynasty in China. It proved popular as a foundation for 
developing the political system, education system and the arts and crafts. It reached its 
heights during the Tokugawa regime when the rulers adopted Confucianiam to 
solidify and justify their power. The shogun was the military and political leader of 
the Tokugawa reign, and each social class was given a code of behaviour stemming 
from Confucianism: the samurai’s code was the bushido, the warrior’s way; the 
merchant’s code was chonindo, the merchant’s way. The tenets of Confucianism like 
loyalty, frugality, righteousness, humanity and harmony formed the backbone of 
moral behaviour in each class. When the warriors came into debt, they would have 
their debts cancelled by the merchants in exchange for higher status.349 
 
Confucianism was imbibed into business when the feudal system was 
abolished in the Meiji era. The government had given monetary compensation of an 
equivalent of six years’ salary to the privileged classes of shogun, daimyo and 
samurai to encourage them to enter the commercial society. When the samurai 
                                                            
349 Yu, Kam-Yan, “The Influence of Confucianism on Chinese and Japanese Business Society” The HKU 
Scholars Hub, The University of Hong Kong, 2003 at 9-10. A copy can be obtained from 
<http://hdl.handle.net/10722/30309> 
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entered into the business society, they brought along Confucianism with them. Thus, 
Confucianism and the business society are intertwined.350 
 
Yet, Confucianism’s influence on Japanese business produced a different 
industrial structure from the Chinese. Under the influence of Confucianism, the 
Chinese-dominated societies of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore produced family-
owned businesses with concentrated ownership as discussed above whilst Japan has a 
preponderance of very large organizations like Toyota, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo 
with dispersed ownership. Mitsubishi and Sumitomo were part of the huge family-
owned conglomerates called the zaibatsu, that thrived before World War II. During 
that time, the “big four” zaibatsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, 
controlled a quarter of the paid-in capital of businesses in Japan. The zaibatsu were 
dissolved under the American occupation but gradually reorganized themselves as the 
present-day keiretsu.351 
 
The Confucian way of harmony evoked a different response in the Chinese 
than the Japanese. For the Chinese which were a peasant society, harmony means to 
“avoid taking extreme positions, and remaining cautious even in prosperous times as 
lean days may suddenly occur”. Thus, the Chinese family firm eschewed innovation 
and research as it involved high financial costs of trial and error. As a result, the 
Chinese family firm thrived in the light manufacturing sector, food and beverage and 
retail sector. On the other hand, harmony to the Japanese means “continuous 
                                                            
350 Yu, Kam-Yan, n 349 at 14. An outstanding Japanese businessman called Shibusawa Eiichi wrote the famous 
Rongo to Soroban (The Analects and The Abacus). Shibusawa Eiichi was born in Japan in 1840 into a family 
running an agricultural-industrial-banking conglomerate. In writing the Rongo to Soroban, he believed that the 
Analects were wholly compatible with The Abacus. He exhorted that “without business expansion we can never 
achieve national prosperity when on the other hand, national prosperity will not last long if it is not based on the 
moral principle of benevolence and righteousness”. 
351 Fukuyama, n 303 at 162. 
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innovation” to keep the world in harmony. Thus, Japan produced strong, creative and 
open-minded enterprises like SONY etc. 
 
Although the zaibatsu started out as family businesses, they moved into 
professional management much earlier. During the peak of Japanese industrialization 
in the Meiji era, Japanese businesses often co-opted the banto, a hired hand, totally 
unrelated to the controlling family to oversee the family business. For example, by the 
18th Century, the Osaka merchants made a pact not to turn their businesses over to 
their children. Instead they made extensive use of the banto, who went through 
training as an apprentice and given much autonomy in decision making in the 
business. Like the Chinese, the Japanese believed in the dangers of excessive 
familiarism as expressed in this proverb: “The fortune made through the hard work of 
the first generation is all lost by the easygoing third generation”.352 Thus, the zaibatsu 
retained ownership of their business empire but delegated top authority to salaried 
managers, and even rewarding these managers with small stakes in the company, 
albeit with voting restrictions and dispositions. This situation lasted until the 
American occupation in 1945 where family ownership was deliberately broken up.353 
 
After World War II, the zaibatsu reconstituted themselves as the keiretsu, and 
they perpetuated the practice of cross shareholding. To this day, the Japanese industry 
is highly concentrated and firms are closely integrated together in supplier 
                                                            
352 Fukuyama, n 303 at 166. 
353 Fukuyama, n 303 at 167-168. The Americans believed that the large concentration of wealth by the zaibatsu 
was undemocratic and a source of support for Japanese militarism. The owners of the large family trust had to 
surrender their equity stakes with the Commission for Dissolution of Zaibatsu, which then sold the stakes to the 
public. The shareholders and top management of the zaibatsu were purged, and replaced with new managers, 
see Fukuyama, n 303 at 168. 
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relationships. However, ownership is publicly dispersed and the firms are 
professionally managed.354 
 
Hitherto, it is strenuously argued that culture in terms of Hofstede’s paradigm 
influenced the manner in which ownership structure is configurated. The Chinese 
culture can be neatly subsumed under Hofstede’s paradigm of the collectivist, high 
power distance and masculine tendencies. Such tendencies are mirrored in Ru-jiao 
teachimgs of Confucius, Mencius and Laozi. It has influenced Chinese family owners 
of Singapore firms to keep control within the business, and not sell out their stakes at 
IPO (ie concentrated ownership). On the other hand, the Japanese who have also 
adopted aspects of Confucianism into their business ethos and management styles 
created organizations with dispersed ownership. How do we explain this different 
outcome? 
 
  Fukuyama suggested that the answer lies in the different levels of trust in 
Chinese-dominated communities and the Japanese society. Chinese inheritance laws 
adopt partible or equal inheritance amongst the children, particularly the sons. The 
result is that at each generation, the estate or wealth is disintegrated. As in most cases, 
the family wealth is tied up in the family business. Hence, at each generation, the 
company breaks up into smaller parts to be distributed to the descendants. It is 
common to see different lines of business distributed amongst the descendants- as a 
result, the conglomerate breaks up into smaller entities. Furthermore, there may be in-
fighting amongst the siblings to seize control over the whole empire. This occurred in 
the Yeo Hiap Seng debacle which saw the entire business sold to third parties. 
                                                            
354 Fukuyama, n 303 at 168. 
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Alternatively, one sibling may be able to fund the purchase of the other siblings’ 
stakes in the business where the latter are no longer interested in running the family 
business, having taken on other career paths. 
 
In contrast, the Japanese family ideology is not hostile to outsiders taking on 
the household headship position. The Chinese jia or family, is very different from the 
Japanese ie, or “household”. The Japanese ie concept is more like a trust of the 
family’s assets to be watched over by a biological member of the family. But in case 
the eldest son is not able to perform that role, an outsider could be adopted into that 
role. It is not uncommon for a family without a male heir, or with an incompetent one, 
to marry a daughter to a son-in-law who will eventually take his wife’s family 
surname. He would inherit the family’s wealth as if he were the biological son, even if 
a son were born into the family subsequently. The Japanese, unlike the Chinese, are 
wary of nepotism in raising lazy or incompetent sons to succeed the business. Thus, 
even nonrelated servants who have grown up with the family could be adopted as the 
ie. For instance, Eisaku Sato, prime minister of Japan from 1964-1972 was an adopted 
son, coming himself from a prominent family.355  
 
Moreover, from time immemorial, the Japanese are prone to form iemoto 
groups. These groups are clan-like but not based on kinship and lineage like the 
Chinese counterparts. Instead they are voluntary obligations undertaken on a mutual 
basis, such as the samurai would become linked to a village of peasants to provide 
them protection in return for a share of the agricultural output.356 In modern times, 
such iemoto group culture can be seen replicated in the business organization. 
                                                            
355 Fukuyama, n 303 at 172-173. 
356 Fukuyama, n 303 at 175-176. 
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Japanese employees are known to place their loyalty to their company above their 
wives, children and parents in return for life-time employment. They devote an 
inordinate amount of time for work and company functions, going for after-office 
drinks and social bonding with their colleagues.  
 
Furthermore, the Japanese system of primogeniture mandates that the oldest 
son or the designated heir inherits the entire estate, or the entire business if the family 
wealth is tied up in the business. The younger sons often leave the household to 
establish their own households and careers in the military, bureaucracy or in 
commerce. As the “household” is not broken up into discrete pieces for distribution 
amongst the descendants like their Chinese counterparts, large family fortunes have 
remained intact for several generations. This system of inheritance together with the 
high level of trust amongst the Japanese to co-opt the unrelated banto or adopt a non-
kin ie to assume the headship role have resulted in large scale professionally managed 
companies lasting longer than the Chinese family business. The latter’s low level of 
trust against non-kin and non-blood relatives have kept the Chinese family-owned 
businesses atomistic and short-lived.357  
 
It is submitted that the above analysis validates the larger argument that 
culture influences the way societies organize their businesses. To further strengthen 
the “culture” argument, let’s take a look at Korea, another low-trust society deeply 
influenced by Confucianism but whose industrial structure boasts of such behemoths 
as Samsung, Hyundai and Lucky-Goldstar. Why is this so? 
 
                                                            
357 Fukuyama, n 303 at 174-175. 
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 D.3] Chinese-dominated Societies v Korea 
 
In terms of its economic structure, Korea is closer to Japan, Germany and the 
U.S in the sense of its very large corporations and highly concentrated industrial 
structure. However, in respect to family and social values, Korea is much closer to 
China than to Japan. All three countries adopt and practice aspects of the Ru-jiao, 
particularly Confucianism. 
 
A significant feature of the Korean industry is the presence of keiretsu-like 
structures called the chaebol. These chaebol dominated the entire country’s economic 
landscape: for example, the 20 largest chaebol produced 21.8 per cent of Korean GDP 
in 1973, 28.9 per cent in 1975 and 33.2 per cent in 1978.358 Recently, it was reported 
that including Samsung, Hyuandai and the SK Group, a total of 30 largest businesses 
accounted for 95 per cent of Korea’s GDP in 2011.359  
 
Yet, these behemoths are essentially family-owned and managed businesses. 
They operate much like the Chinese family-owned firm. According to the Fair Trade 
Commission, some 43 of the 50 largest chaebol, or 84 per cent, are currently led by 
family members of the founders.360 Samsung is controlled by Lee Kun Hee, the 3rd 
son of the founder Lee Byung Chul.361 Both Hyundai Motor Group and SK Group are 
controlled by the eldest son of the founders.  
                                                            
358 Fukuyama, n 303 at 129. 
359 “Corporate Kingpins living on borrowed time”, Korea Joongang Daily, 7 December 2012. A copy of the 
report can be obtained from <http:koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2963561> 
360 See n 359. 
361 Fukuyama, n 303 at 134 narrated how the elder Lee Byung Chul manoevered his youngest son, Kun Hee into 
leadership position, by transferring his shares into two family foundations to prevent the older sons from seizing 
control of the company. After Kun Hee was safely entrenched in power, the shares from the family foundations 
were transferred to Kun Hee. This method of succession went against the grain of Korean familiarism, which is 
very similar to the Chinese of passing the baton to the eldest son. 
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Control by the family is exerted through complex cross shareholdings. For 
example, Samsung Everland, an amusement park operator, owns a 19.3 per cent stake 
in Samsung Life Insurance, which in turn owns a stake in Samsung Electronics. 
Samsung Electronics then owns a 35.29 per cent stake in Samsung Card, which in 
turn owns a 5 per cent stake back in Samsung Everland.362  
 
Like its Chinese counterparts, Korean management style is hierarchical, 
authoritarian and centralized. It is family-based because of the low levels of trust 
against outsiders, who are not related to the founders. Family control is relatively tight 
at the top. A study found that of the top 20 chaebol, 31 per cent of the executive 
officers were family members, 40 per cent were recruited from outside and 29 per 
cent were promoted from within the organization. In chaebols that are still run by the 
founder, management decisions are often taken by him personally.363 There is no life-
time employment in Korea and Korean workers have been known to be adversarial, 
militant and anti-government.364 Then how does Korea create its very large chaebol? 
 
The answer lies in the role of the state. Though a signified culture, Korea’s 
rise as an economic power could be traced back to the predilections of one man, 
President Park Chung Hee, who seized political power in 1961. He ruled Korea with a 
strong hand until his assassination in 1979. He set the stage for a state-dominated 
economy where state-owned companies, including the entire banking sector, produced 
nine per cent of Korean GDP in 1972. The rest of the economy was tightly controlled 
by the state through state credit and the granting of licenses, subsidies and protection 
                                                            
362 See n 359. 
363 Fukuyama, n 303 at 133-135 
364 Fukuyama, n 303 at 136. 
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from foreign competition.365 The Korean government granted large subsidies and soft 
loans to the chaebol to strengthen their global position. It selected a limited number of 
firms to participate in the lucrative export market. These firms designated as general 
trading companies enjoyed preferential access to credit, markets and licenses.  
 
In 1961, Park’s government directly dictated corporate behaviour by arresting 
a number of wealthy businessmen from the Syngman Rhee era, and threatening them 
with prosecution and confiscation of their property unless they invested in industrial 
sectors dictated by the government and sold shares directly to the state.366  Under the 
state’s command, Korean businesses went into shipbuilding, petrochemicals and 
heavy industries. Although President Park ostensibly wanted to emulate the Japanese 
keiretsu of scale and size, the outcome was different. Korea’s chaebol remains family-
owned and controlled whilst the Japanese keiretsu is a network of corporations in 
supplier-assembler relationships centred around a main bank and administratively 
guided by the Japanese government. The ownership structure of the Japanese 
corporation is dispersed. This further supports my proposition that culture, inter alia, 
influences ownership patterns and management style. 
 
From the path dependence’s perspective and argument, “culture” that evolves 
over time stablilizes into an institution that “locks in” the trajectory of ownership 
development. The early Chinese businessmen had chosen the concentrated form of 
ownership structure that persisted and self-perpetuated in the modern corporations. 
Seen from the broader angle of Hofstede’s praradigm, the Chinese culture, in 
particular, the Confucian influence, created hierarchical, authoritarian and centralized 
                                                            
365 Fukuyama, n 303 at 137. 
366 Fukuyama, n 303 at 139. 
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management styles controlled through concentrated ownership of the firm. In 
addition, the low level of trust amongst the Chinese ethnic race, arising from a 
familiaristic culture and also the political circumstances of a chaotic China in 
transition from imperialism into a Republic, ensured that ownership and control are 




This chapter argues that culture is a very important determinant of ownership 
structure. Firstly, it presented the empirical data of the ownership structure of the 100 
top companies listed on the SGX. Out of 74 non-GLCs, 69 were family-owned. It is 
further found that out of 69 family-owned firms, 32 were under strong family control, 
32 under moderate family control and five under weak family control. Hence, 93 per 
cent of family firms in Singapore were under moderate to strong family control. In 
terms of ethnic ownership of the non-GLCs, 62 out of 74 firms, ie 83.7 per cent are 
owned by the Chinese. It is thus befitting to examine how the Chinese culture and 
tradition had influenced the ownership trajectory of these firms. 
 
Chapter 3 chronicled the socio-economic developments in Singapore since its 
inception in 1819 and how entrepreneurs formed sole-proprietorships, partnerships 
and incorporated entities. At the “critical juncture” of choosing an ownership 
structure, these entrepreneurs contingently chose the concentrated form. Using a 
counterfactual analysis, if the family owners had “selected” a dispersed ownership 
structure as they could have if they had emulated the dollar and sterling rubber 
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companies, a very different path would have emerged. But they had selected a 
concentrated ownership structure.  
 
This chapter argues that culture creates increasing returns and positive 
feedback, which caused concentrated ownership structures to persist. However, we 
surmised that institutional forces arising from a Western system of education, pop-
culture and state-driven policy imperatives may whittle away the cultural tendencies 
of the Chinese to keep control within the family in order to preserve the family 
fortune, or “force” our Chinese family-owned companies to give up control 
precipating a separation of ownership from control respectively. Thus, we might see 
family scions and their descendents giving up control and putting them into the hands 
of professional managers. Or we might see the state directly influencing the 
separation of ownership from control as evidenced in the banking sector. Considering 
the evidence at this stage, however, it is difficult to determine conclusively if another 
“critical juncture” had occurred that has separated ownership from control.  
 
All considered, as 93 per cent of our 69 family firms are still under strong and 
moderate family control, we can safely conclude that concentrated ownership is still 
the dominant form of corporate structure in Singapore. In the next chapter, we will 
further strengthen our arguments that concentrated ownership had persisted because 
of the utilitarian and functional explanations of self-reinforcing path dependence. In 
addition to “culture as the mother of all path dependencies”, such structures had 
persisted because of the efficiency gains from concentrated ownership together with 
fiscal advantages enjoyed under an imputation system of dividends taxation.  
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 Thus far we have explained that culture has reproduced and “lock-in” the self-
reinforcing path taken by concentrated ownership. Whether institutional isomorphism 
will become a “critical juncture” or breakpoint to cause ownership to separate from 
control remains to be seen. In this chapter, we examine two issues: firstly, whether the 
key reason why concentrated ownership persists in the SGX-listed family firms was 
Chinese culture or merely the superior financial performance of family firms, 
regardless of ethnicity (ie is it utility or culture)?  Secondly, other possible factors 
why concentrated ownership persists in Singapore’s family firms. First of all, let’s 
examine some empirical evidence of the financial performance of family firms, both 
in Singapore and elsewhere. 
 
6.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
FAMILY FIRMS 
A] Studies that showed better financial performance in family firms over non-family 
firms 
 
 Demsetz and Lehn’s study on 511 U.S corporations in the regulated utility, 
financial institutions and media/sports industries found that there was no significant 
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profits; thus casting 
doubts on Berle and Means’ hypothesis that professional managers in diffuse 
ownership structures would lower the profit yield due to managerial expropriation. In 
202 | P a g e  
 
addition, the researchers found ownership concentration in the media/sports industry 
and speculated that it could be due to the amenity potential of owners to enjoy non-
percuniary “rents”.367 Demsetz and Lehn opened the hornet’s nests that there could be 
other explanations for ownership concentration or diffusion other than the managerial 
hypothesis posited by Berle and Means.  
James argued that family firms have longer investment horizons, leading to 
greater investment efficiency. This is because the family intends to pass the firm onto 
successive generations. 368 It was estimated that 70 per cent of family businesses in 
the U.S fail to survive into the second generation of family control. The average 
business survives only about 24 years, which is the length of time the founder runs the 
firm. At first cut, this empirical finding supports my argument that Chinese 
founders/entrepreneurs behave differently from their U.S counterparts. Though the 
founders/entrepreneurs in both the U.S and Chinese-dominated societies intend for the 
firm to be passed down to successive generations, the Chinese does it better than the 
Americans. Why? I would venture to suggest that culture (and low-trust in 
familiaristic cultures) is the key reason for this difference in behaviour. 
 
Ronald C Anderson and David M. Reeb’s study found that out of the Standard 
& Poor’s 500 firms (from 1992–1999), 35 per cent of the S&P Industrials are family 
firms, and on average, families own about 18 per cent of the outstanding equity of a 
firm. The study further found that controlling for industry and firm characteristics, 
firm performance is greater in family firms than non-family firms. Relationship 
between founding-family holdings and firm performance is non-monotonic- 
performance first increases as family ownership increases but then decreases with 
increasing family ownership. Performance peaked when family ownership reached 
30.8 per cent. Both types of firms, older and younger than 50 years, exhibited better 
performance than non-family firms. In addition, the same study established that 
family firms had differential performance depending on CEO status — CEOs who are 
                                                            
367 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences” 
(1985) 93:6 Journal of Political Economy 1155. 
368 Harvey S James Jr, “Owner As Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm”, (1999) 6:1 International 
Journal of the Economics of Business 41 at 44 and 47. 
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family members (founder or founder descendants) exhibit a positive relation to 
accounting profitability measures. Market performance however appears to be better 
only in the presence of founder CEOs and outside (hired-hand) CEOs; founder 
descendants serving as CEO have no effect on market performance.369 
 
A similar result was obtained by Villalonga and Amit when examining data of 
all Fortune-500 companies during 1994-2000. They found that family ownership 
creates value only when the founder is still active in the firm as CEO or as chairman 
with a hired CEO. When family firms are run by descendants-CEO, minority 
shareholders are worse off than they would be in non-family firms. This holds true 
even when the founder remains as chairman of the firm. The negative effect of 
descendant-run firms is entirely attributable to second-generation firms.370 
 
 B] Familial factors that undermine the financial performance of family firms 
A study of 465 Taiwanese listed companies found that the optimum share of 
family ownership in a firm to positively affect its performance is 30 per cent; after 
which the potential for entrenchment and poor performance becomes greater. It was 
reported that family members have both the power and the incentive to seek personal 
benefits at the expense of firm performance. For instance, the Disney family 
influences the policies of the firm to satisfy the needs of the family rather than 
                                                            
369 Ronald C. Anderson and David M. Reeb, “Founding-family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence 
from S&P 500” (2003) 58:3 Journal of Finance 1301 at 1303. 
370 Belen Villalonga and Raphael Amit, “How do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm 
Value?” (2006) 80 Journal of Financial Economics 385   
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maximize the profits of the firm. It was further stated that inherited management 
within the family negatively affects the performance of a firm.371  
 
Lucia Naldi et al carried out a study on a sample of 696 Swedish SMEs 
(comprising 265 family firms and 431 non-family firms), and reported that family 
firms tend to be more risk-averse and conservative in their strategy making for the 
firm. They posited that since the managers’ equity position in the firm is high, they 
are afraid of losing their family’s accumulated wealth and jeopardizing the financial 
and social well-being of future generations. Moreover, the study concluded that risk 
taking in family firms is negatively related to performance.372  
 
Extant literature has indicated that the duality role (ie the CEO-chairman roles 
are conflated in one person) of firms with family ownership is found to be negatively 
correlated to Tobin’s Q and ROA, suggesting that family firms with separated 
positions achieve a better performance.373 In contrast, non-family firms with duality 
                                                            
371 Jonshi Shyu, “Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese Firms” (2011) 7:4 
International Journal of Managerial Finance 397 
372 Lucia Naldi, Mattias Norqvist, Karin SjÖberg and Johan Wiklund, “Entrepreneurial Orientation, Risk 
Taking, and Performance in Family Firms” (2007) 20 Family Business Review 33 at 41 and 43. However, 
Shaker A Zahra (2005) in a study of 209 U.S family firms in the manufacturing industry reported that CEO-
founder duality does not have any bearing on entrepreneurial risk taking. However, the length of a CEO’s tenure 
is negatively associated with entrepreneurial risk taking, in respect of a family firm’s emphasis on innovation 
and venturing in domestic and international markets. Hence, long CEO tenures create strategic simplicity and 
prevent the firms from responding to changes in the environment. An interesting result from the study was a 
finding that the higher the number of generations from the same owner, the higher the firm’s focus on 
innovation, suggesting that multiple generations bring fresh insights and experiences into the firm, triggering 
innovation, see Shaker A Zahra, “Entrepreneurial Risk Taking in Family Firms” (2005) 18:23 Family Business 
Review 23 at 35-37. 
373 Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Mcknight and Mira (2003) cited in H Ibrahim and F.A Samad, “Agency 
Costs, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Performance of Public Listed Family Firms in Malaysia” (2011) 
42:3 South African Journal of Business Management 17 at 21. 
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positions correlate positively with ROA, suggesting that strong leadership at the top 
delivers good performance.374 
 
C] Is it culture or efficiency that caused family firms to endure beyond the founder 
generation? 
 At first glance, family firms tend to perform better than non-family firms, 
particularly if they are still managed by the founder as CEO or as Chairman with a 
hired CEO. Evidence on efficiency of descendant-run family firms varied but tended 
to show that they are worse off for minority shareholders, and inherited management 
within the family negatively affects the performance of the firm. Therefore, we can 
conclude that family firms per se do not guarantee a superior financial performance, 
and hence its survival. It depends on the corporate ownership and management 
structure. As successive generations move farther away from the founder’s vision and 
familiaristic management culture, the firm’s propensity to disintergrate increases. Yet 
there is a distinct difference between the U.S family firm and the Chinese family firm. 
The average U.S family firm’s life span of 24 years quite clearly shows that the firm 
tends to “die” with the founder. The Anglo-american founder may consider the firm 
his personal property, but does not intend to pass the firm down to his descendants.375 
 
 In contrast, the Chinese family businesses, whether in Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore or elsewhere, often build Confucian cultural values into their corporate 
                                                            
374 See H Ibrahim and F.A Samad, n373 at 21. This finding is confirmed by Sridharan and Marsinko (1997). 
375 Jun Yan and Ritch Sorenson, “The Effect of Confucian Values on Succession in Family Business” (2006) 
19:3 Family Business Review 235 at 242. 
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ethos, promote succession, and a high level of trust amongst family members albeit 
low trust against outsiders and professional management. 
D] Financial Performance of Family Firms in Singapore 
The CGIO Study: The Performance of SGX-listed Family Firms v Non-
family Firms  
D.1] Characteristics 
 
Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
The GCIO reported that family firms in Singapore on average perform better 
than non-family firms by two per cent on a ROA (figure 20). It was further reported 
that family firms make up 34 per cent of the total assets of all SGX-listed firms and 
30 per cent of the total market capitalization (figure 21). The SGX-listed family firms 
are typically smaller than non-family firms. In contrast, state-linked firms, though 
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Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
Family firms are largely found in the hotel and restaurants, construction, 
commerce and manufacturing industries (figure 22). This data confirms the argument 
above that family firms eschewed large capital investments in R & D, preferring to 
stay in the hospitality, food and beverage and light manufacturing industries. This 
finding further syncs with the data that 83 per cent of SGX-listed family firms are 
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Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
 
 
Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
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On average, families own about 33 per cent equity in a firm, either held by 
individuals or through family holding companies owned by the same family. Equity in 
family firms are commonly held by individual shareholders than in non-family firms, 
based on the top 20 shareholders (figure 23). Ownership concentration among the top 
10 owners in family firms and non-family firms are at 74 per cent and 73 per cent 
respectively.  
D.2] Corporate Governance 
On average, family members hold 35 per cent of the board seats in SGX-listed 
family firms (figure 24). The two figures below compare the board composition 
between family firms and non-family firms (figure 25 and 26). 
 
 
Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
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Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
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Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
In family firms, founders formed 89 per cent of executive directors and co-
founders formed 91 per cent of executive directors. Other family members comprise 
79 per cent of executive directors and only 20 per cent are non-family members. The 
majority, ie 67 per cent of independent directors are non-family members whilst one 
per cent of independent directors are other family members. Founders and co-
founders together formed 20 per cent of non-executive directors, 18 per cent 
comprising other family members, and non-family members taking up 11 per cent 
(figure 27). 
 
Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
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Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
Family members are often the Chairman or CEO of family firms — 82 per 
cent of family members and 90 per cent of family members occupy the position of 
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Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
CEO-Chairman duality was found in 44 per cent of family firms (figure 29). In 
line with the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012, family members 
refrained from occupying board committees. Only 19 per cent of the nominating 
committee comprised family members, while eight per cent and six per cent of the 
remuneration committee and the audit committee respectively are occupied by family 
members. 
 
Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 






214 | P a g e  
 
 
Source: CGIO, Drawing a Portrait of Family Firm Governance in Singapore: A Study of SGX-Listed 
Family Firms, 2012 
The average tenures of directors in family firms (11 years) are longer than 
non-family firms (seven years). Within family firms, family member tenures averages 
19 years compared to non-family firms of seven years (figure 30 and 31). 
 
Overall, the above findings show that the SGX-listed family firms are mostly 
at the founder-stage of ownership and management. Family members occupy key 
positions in the firm and ownership has not separated from management. It may then 
be argued that the reason SGX-listed firms remain in concentrated ownership form is 
because of every entrepreneur’s natural desire to keep control of the business in order 
to maximize his returns, regardless of ethnicity. I would, however, stick to my 
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the key reason why Chinese family firms remained in concentrated ownership 
structures. The Eu Yan Sang case-study below supports this argument. 
 D.3] Case-study of Eu Yan Sang Limited. 
Eu Yan Sang’s corporate history supports my argument that the Chinese 
Confucian culture is embedded in the “collective programming of the corporate mind” 
such that it ensured the firm’s survival into its 5th generation.  
 
Eu Yan Sang started off as a traditional medicine shop on Gopeng’s High 
Street in Perak, Malaysia on 23 July 1879. Its founder was the late philanthropist, Eu 
Tong Sen’s father Eu Kong. Eu Kong built up a successful business in tax farming, tin 
mining, and a postal and banking hub for Chinese coolies. However, he died at a pre-
mature age of 37. Eu Tong Sen inherited the business at a tender age of 15. In 1932, 
Eu Tong Sen Ltd was incorporated, but Tong Sen died in 1941, leaving a vast estate 
that took some 50 years to liquidate. As Eu Tong Sen had 11 wives and 13 children, 
family squabbles were rife and frequent. His eldest son, Keng Chee took over the 
helm after Tong Sen’s death in accordance to his Will. In accordance to Chinese 
partible inheritance custom, Tong Sen divided his estate equally amongst his 13 
children. 
 
In 1973, Eu Yan Sang Holdings Ltd was listed on the SGX, bringing about a 
25 per cent reduction in the Eu’s ownership of the family business. Out of 20 million 
S$1 shares, 10 per cent was offered to the public. Three Eu brothers remained on the 
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board, and four non-Eus were co-opted from the wider business community. But the 
Eu’s family holdings remained at 75 per cent. 
 
The crown jewel of Eu Yan Sang were their real estate holdings at prime 
districts in Singapore, which accounted for more than half of the company’s paid-up 
capital of S$8 million. Two finance companies were added to the stable of businesses. 
When William Keng Yuet retired in 1989, the 4th generation of Eus, led by Dick Yee 
Ming, took over the business.  
 
38 year-old Dick Yee Ming, had a vision for the family’s traditional Chinese 
medicine business, although he was well-educated in Western business management. 
However, not all of the Eus shared the same vision as him and many sold out. As a 
result, the Lum Chang Group, a construction and property development giant, was 
able to stage a takeover of EYS Holdings so as to gain control of Eu Yan Sang’s vast 
property empire.  
 
The Lum Chang Group, however, kept Richard Keng Mun and Dick on as 
Chairman and Executive Director respectively to manage the traditional medicine 
division. In the intervening years, Eu Yan Sang made double-digit growth despite 
being owned by non-Eus. In 1993, Dick made his move to purchase the medicinal arm 
worth some S$10.8 million back from Lum Chang.  
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Eu Yan Sang has gone full circle back to its original business of traditional 
Chinese medicine. It is run by the 4th generation Eus, who are open to co-opting 
professional managers onto its board although Richard and Dick kept a tight rein on 
the business. The company continued its tradition of providing two meals daily to its 
30 employees, some of whom have served the company for over 40 years. It is still 
very much a family business, run by the 4th generation descendants who continued to 
echo its founder’s vision to “care for mankind by helping out consumers, realize good 
life-ling health”.376 
 
The 4th generation’s management culture was summarized by Professor 
Carlock as follows:377 
“The Eu family will always carry the independent-minded DNA that drove their 
great-grandfather to strike out on his own, and there will always be a diversity of family 
views about what is best for the company. The difference today is that the family understands 
that family disputes must be resolved through governance processes, not personalities or 
family politics. Branch family meetings have replaced private conversations and “backroom 
deals”, ensuring that family members have the opportunity to share their concerns with their 
family member on the board. An important responsibility of the four Eu family board 




376 Ilsa Sharp, “Path of the Righteous Crane: The Life and Legacy of Eu Tong Sen” Landmark Books, 2009 at 
137. Eu Kong’s first medicinal shop was named “Yan Sang” which roughly translated meant “benevolence and 
life” or “caring for mankind”. 
377 Ilsa Sharp, n 376 at 143. 
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Furthermore, although the company has vowed to reduce family dominance of 
its board, it is clear that the 4th generation owners intend to pass the family  
“heirloom” ie the traditional medicine business to their 5th generation descendants. 
The company will continue to enshrine Eu values of caring for mankind and Asian 
traditions, even as it moves into professional management.378  
 
Thus, I would argue, based on the Eu Yan Sang’s case study, that the key 
factor that keeps the ownership of Eu Yan Sang within the Eu family, even into its 4th 
generation, is CULTURE, ie the Chinese Confucian values of filial piety, caring for 
relatives and employees, building a lasting business for descendants and eschewing 
illegal business. The company underwent a major change in ownership when it was 
bought over by the Lum Chang Group, but after a decade, it re-organized itself back 
into a closely-held family firm, re-focusing on its traditional business.   
 
The desire to keep the family business within the family as an “heirloom” for 
inheritance can be seen in the memorandum and articles of two prominent family 
businesses in Singapore. For example, article 30 of Hong Leong Company Ltd states 
that “the directors may without assigning any reason refuse to register any transfer of 
shares to any person who is not a spouse or lineal descendant of a member”. The 
desire to keep ownership within the family was also evident in article 26 of Wee 
Investments Limited which provides that “…the Directors may, without assigning any 
reason therefor, refuse to register the transfer of any share…”. The family holding 
                                                            
378 Ilsa Sharp, n 376 at 143. 
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company serves to hold the family members together, and prevent the disintegration 
of the family firm. 
 
6.3 UTILITARIAN AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF SELF-
REINFORCING PATH DEPENDENCE 
A] The Controller’s Roadblock 
 
 It is my contention that although culture is a strong self-reinforcing actor in 
the path dependence argument, other actors, particularly economic efficiency factors 
are probably in action too, when answering a question as complex as the cause of 
ownership dispersion. Now we explore these other factors that have played a part in 
causing ownership of SGX-listed family firms to remain concentrated from its 
inception.  
 
In chapter 1, we discuss how the utilitarian and functional aspects of self-
reinforcing path dependence caused contingently selected sequences of events to 
persist. Bebchuk and Roe had given an example of the utilitarian explanation of self-
reinforcing path dependence. The authors tell us that it is difficult, though not 
impossible for a concentrated ownership structure to become a diffuse ownership 
structure because of path dependence.  
 
In what is termed “structure-driven path dependence”, initial ownership 
structures at Tº persists at T¹ because the institutional and cultural environment (ie 
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sunk adaptive costs and complementaries) may favour such structures or the rents that 
controllers benefit from having control will not be given up easily.379  
  
 In essence, a family owner who holds 100 shares at Tº in a concentrated 
ownership structure will not sell off his shares at T¹ to become a dispersed ownership 
structure because the gains to him are higher if he remains in a concentrated structure 
than in a dispersed structure, even though a dispersed structure may be more efficient 
overall. In other words, while the move to a dispersed ownership structure will be 
efficient, the controller would not be served by it, because the controller would lose 
her rent (ie private benefits of control) and would not fully capture the efficiency 
gains from the move, some of which inured to the minority shareholders.”380 
 
 However, this is not to say that the controller will never move to a diffuse 
ownership structure. If the efficiency gains to the family owner in a dispersed 
structure far exceed the private benefit of control he gets under a concentrated 
structure, then the family owner will divest. In other words, if the private benefits of 
control are very large, then concentrated structures will persist unless some external 
forces break up these benefits. These external forces could be rent-reducing legal 
rules or other socio-economic or political conditions that are specific to every 
economy.  
 
B] Utilitarian Explanation-Private Benefits of Control 
 
                                                            
379 Lucian A Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, n 29. 
380 Lucian A Bebchuk and Mark J Roe, n 29 at 11-12. 
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 Bebchuck and Roe’s path dependence theory can explain why blockholders in 
family firms do not use the IPO route to divest but would rather sell to another 
blockholder because they can then extract the full value of their private benefits of 
control especially in a take-over situation.  
 
B.1] Case Study of Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd 
 
Take the case of the sale of Yeo Hiap Seng shares in block deals to rival 
bidders Ng Teng Fong and Quek Leng Chan in 1994 after the family-owned firm 
broke up when Alan Yeo petitioned to the court to wind up Yeo Hiap Seng on the 
“just and equitable” ground.381 Speculations were rift that members of the Yeo family 
were selling off their blocks in deals to either of these tycoons. In such bidding for 
block deals, the Yeo family can extract a higher price than if they sold a piece in the 
open market because it was rumoured that the rival bidders were keen to buy Yeo 
Hiap Seng Ltd for its large tracts of land in Bukit Timah.382  
 
Barclay and Holderness pioneered a method to measure the size of the private 
benefits of control-the difference between the price per share paid by the acquiror and 
the price quoted in the market the day after the sale’s announcement.383  The price 
paid by Ng Teng Fong for purchasing a control block on 28 September 1995 was 
$5.35 a share and the opening price when trading resumed on 19 January 1996 (after 
                                                            
381 Lan Luh Luh, n 128 for the chronological events that led to property tycoon Ng Teng Fong taking control of 
Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd. 
382 Lan Luh Luh, n 128 at 186. At the end of the take-over battle between Quek Leng Chan and Ng Teng Fong, 
Yeo Hiap Seng shares were sold to Ng Teng Fong at $5.35 per share, representing a 38.2 per cent premium over 
the adjusted net tangible asset of $3.87 per share (see 188-189).  
383 Alexandra Dyck and Luigi Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison” The Centre 
for Research in Security Prices, Working Paper No 535 and the Harvard Law School Programme on 
Negotiation, a copy available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=296107  at 8. 
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the market has incorporated the identity of the new acquiror in its expectation of 
future cash flow) was $4.90 a share.384 One could say that an estimate of the size of 
the private benefits of control is the difference between the two, ie 45 cents a share 
which represents the premium that Ng paid for obtaining control of Yeo Hiap Seng. 
As evidenced by the Yeo Hiap Seng take-over saga, ownership did not dispersed but 
in fact became even more concentrated (at 92.2 per cent) after Ng Teng Fong took 
control.385  
 
I would argue that Bebchuk and Roe’s path dependence theory can explain 
why the Yeo family members did not sell their shares to public shareholders in the 
open market because they wanted to extract the full value of the private benefits of 
control. The rent-seeking behavior of the blockholder act to ensure that ownership 
remains concentrated. The efficiency gains from concentrated ownership have 
become locked-in and family-owners are unwilling to give up this gain. 
 
C] More Utilitarian Aspects-IPO Underpricing and Cashing Out 
 
 Next, we note that when blockholders in Chinese family businesses divest at 
IPO, they often keep a significant proportion of shares within the family, reinforcing 
concentrated ownership. This could be due the underpricing problem encountered in 
all IPOs.386 The underpricing phenomenon occurs because informed investors lined 
                                                            
384 Ideally, the price paid by acquirer should only take into account the price paid for the control block and not 
the price paid to all the shareholders in a tender offer. But sales of control blocks under 30 per cent are often 
carried out in private contracts where the transacted price is not published. As such, the tender offer price is used 
as a rough guide for the price paid for obtaining control. 
385 At the close of the take-over the Stock Exchange of Singapore held records that Orchard Parade Holdings 
and its affiliates held 92.2 per cent stake in Yeo Hiap Seng Ltd, see Lan Luh Luh, n 128 at 189. 
386 Roger G Ibbotson, Jody L Sindelar and Jay R Ritter, “Initial Public Offerings” in Donald Chew, “New 
Developments in Commercial Banking” Blackwell Finance, 1991 at 339. 
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up to buy the undervalued stock and avoid the overvalued stocks whilst the 
uninformed investors will do the opposite, thereby earning a less than average return. 
To continue attracting uninformed as well as informed investors to the market, new 
issues must be underpriced on average to provide uninformed investors with 
acceptable rates of return.387  
 
Studies of the underpricing phenomenon in Singapore showed that new issues 
are underpriced by 37.5 per cent (1984 study), 38.4 per cent (1985 study) and 27 per 
cent (1989 study) respectively. A study in 2005/6 showed that the mean underpricing 
of a sample of 263 IPOs between 2001 and 2005 was 21.4 per cent. In addition, 
family firms underpriced their shares by approximately 12 per cent more than non-
family firms. By underpricing the new issues, it can be deduced that owner/founders 
do not attempt to divest all their shares at IPO.388  
 
 A second reason for IPO underpricing could be that the dominance of the 
GLCs have so crowded out the private enterprises that the growth prospects of these 
firms may be sub-optimal and hence, a lower IPO price has to be used. Chapter 7 
explains the “crowding out” phenomenon. 
 
In 1995, Pagano and Zingales empirically examined a sample of Italian firms 
(Note: Italian firms are owned and controlled by family owners from low-trust 
familiaristic cultures akin to the Chinese) to find out why some of these firms went 
public. They found, inter alia, that in 39.8 per cent of the firms that went public, the 
company raised new equity and the control group did not sell its equity at the time of 
                                                            
387 Roger G Ibbotson, n 386 at 345. 
388 Toh Shaowei, “Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: An Empirical Analysis of Family-owned Firms in 
Singapore” Honours thesis for Bachelor’s of Social Science Degree, National University of Singapore, 2005/6.  
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IPO. In another 39.8 per cent of the firms, the company issued new equity while the 
control group sold some equity. Only in 11.7 per cent of the cases did the company 
issue new equity while the control group divested its portfolio. It was further found 
that the controlling shareholders of independent companies that went public were less 
likely to divest at the time of IPO (42 per cent versus 62 per cent for carve-outs) and 
divested on average less (6.1 per cent of the value of the company compared to 17.9 
per cent for carve-outs) than the parent companies of subsidiaries that went public (ie 
the carve-outs).389  
 
Based on pagano and Zingales’ study, it is argued that controlling 
shareholders/owners of Italian family firms tend not to part with control of the firm 
when they float the firm publicly as only 11.7 per cent of the controlling owners 
divested their portfolio.  In chapter 4, we have shown that the Italian culture closely 
mirrors the Chinese culture in terms of the strong familial bonds amongst family 
members and relatives, resulting in low levels of trust against outsiders. Hence, there 
is a preponderance of family firms in Italy with concentrated ownership structures. 
 
We propose testing whether SGX-listed family firms exhibit similar 
behaviour. We use a sample of IPOs in 2000 as a gauge of whether the controlling 
shareholders in such firms use the IPO route to divest after the moratorium expires.390 
                                                            
389 Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta and Luigi Zingales, “Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis” 
NBER Working Paper No. 5367, 1995 available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=225430>  at 36-37. The study 
found that independent companies went for IPO to rebalance their capital structure after implementing 
substantial investment plans and reducing leverage, while carve-outs went for IPO to raise resources to finance 
current investment and for divestment purposes. It is further found that the costs of credit to independent 
companies reduced after IPO than for carve-outs. This could be due to more transparency in information after 
listing which reduces the costs of information to banks and the competition in financing options available to the 
company after listing, see 32-35. 
390 Note that it was often not clear from the data in the prospectuses how many of the shares belonging to the 
blockholders were sold to the public at IPO (ie evidence of divestment of portfolio). However, SGX listing rules 
require that at least 25 per cent of a company’s shares be offered to the public at IPO and considering that a 
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After the moratorium expired, it was found that the owners/founders in under half of a 
sample of 32 IPOs in 2000 liquidated only small amounts of their shareholdings 
within the first and/or second year of the company’s IPO. The following table shows 
the data:391 
 
Table 24: Extent of Divestment of Shares By Founders, 2000 
Name of Company  Number of shares  Number of shares sold Share 
    at IPO   within 1st or 2nd year  sold 
in % 
     (million)  (million)   
            
Addvalue Technologies Ltd  156.9       6.3    4.0% 
AEM-Evertech Hldgs Ltd   219.4       7.0    3.1%  
AirOcean Ltd    198.5     10.5    5.2% 
Aussino.com Ltd     80.0       4.0    5.0% 
Food Empire Hldgs Ltd  218.4     14.7    6.7% 
Goodpack Ltd    169.2     15.0    8.8% 
Hong Lai Huat Grp Ltd  231.8     19.5    8.4% 
Hua Kok Int’l Ltd   170.0          3.0    1.7% 
iSoftel Ltd    120.7       3.0    2.5% 
Jurong Technologies Ind Corp Ltd 270.9       3.0   1.1% 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
mean of 69.52 per cent of shares are held by a blockholder, it can be surmised that blockholders did not offer a 
substantial amount of their shears to the public at IPO nor do they divest substantial portions of their portfolio 
after IPO.    
391 The year 2000 was chosen because it is the first year that data was available from the SGX on IPOs. Data 
was culled from 44 companies that went public in the year 2000. Data on 12 companies were incomplete and 
therefore excluded from the sample. The shareholdings of the owners/founders were measured at the time of 
IPO, and in the first and second years after IPO from information contained in the prospectuses and the annual 
reports.  
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Sing Lun Hldgs Ltd   153.9       2.9    1.9% 
Tat Hong Hldgs Ltd   269.4     10.0    3.7% 
Wizoffice.com Ltd   306.6     13.4    4.4%
 Source: Annual Reports  
 
 Due to the small sample size of the study, Table 24 can only constitute prima 
facie evidence that owners/founders in Chinese firms do not use the IPO route to 
divest their shareholding. The owners/founders in the 12 listed companies probably 
divested small amounts of their shareholdings for profit-taking. Evidently, 
blockholders (representing the controlling shareholders) in SGX-listed family firms 
do not intend to divest their portfolio at IPO- indicating a desire to keep control of the 
firm within the family. 
 
It is submitted that the reasons for this self-reinforcing path dependence are 
entirely utilitarian because the family owner’s gains are maximized through holding a 
controlling stake in the firm which allows him to extract private benefits of control. 
The benefits inuring to him far outweigh the costs of shifting to a dispersed ownership 
pattern even though dispersed ownership may arguably be a more efficient 
outcome.392 This is an illustration of the second degree path dependence expounded in 
chapter 1 where seemingly inefficiencies are not remediable.  
   
D] Functional Explanation-Fiscal Advantages 
  
                                                            
392 Ronald Gilson has argued convincingly that the concentrated structure may be just as efficient as the 
dispersed form, see Ronald Gilson, n 32. 
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 As argued above, the owners of Chinese family firms value their control 
highly. These owners could extract private benefits of control through regular 
dividends payout or through capital gains on retained earnings, or executive 
compensation, perquisites and loans to shareholders and directors, and transfer pricing 
amongst related companies. Thus concentrated ownership serves the function of 
providing private benefits of control to the family-owners. In other words, the 
consequences of concentrated ownership are also understood to be the causes of the 
reproduction of that institution.393 
 
 This section explores the functional aspects of self-reinforcing path 
dependence. In other words, it is argued that concentrated ownership fulfils a fiscal 
advantage under the previous imputation system of taxation of dividends- a functional 
explanation. 
 
Prior to 1 January 2003, tax paid by a resident company on its profits was 
passed on as a tax credit to its shareholders upon distribution of profits as dividends. 
When the shareholders received the dividends, they get a tax credit (so-called section 
44 tax credit) if their marginal rate of taxation is higher than the corporate rate and 
they can a refund of the tax paid if their marginal rate of taxation is lower than the 
corporate tax rate.394  For example, if the UOB makes $100,000 profit: 
 
United Overseas Bank Ltd 
Profits    $100,000 
Tax (assuming 17%)  $  17,000 
                                                            
393 James Mahoney, n 34 at 519. 
394 Angela Tan, “Master Tax Guide Handbook”, 26th edition, CCH, 2007/8 at 284 
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Dividends   $  83,000 
 
Wee Investments Pte Ltd (family holding company) 
Received dividends  $83,000 
Tax (assuming 17%)  $14,110                                                
   
Wee Investments Pte Ltd will receive a tax credit of $14,110, therefore they will 
enjoy tax-free dividends.  
 
 If Wee Investments Pte Ltd declares a dividend to the family members, the 
family members will get a proportional tax credit of the $14,110 and assuming they 
are in the top bracket of assuming 20 per cent, they will pay only 3 per cent tax. But 
for those family members whose marginal tax rate is less than 17 per cent such as 
Wee Cho Yaw’s wife or any other non-working family member, they would enjoy a 
tax refund. 
 
 I would argue that under the imputation system of taxation, the Wee family 
would likely hold the dividends at the family holding company level to minimize their 
tax liability.  
 
 When the imputation system was abolished on 1 January 2003, companies 
were given five years to utilize their section 44 tax credit. It was reported that OCBC 
had accumulated section 44 credits of $400 million.395 About 50,000 companies, 
representing half of all firms in Singapore had accumulated section 44 credits that ran 
                                                            
395 Business Times, 16 January 2003. 
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into billions.396 It was particularly noted that the Singapore banks had accumulated 
substantial section 44 credits given their past profitability record, high retained 
earnings and low dividend payout (nine-year averages of 29.7 per cent for DBS, 26.9 
per cent for OCBC and 34.8 per cent for UOB).397 This means that listed family firms 
like UOB paid 34.8 cents on every dollar of earnings as dividends to its shareholders. 
The remaining 65.2 cents went into retained earnings for investments and growth 
purposes.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the imputation system would have worked well for the 
Wee family and entitled them to tax-free dividends when they would hold the 
dividends at the holding company level and refrained from paying dividends to family 
members if their top marginal rate was 55 per cent at that time. For those family 
members who were not working, their marginal rate would probably be less than the 
40 per cent corporate rate at that time, and it made sense to distribute them dividends 
because they would obtain a tax refund from the authorities.  
 
When the corporate tax rates and individual tax rates were about the same in 
the 1990s, they were more likely to have declared dividends to the family members 
and paid the differential rates. However, due to the dividends “smoothing” theory,398 
the Wee family are also unlikely to suddenly increase/decrease the dividend payout 
                                                            
396 The Straits Times, 20 January 2003. 
397 The Edge, 10 February 2003. 
398 Lintner, J, “Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes” 
(1956) 46 American Economic Review 97. In this theory, empirical evidence supported two main factors 
affecting the decision to pay dividends. Firstly, managers are concerned to see the stability of stable dividends as 
they believe that the market puts a premium on firms with a stable dividend policy. Secondly, dividends vary 
with long-run, sustainable earnings and are smooth from year to year so as not to adversely affect the share 
price. As such, dividend changes depend on current earnings and past dividends, and managers will partially 
adjust dividends to the target payout ration rather than make huge changes to the dividend payments when 
earnings increase. For instance, they may pay special dividends or repurchase shares to return excess capital to 
shareholders. 
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ratio. In short, the family would not want to disintegrate their family holdings by 
selling to public shareholders because the imputation system of taxation had improved 
their overall tax position.   
 
Overall, the imputation system of the past would have encouraged families to 
continue holding their wealth in family holding companies, and with a low dividend 
payout ratio, families are not under pressure to unravel their family holdings.399 In 
addition, family members enjoyed executive perks and perquisites and unless there is 
a family squabble, they are unlikely to incur transaction costs to unravel their family 
holdings. Even in a case of family feud such as Yeo Hiap Seng, the different family 
factions are likely to sell in blocks to rival take-over bidders in order to extract full 
value for the control premium. It is unlikely they will sell a piece in the open market 




This chapter continued with the culture dimension argument of family firms 
using empirical studies of the financial performance of family firms. Generally, 
family firms performed better than non-family firms. However, the superior 
performance of family firms depends on the generational characteristics in the 
ownership and control of the firm. Founder firms tend to perform better than 
descendant-run firms. This affirms the argument that family firms will tend to 
disintegrate after one or two generations as poor performance will see the firm closed 
down eventually. But comparing the U.S and the Chinese family firm, the latter lasted 
                                                            
399 Brian Cheffins, n 116 at 80 where Cheffins argued that the high dividend payout ratios of British companies 
provided a potential catalyst for blockholders to exit in the U.K. 
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longer than the former. These American founders/entrepreneurs are more likely to sell 
off bigger chunks of their shares at IPO compared to their Chinese counterparts. 
Therefore, I argued that Chinese founders/entrepreneurs intend to keep ownership and 
control within the family as it is an intrinsic part of Chinese culture to preserve the 
family wealth as an inheritance for future generations. 
 
In addition to the culture argument, I added the utilitarian and functional 
aspects of the path dependent theory as utility arguments to show how concentrated 
ownership is reinforced as Chinese owners enjoyed “rents” ie private benefits of 
control which they are reluctant to give up (see Bebchuk and Roe’s thesis). These 
“rents” are fully exploited when they sell control to outsiders as seen in the Yeo Hiap 
Seng saga.  
 
It is further observed from a small sample of IPOs in 2000 that SGX-listed 
family firms do not divest huge amounts of their shares at IPO. Such behaviour could 
be due to culture as it was also seen in the IPOs of Italian firms, which is another 
familiaristic culture. Or it could be due to IPO underpricing. In both cases, ownership 
would tend to remain concentrated. 
 
Lastly, I would argue that the imputation system of taxation prior to 2003, had 
facilitated family firms to keep ownership concentrated so that they can maximize 










 Having surveyed the manifold reasons why ownership is concentrated in 
Singapore’s family firms, it is now necessary to explore the reasons why ownership is 
also concentrated in the state-owned companies in Singapore, what are commonly 
known as GLCs. 
 
 In essence, this chapter seeks to establish the political roots of corporate 
ownership in Singapore companies in the light of path dependence theories. My thesis 
runs as follows: “critical junctures” in the historical developments in Singapore, 
namely the PAP winning the seat of power in the 1959 general elections set in motion 
a sequence of events that eventually led to the formation of GLCs with concentrated 
ownership. After separating from Malaysia in 1965 (so-called “conjuncture”), 
Singapore attained full independence and reacted with a path of dominance by the 
PAP.  
 
The hegemonic power of the PAP in dominating Singapore politics for close 
to 50 years led to a moribund civil society and private sector. The enlargement of the 
government and public sector in the 1960s and 1970s so encroached onto the private 
sector that the latter was starved of capital, investment, talent and other resources. The 
result is a shrunken private sector that is lacking in life and vitality compared to the 
public sector. The companies in the private sector remain family-owned even if they 
went public, and for the reasons expounded in the preceding chapters had 
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concentrated ownership structures. On the other hand, the GLCs which were formerly 
state-owned enterprises or appendages of the civil service began with concentrated 
ownership despite being privatized and continued their concentrated ownership 
structures. Even after the GLCs are listed, their ownership remained concentrated as 
these GLCs are the crown jewels of Singapore and will be sold off only at the right 
price.  
 
There was another conjuncture in 1984 where the electorate reacted adversely 
to the hegemonic power by the PAP. It sets in motion a new direction for economic 
growth, namely, the rolling back of the government in economic activities and the 
expansion and acceleration of the private sector as the engine of growth. It began with 
the privatization of the GLCs via listing them on the SGX. However, this new 
direction was slow and laborious. At this point, institutional patterns that had been 
formed during the struggle for independence in the early years, particularly the 
political ideology of survival, a crisis mentality, pragmatism and meritocracy acted to 
perpetuate the dominance of the government in business.  
 
Another conjuncture or “breakpoint” occurred in the watershed May 2011 
General Elections where for the first time, an opposition Group Representative 
Constituency (GRC) was voted into Parliament, representing the rejection by the 
electorate of many of the PAP’s prevailing policies and ideology. This is reactive path 
dependence. The PAP was “forced” to re-examine its governing policies which 
hitherto had seriously disadvantaged the working and lower income class and to allow 
civil society more room for expression and manoeuvre.  
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In the economic sphere, the government appeared to “walk the talk” and let 
the private sector take the lead in growing the economy but will step in only in areas 
where the capital costs are too high or risky for the private sector to undertake, such 
as in the biomedical sector. A cozy partnership appears to have been forged between 
the government and the private sector to bring Singapore into its next stage of growth.  
 
A “new normal” has been “selected” at this conjuncture. The aforesaid events 
will be discussed in the light of Mahoney’s reactive path dependence as well as 
institutional self-reinforcing path dependence theories.400 
 
The initial inspiration for my “political roots” argument came from Professor 
Mark J Roe’s exposition of American democracy influencing American finance. 
According to Mark Roe, the distinctive governance structure of the large American 
firm with dispersed shareholders and a board of directors that is dominated by the 
CEO is not entirely the natural economic outcome arising from specialization. It is in 
part the result of political decisions, many long forgotten, about the organization of 
financial intermediaries. American politics deliberately weakened and shattered 
financial intermediaries, thereby making managers more powerful than they otherwise 
would be. In Mark Roe’s words:401 
 
 “Interest group fights helped shaped the outcome-fights between rival 
financial institutions in the distant past, and more recently fights led by managers. At 
other times a public policy rationale-usually of dealing with a financial abuse-was in 
play. The rival interest groups were sometimes evenly divided, allowing lawmakers 
                                                            
400 James Mahoney, n 34 at 526. 
401 Mark J Roe, n 15 at Preface ix-x. 
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to play one off against the other; at other times, lawmakers had several solutions to a 
public policy problem, several ways of dealing with a financial abuse. When the 
divided interest groups and the multiple public policy solutions balanced out and 
failed to yield clear winner, the public’s fear of concentrated private economic power 
often tipped the decisional balance toward whichever interest group, or whichever 
public policy rationale, supported greater fragmentation of the financial intermediary. 
 
 Our federal system favoured smaller, local interests over concentrated private 
economic power: An American antigovernment bias tended to suppress the 
alternative of allowing concentrated private economic power, and building 
counterveiling political power in Washington: the public would have more easily 
accepted powerful private financial structures had there been a stronger central 
government. Populist fears, interest group maneuvering and American political 
structure all had a cumulative effect that repeatedly led Congress and the states to 
fragment financial institutions, their portfolios and their ability to network together. 
These political decisions gave rise to the distinctive form of the modern American 
corporations: scattered shareholders with managers in control.” 
 
If one examines Mark Roe’s thesis closely, it is but another path dependence 
story. Of course America’s political history differs markedly from Singapore’s but it 
is submitted that the foundational theory undergirding Roe’s thesis is a path 
dependent one- it is institutional self-reinforcing path dependence. Part 6.2 will show 
how the political ideology of the first generation leaders of the PAP impacted upon 
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7.2 FROM POLITICS TO ECONOMICS 
 
Since my thesis has a political origin, the question naturally arises “what is 
politics?” Politics is often difficult to define but easy to recognize.  
 
Bismarck declared that “politics is not a science…but an art”. He had in mind 
the art of government, the exercise of control within society through the making and 
enforcement of collective decisions.402 Deriving from its origin polis, which literally 
means the city-state in Ancient Greece, politics is about the “affairs of the city-state”. 
It is about the machinery of the government. David Easton defined politics as the 
‘authoritative allocation of values’, ie ‘the policy, formal or authoritative decisions 
that establish a plan of action for the community’.403 
 
Secondly, what is “ideology”? A good definition of ‘ideology’ can be obtained 
from Andrew Heywood’s book “Political Ideology: An Introduction” as follows:404 
 
 “An ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for 
organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow 
the existing system of power. All ideologies therefore (a) offer an account of the 
existing order, usually in the form of the ‘world view’, (b) provide the model of a 
desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’, and (c) outline how political change can 
and should be brought about.” 
 
                                                            
402 Andrew Heywood, “Political Theory: An Introduction” 2nd edition, St. Martin’s Press, 1999 at 52. 
403 Andrew Heywood, n 402 at 53. 
404 Andrew Heywood, “Political Ideologies: An Introduction” 2nd edition, Macmillan Press, 1998 at 3. 
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A few key concepts are undergirded by this definition. Firstly, it straddles the 
descriptive and normative spheres, and between political theory and practice. 
Ideology is descriptive in that, it provides individuals and groups with an intellectual 
map of how their society works, and more broadly a general view of the world. This is 
the ‘what is’ aspects of ideology. The ‘what is’ aspect dovetails into the ‘what should 
be’ or normative sphere to bring forth ideas on the adequacy of present social 
arrangements and nature of any alternative or future society.405  
 
Secondly, Andrew Heywood explained that there are two levels of ideology: 
‘fundamental’ and ‘operative’. At a ‘fundamental’ level, ideologies resemble political 
philosophies in that they deal with abstract ideas and theories. At the ‘operative’ level, 
ideologies take the form of broad political movements, engaged in popular 
mobilization and the struggle for power. These are manifested in sloganising, political 
rhetoric, party manifesto and government policy.406 
 
Wriggins’ The Ruler’s Imperative, explored how new political leaders such as 
Lee Kuan Yew who had wrangled independence from the British colonial masters, 
often adopt a variety of measures or strategies to ensure his political survival. Notable 
strategies deployed by these leaders include developing a viable economy, promoting 
an ideology or dominant occult personality of the leader and intimidating the 
opponents and wavering allies.407  
 
                                                            
405 Andrew Heywood, n 404 at 12. 
406 Andrew Heywood , n 404 at 13. 
407 W Howard Wriggins, “The Ruler’s Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa” 
Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1969 at 91-107, 129-144 and 159-179. 
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Lee Kuan Yew had used some of these measures to entrench his power and 
ensure the survival of the PAP regime in the last five decades. Firstly, the ideology 
that Lee Kuan Yew imbued in the citizenry was and still is the politics of survival 
against an uncertain world pregnant with crises that challenge the nation and demands 
appropriate responses from the government and the people. Secondly, the opponents 
or “foes” that Lee had to annihilate or at least intimidate were the pro-communist 
factions working insidiously in the labour unions, the Chinese middle schools and the 
media. To this end, Lee ingeniously used the law and the courts to severely cut down 
their dominance and ground support to build a placid labour force and student body, 
supported by a compliant media.  
 
From Mahoney’s reactive path dependence perspective, these actions by Lee 
were reactive events that casually connected the contingency of the PAP’s electoral 
victory in 1959 to the final outcome of producing a stable of GLCs with concentrated 
ownership structures. Part 6.2 explains Lee’s political ideology as shaped by his 
struggle against the colonialists, and later against the communists and communalists. 
Part 6.3 argues how the 1985 economic recession was another “conjuncture” that sets 
forth in motion a sequence of events reacting to the self-reinforcing political ideology 
of survival, pragmatism, rationalism and dominance. The new economic direction 
produced by this “conjuncture” was the identification of the private sector as the 
engine for growth for Singapore’s economy and the rolling back of the government in 
economic activities.  
 
Part 7.4, argues that the May 2011 general election is yet another 
“conjuncture” that heralded the “new normal” in Singapore’s political developments. 
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Within this chain of reactive casual events that connected the initial conditions to the 
final outcome is a self-reinforcing path dependence predicated upon the political 
ideology of survival, pragmatism, dominance and rationalism. This self-reinforcing 
path dependence can be seen from the power-centred approach whereby an elite-
supported group perpetuate and reproduce the institution (ie the political ideology of 
survival, pragmatism and rationalism) that it has created. Furthermore, the efficiency 
gains arising from this institutional pattern are the trade-offs that citizens obtain in 
having a good life and material wealth in exchange for restrictions to their political 
freedom. This institutional pattern is laid deep in the conscience and psyche of the 
PAP leaders and its citizenry, and with increasing returns and positive feedback, the 
system is self-reproducing, so that it becomes more and more difficult for the actors to 
adopt any alternative option.  
 
7.3 THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL 
A] Ideology of Survival and a “Crisis”Mentality  
 
From his early education at Raffles Institution, Lee Kuan Yew viewed the 
evolving world society as the product of progress in science, technology and 
mathematics.408 He was an ardent believer in progressivism. For him, the world will 
naturally move towards higher and higher goals, and in this, he was much influenced 
by Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History.409 In the Toynbeean worldview, civilizations 
                                                            
408 Michael D Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man” Georgetown University Press, Washington 
D.C 2000 at 54-55. 
409 Dr. Goh Keng Swee had confirmed that Lee regularly quoted Toynbee’s “Challenge and Response” thesis in 
Cabinet meetings from 1959, see Michael D Barr, n 378 at 64. Further confirmation that the Toynbeean 
worldview of civilization was considered by other Cabinet members can be found in speeches of former Cabinet 
Minister S. Rajaratnam  in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, “The Prophetic & The Political: Selected 
Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam” Graham Brash, Singapore and St. Martins Press, New York, 1987 at 
236. 
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are cyclical in the sense that development will be progressive up to the “times of 
trouble” which presaged the civilization’s fall. A successful civilization is one where 
there is continuous improvement. It is likened to a mountain climber trying to conquer 
a sheer cliff. Those who are, at the moment, resting on a ledge have climbed to that 
level, and may or may not be able to make it to the next ledge, while those above 
them who are climbing onto the next ledge have no idea how far above that may be, 
or how difficult the climb may be. According to Toynbee, healthy civilizations are 
never static, but are dynamic and evolutionary movements. Civilizations continually 
evolved in response to a series of internal and external challenges, and to Lee, these 
challenges must be powerful, but not so powerful, so that society can organize 
themselves to overcome. 
 
This notion of progressivism was attractive to Lee who had in London been 
much influenced by Fabian socialism. Lee believed in Fabianism’s general desire for 
social progress and regarded democratic socialism as an economic and social system 
that will leapfrog Malaya into the modern world. The mapping of Singapore’s 
development into a first world nation had to follow Toynbee’s sheer cliff analysis. 
There must be a “challenge or crisis” and a “response” to bring Singapore onto the 
next ledge. For Lee, society must be in a constant struggle to achieve.  
 
Truly the father of a nation, Lee Kuan Yew told an audience in 1966, “I am 
not interested in the next election, I am interested in the next 100 years”. 410 Upon 
achieving independence, Lee sought to build a “rugged” and “tightly-knit” society 
capable of ensuring the nation’s survival. Arguing for the amendments to the 
                                                            
410 Michael D Barr, n 408 at 50. 
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Employment (Amendment) Bill, 1968, Lee Kuan Yew had this to say in 
Parliament:411 
 
“If we were a soft community, then the temptation would be to leave things alone and 
hope for the best. Then, only good fortune can save us from the unpleasantness which 
reason and logic tell us is ahead of us. But we are not an easy-going people. We cannot 
help thinking, calculating and planning for tomorrow, for next week, for the next 
generation…” 
 
Chan Heng Chee analysed the situation in these words:412 
 
“The most striking feature of PAP thinking after separation is the party’s unshaken 
belief that the survival of Singapore will depend on the willingness and ability of the 
Singapore citizen to adopt a new set of attitudes, a new set of values, a new set of 
perspectives; in short, on the creation of a new man.” 
 
To bring about the transformation of Singapore and “catch up” with the 
advanced Western nations, Lee believed that a strong paternalistic state is necessary 
to accumulate and deploy capital to achieve rapid economic development. Lee 
regarded Toynbee’s sheer cliff analysis as a useful tool to “engineer” Singapore’s 
social and economic development. He said to Parliament: 413 
 
                                                            
411 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 15 July 1968 at 642. 
412 Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore: The Politics of Survival, 1965-1967” Oxford University Press, Singapore and 
Kuala Lumpur, 1971 at 49. 
413 Lee Kuan Yew’s speech in Parliament on 15 July 1968 on the occasion of the amendments to the 
Employment (Amendment) Bill, 1968, see Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 15 July 1968 at 642. 
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“And it is because we have restless minds, forever probing and testing, seeking new 
and better solutions to old and new problems, that we have never been, and I trust never 
shall be, tried and found wanting.” 
 
Lee was an ardent advocate of state planning and control. It could even be 
argued that he “engineered” many a social and political change in Singapore based on 
the ideology of survival through creating a “crisis” mentality amongst its citizenry. 
Some of these “crises” were real such as the incident of Singapore being booted out of 
the Federation by the Tunku in 1965, the withdrawal of the British troops from 1968 
onwards, the 1973 oil crisis etc. In Toynbeean terms, each of these crisis was a 
challenge to the nation and will invoke a response, the ideal response of which was to 
provoke a new challenge, thus providing a catalyst for continual progress and 
improvement. It was quite clear that Lee was “bought” by Toynbee’s worldview. At a 
trade union meeting in late 1966, he told the audience:414 
 
“Human beings always respond to a challenge. Where there is no challenge, there is 
very seldom more than ordinary performance. It is true that sometimes, where the 
challenge is too intense, too sustaining, too enervating, the response can never be equal to 
the challenge. But the situation in which we have found ourselves and the response that 
there has been from the people in the past year shows first, a lively appreciation of the 




414 Michael D Barr, n 408 at 82-83. 
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In Lee’s National Day message on 9 August 1985, he exhorted the public in 
these terms:415 
 
“[W]e altered the relationship between workers and management by the Employer 
Act. We put an end to hostile confrontational trade unionism. We got people to accept 
National service to defend what we set out to build. We rid ourselves of the give-me 
social security approach to life. Each change was a conscious exercise of will to respond 
to and overcome a new challenge.”  
 
But some of these “crises” were contrived to force social change upon its 
people such as the “debate” provoked by Lee on genetics, environment and 
intelligence when he lamented that our gene pool is shrinking because “good” genes 
are not being replicated fast enough as graduate women are not getting married and 
propagating themselves. This “crisis” gave rise to the Graduate Mother Scheme which 
met with vehement protests from the public and particularly from graduate mothers 
themselves.416 The scheme was scrapped but not without first costing the government 
some electoral support in the 1984 general election.417  
 
The 1981 by-election victory by the late J.B Jeyaratnam jolted the PAP 
government out of its complacency and Lee warned that there could be “freak 
election” results and suggested the “one man one vote system” had to be re-
                                                            
415 Michael D Barr, n 408 at 83. 
416 The Graduate Mother Scheme provided direct financial benefits and special school privileges for graduate 
mothers having more than two children. It also offered financial and other benefits for the voluntary sterilisation 
of women with little education who had at least one child and whose total household income fell below a certain 
specified level, see Diane K Mauzy and R.S Milne, “Singapore Politics Under the people’s Action Party” 
Routledge, London and New York, 2002 at 60. 
417 Diane K Mauzy and R.S Milne, n 416 at 60 and 150. 
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examined.418 By “freak election” results, Lee raised the fear of less competent people 
inadvertently becoming elected to govern, which will be inimical to national interests. 
Votes for seemingly less qualified opposition party members compared to the elite 
PAP party members are considered irrational and based on emotion  than reason, and 
are therefore unintended by the electorate; thence the term “freak elections” results 
was coined.419  
 
In successive elections, the PAP government never failed to warn the 
electorate against voting for the opposition for fear that a “freak election” result may 
ensue and Singapore ends up with an opposition in government that it does not want. 
The spectre of “freak election” results has filtered down the echelons of government 
and was echoed by Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1996 when he 
warned that “Singaporeans should not be seduced by “idealistic arguments” and vote 
for opposition candidates who appeared credible, as this could result in a freak 
election result with the opposition forming the government”.420   
 
Even third generation leaders of government held seriously onto this view, 
such as Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean who warned in the run-up to the 2011 
general elections that “Be careful what you vote for, you may just get it [a freak 
election result]”.421 That Singapore is in a perpetual precarious and “crisis” mode was 
                                                            
418 Diane K Mauzy and R.S Milne, n 416 at 146 where Lee Kuan Yew suggested that married Singaporeans with 
children, aged between 35 and 60 years should have two votes each, in order to give more weight to people with 
the greates stake in the country. 
419 Beng-Huat Chua, “Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore”, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1995 at 22. 
420 The Straits Times, 2 May 1996. 
421 The Straits Times, 29 April 2011. 
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made clear by Lee Kuan Yew, who in 2008 reiterated that “one freak election result is 
all it will take to wipe out Singapore’s success in building up the city state”.422  
 
The 1981 by-election and 1984 general elections were “breakpoints” that set 
forth new directions for Singapore’s economic and political development. At these 
“critical junctures”, the public reacted to PAP’s hegemony and bullying of the 
electorate by voting into Parliament credible opposition candidates, firstly, J.B 
Jeyaratnam in the Anson constituency in 1981 and later, Chiam See Tong in the 
Potong Pasir constituency in 1984. Despite the introduction of the Non-constituency 
Member of Parliament (“NCMP”) scheme in 1984 and the Nominated Member of 
Parliament (“NMP”) scheme in 1991 to allow for more opposition voices in 
Parliament, some elements of the electorate were not appeased and continued a path 
of dissent against the government. 
 
Leaving aside matters of ideology for the moment, we now focus on Lee Kuan 
Yew’s strategy for consolidating power through crushing his opponents; first, the 
militant trade unions had to be tamed, second, the so-called irresponsible media had to 
be rein in and political dissent stifled and, lastly, the Chinese middle schools and 
Nanyang University, the seedbed of communist activities, had to be depoliticized.  
 
B] Taming the Trade Unions 
 
Beginning with the split in the PAP when 13 assemblymen crossed over to 
form the Barisan Socialis, the labour force was similarly split along the pro-
                                                            
422 The Straits Times, 26 June 2008. 
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communists and non-communists factions. The non-communists faction featuring 
Devan Nair, Kandasamy and Magmud Awang set up a pro tem body called the 
National Trades Union Centre, later renamed the National Trades Union Congress 
(“NTUC”) to rival the pro-communists’ Singapore Association of Trade Unions 
(SATU). SATU, controlled by Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and their comrades 
went off to a flying start with 82 unions comprising mostly the Chinese industrial 
unions and boasted 20,000 members and 32 affiliates. On the other hand, NTUC got 
off to a fledging start with only about 12 unions on their side. The reach of NTUC 
was strengthened by the formation of the Amalgamated Union of Public Employees 
(AUPE) and the secondment of public servants such as Hsu Tse Kwang, S.R Nathan 
and Roy Daniels to its research arm which helped NTUC clinched convincing victory 
in labour disputes over genuine industrial claims. Soon, the public realized that SATU 
was but a cover for the political activities of the pro-communists whilst NTUC’s 
mandate was to fight for workers over unfair wages and working conditions. 
 
On its part, the PAP government “sold” an industrialization programme to the 
electorate premised upon the creation of jobs and employment through the infusion of 
foreign investments. To attract these foreign investors, the PAP government laid 
emphasis on the social responsibilities of the trade unions. The gist of the PAP 
rhetoric was that unless Singapore could have industrial peace and stability, it was 
impossible to have the economic expansion that was needed to meet the rising 
expectations of the younger generation. Thus, on 17 August 1966, the government 
acted to further clipped the wings of any runaway unions by passing the Trade Unions 
(Amendment) Bill which made it illegal for strikes and other industrial action to be 
taken by a trade union unless the majority of the members had given their consent by 
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secret ballot. The Bill also debarred non-citizens and persons with criminal records 
from holding office in or working for a registered trade union, and provided for 
compulsory registration of branch and paid officials in the same manner as was done 
in respect to the registration of headquarters officers and central committee 
members.423 In this way, the PAP leaders kept a tight rein on the union leaders.424  
 
The resolve of the PAP government to rein in the unions was clearly 
demonstrated in the October 1966 threatened strike action by the 15,000 strong Public 
Daily Rated Employees Union Federation (“PDREUF), an affiliate of the NTUC. The 
PAP government charged the NTUC and PDREUF for “social indiscipline” and 
threatened roughly 7,000 non-citizens with their jobs if they went on strike. The 
NTUC, whilst persuading the parties to come to a resolution was, however, not ready 
to confront the government. In the end, the PAP government pre-empted the unions 
by sending three out of 13 affiliates of PDREUF to the arbitration court, thus making 
it illegal for them to strike. Furthermore, the government passed a law making it 
illegal for members of the Public Utilities Board to adopt strike action.425 
 
 “Striking while the iron is hot”, the PAP government passed two more Bills, 
namely the Employment (Amendment) Bill, 1968 and The Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Bill, 1968 to curb industrial unrest and rein in the workers’ rights. In 
The Employment (Amendment) Bill, workers who were malingerers, lazy, inefficient 
and unproductive will not be given the protection of the law. The Bill took the issue 
of bonus, dismissals, overtime pay and other management decisions out of the 
collective bargaining between the parties and substantially curtailed the rights of the 
                                                            
423 Chan Heng Chee, n 412 at 24. 
424 Chan Heng Chee, n 412 at 24. 
425 Chan Heng Chee, n 412 at 25. 
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workers. In the Parliamentary debates that followed the passing of the Bill, the 
Members of Parliament continually spoke of the need for Singapore to survive. Ng 
Yeow Chong, Member of Parliament for Mountbatten exhorted the House in the 
following terms:426 
 
“If Singapore is to survive and progress as an industrial nation, there must be concerted 
effort by labour, management and the Government to steer the country through the crucial 
years…” 
 
Thus, was born the tri-partite relationship between labour, management and 
the government in the ordering of industrial relations in post-independent Singapore. 
The tri-partite relationship which augurs industrial peace and stability was part of the 
survival motif of Singapore in those days and the present. In addition, The Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Bill sought to restore the rights of management to the 
employers in the areas of hire, fire, promotion and transfer of employees where these 
are necessary for the efficiency of the enterprise. Mr. S Rajaratnam, former Minister 
for Foreign affairs and Minister for Labour pointed out that “no investor or 
entrepreneur is going to risk millions of dollars if he has not got the final say and the 
responsibility to decide how the enterprise should be run…the essence of 
management is the ability to deploy its labour resources and skills in the most 
effective and most rational way..”.427 
 
                                                            
426 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 10 July 1968 at 632. 
427 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 31 July 1968 at 734. 
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The PAP government exerted overwhelming dominance in industrial relations 
in Singapore over the last five decades and never hesitated to interfere when industrial 
relations threatened to turn confrontational.  
 
In 2003, the Air Line Pilot Association-Singapore (“Alpha-S”) was in 
acrimonious dispute with Singapore Airlines over pay cuts in the aftermath of the 
SARS outbreak. In February 2004, Lee Kuan Yew personally met with the pilots and 
management to mediate in the dispute.428 Captain Ryan Goh Yew Hock, a Malaysian 
permanent resident in Singapore was singled out by Lee Kuan Yew as the “instigator” 
who ousted the previous executive committee of Alpha-S to pave the way for 
confrontational trade unionism in Singapore.429 In the midst of the dispute, the 
immigration authorities revoked Captain Goh’s permanent residency status.430 His 
appeals to the authorities were dismissed.431 The government took decisive steps and 
sealed the gap by amending the Trade Unions Act in 2004 to remove the need for the 
executive committee members to seek members’ approval before concluding 
collective agreements or settling disputes with management.432 
 
  Lee Kuan Yew exhorted the pilots that Singapore Airlines could not afford to 
be locked in “uncompetitive rigidities” by collective agreements. To maintain Changi 
International Airport as a leading aviation hub, all stakeholders including Singapore 
                                                            
428 The Straits Times, 29 February 2004. 
429 The Straits Times, 7 March 2004. 
430 The Straits Times, 7 March 2004. 
431 The Straits Times, 26 March 2004 and 3 April 2004. 
432 The Straits Times, 21 April 2004. This amendment removed the anomalous situation where Alpha-S was the 
only union with such a provision in their union rules, and brought Alpha-S in line with the unions affiliated to 
NTUC. To-date, Alpha-S is not an affiliate to NTUC. 
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Airlines, Singapore Airport Terminal Services and Changi International Airport 
Services have to periodically re-examine the way they operate.433 
 
 Not only the government but ancillary bodies such as the Industrial Arbitration 
Court of Singapore had worked assiduously to maintain harmonious industrial 
relations in Singapore, which, unfortunately, for workers often adopt a pro-
management stance. For example, in the 2011 labour dispute between Silkair and its 
pilots over how flying allowance should be computed, the Industrial Arbitration Court 
president, Justice Chan Seng Onn ruled that flying allowance should only be 
computed based on the time the flight departs until it arrives at its destination. Pre-
flight and post-flight hours where the pilots carried out administrative duties should 
not be awarded flying allowances.434 It is submitted that the decision was pro-
management as it enables the airline to incentivize pilots to take on long haul flights 
but against the pilots’ interests as they had to take on long haul flights to earn more. 
The Court could have struck a middle ground by awarding a progressive scale of 
flying allowance paying more for actual flying hours and less for non-flying hours, so 
long as the pilot is on duty. 
 
 This self-reinforcing institutional arrangement is perpetuated because of the 
efficiency gains that it brought to Singapore’s labour relations. The 50 decades of 
industrial peace in Singapore had helped propelled Singapore from a third world 
economy into a first world economy enjoying a per capita GDP of US$42,000, 
                                                            
433 The Straits Times, 16 September 2004. 
434 The Straits Times, 22 October 2011. 
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compared to a per capita GDP of less than US$1,000 in 1965.435 The general 
population enjoyed a good life and material wealth which reinforced the dominance of 
the PAP government in business. 
  
C] Reining in the Media  
 
 Having tamed the unions, Lee’s next target was the media. From the start, The 
Straits Times was against the PAP as it was run for British interests. Lee and S. 
Rajaratnam, who had worked for The Straits Times, challenged them to stay in 
Singapore if PAP won the 1959 elections by firing the first salvo two weeks before 
polling day that “it is an open secret that Straits Times editorial staff would scoot off 
to Kuala Lumpur”, if the PAP won.436 Similar attacks were made to the English-
language Singapore Standard, which was owned by the two millionaire Aw brothers 
of Tiger Balm fame, who had turned against the PAP.437  
 
As predicted the Straits Times owners and senior editors moved to Kuala 
Lumpur when the PAP won the elections and did not return until 1965. By then it can 
recanted and the paper became a purely commercial concern without a political 
agenda. Other newspapers such as the Nanyang Siang Pau, Eastern Sun and 
Singapore Herald folded up when their “black operations” were exposed by the 
government.438 In Operation Cold Store, nine of the detainees were journalists from 
                                                            
435 World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance-Google Public data Explorer at 
<http.google.com.sg/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&idim=country:SGP
&dl=en&q=gdp+growth+Singapore#!ctype=i&strai> 
436 Lee Kuan Yew, “From Third World to First: The Singapore Story-1965-2000”, Singapore Press Holdings, 
Times Edition, 2000 at 214. 
437 Lee Kuan Yew n 436 at 214. 
438 The Eastern Sun was launched by Aw Kow in 1966 and funded by high-ranking officials of an agency of the 
People’s Republic of China based in Hong Kong. It became insolvent because of poor management. The 
Singapore Herald was funded ostensibly by Donald Stephens, the Malaysian High Commissioner to Canberra 
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the various print media. In 1971, four editors of the Nanyang Siang Pau were detained 
under the Internal Security Act.439 
 
 In 1977, the government moved against the newspaper industry by passing 
laws to prohibit any person or his nominee from holding more than three per cent of 
the ordinary shares of a newspaper.440 Further, the Newspaper and Printing Presses 
Act, 1974 provides that there shall be a category of shares called “management 
shares” which shall be issued to Singapore citizens or corporations approved by the 
Minister of Culture.441 The “management shares” have been issued to the local major 
banks as it is deemed that they would remain politically neutral because of their 
business interests.442 Further all directors of a newspaper company shall be Singapore 
citizens.443 No newspaper company shall receive any funds from foreign sources 
except with the approval of the Minister of Culture.444  
 
In 1984, The Straits Times Press, Times Publishing and Singapore News and 
Publication Limited merged to form the Singapore Press Holdings (“SPH”). SPH is 
government-controlled and tight reins are kept on it by the government through the 
appointment of individuals close to the ruling party onto the top management of SPH. 
Amongst these appointees were the former President, S.R Nathan, Tjong Yik Min, the 
former head of the Internal Security Department who led the arrest of the 22 Marxists 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
who told Lee that it was purely an investment, which story Lee did not buy. When it ran into difficulties, Aw 
Sian, Aw Kow’s sister lent it $500,000 and when questioned by Lee whether she intend to put more money into 
the newspaper, she replied “no” and scooted to Hong Kong, see Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 217-218. See further 
Jon S. T Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, “Government and Politics of Singapore” Oxford 
University Press, 1987 at 80. 
439 Bilveer Singh, “Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction” McGraw Hill, 2007 at 79. 
440 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 218. 
441 Section 9 (1)(b) and (c), Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, 1974. 
442 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 218. 
443 Section 9(1)(a), Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, 1974. 
444 Section 10, Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, 1974. 
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in 1987, and Dr. Tony Tan, the current President. The late Lim Kim San, ex-Cabinet 
Minister held the post of Executive Chairman from 1988 to 2002. 445 The current 
Board comprises past civil servants and those close to the ruling party such as Dr. 
Cham Tao Soon, the former President of Nanyang Technology University, Ngiam 
Tong Dow, a former top civil servant, Yeo Ning Hong, an ex-Cabinet Minister and 
Yong Pung How, the former Chief Justice of Singapore amongst others. In his 
Memoirs, Lee said that he did not subscribe to the Western practice of allowing a 
wealthy press baron to decide what voters should read day after day.446 
 
 Lee’s contempt for Western-style media which self-aggrandized to the Fourth 
Estate can be seen clearly in his speech to the International Press Institute in 1971:447 
 
“My colleagues and I have the responsibility to neutralize their intentions. In 
such a situation, freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be 
subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore, and to the primary 
purpose of an elected government. The government has taken, and will from time to 
time, firm measures to ensure that, despite divisive forces of different cultural values 
and lifestyles, there is enough unity of purpose to carry the people of Singapore 
forward to higher standards of life, without which the mass media cannot thrive.” 
 
 More importantly, Lee argued that “the mass media [had] to reinforce, not 




445 Bilveer Singh, “Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction” McGraw Hill, 2007 at 80.  
446 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436at 218. 
447 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 82. 
448 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 82. 
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 Lee was not content with reining in the local media. He realized that with the 
increasing globalization of Singapore, Singaporeans would be exposed to opinions 
and views of the international media, some of which may be harmful to Singapore. He 
then tussled with the international media to coerce them into staying out of Singapore 
politics. He first exerted pressure on foreign editors to limit their critical and 
investigative articles on Singapore politics. 
 
 Beginning in 1986, the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act was amended to 
enable the government to have control over the local circulation of newspaper 
published outside of Singapore. The first to bear the brunt of this amendment was 
Time magazine. Time had published an article in October 1986 on Singapore’s 
opposition leader, J.B Jeyaratnam titled “Silencing the Dissenters” which upset the 
PAP government. When Time refused to published a letter by James Fu, the press 
secretary to then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the Minister of Culture slashed 
Time’s circulation from 18,000 copies per week to 9,000 copies per week. By January 
1987, Time’s circulation in Singapore was reduced to 2,000 copies per week. When 
Time published the government’s reply in full, the restriction was lifted eight months 
later.449 
  
 The second publication that came in the line of fire was the Asian Wall Street 
Journal (“AWSJ”). AWSJ had published an article titled “Exchange Puzzled 
Financiers” in December 1986 which insinuated that the government set up the 
SESDAQ in order to dispose of dud government-owned companies to its citizens.450 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore sought to rebut these allegations but AWSJ 
                                                            
449 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 81 and Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 219. 
450 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 219. The SESDAQ, now re-named CATALIST was the second board set up by the 
Stock Exchange of Singapore in 1986 for listing small and medium enterprises. 
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refused to print the reply. As a result, AWSJ’s circulation was drastically reduced 
from 5,000 copies per day to a mere 400 copies.451  
 
 Far Eastern Economic Review (“FEER”) also had a run in with the PAP 
government when it published an article regarding the arrest of 22 people involved in 
a Marxist conspiracy which insinuated that Lee had called a press conference without 
the Catholic Church archbishop’s knowledge and tricked him into attending it and 
prevented a comment by him being published. When FEER refused to answer why it 
published an article based on the statements of a person not present at the meeting 
without checking the facts beforehand with the archbishop or Lee, its circulation was 
reduced from 9,000 copies to 500 copies.452 Lee further sued the newspaper for libel 
and won the suit in 1989. When Lee was invited to speak at the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in April 1988, he warned foreign publishers that:453 
 
“Singapore’s domestic debate is a matter for Singaporeans”. We allow 
American journalists in Singapore in order to report Singapore to their fellow 
countrymen. We allow their papers to sell in Singapore so that we can know 
what foreigners are reading about us. But we cannot allow them to assume a 
role in Singapore that the American media play in America, that is, that of 
invigilator, adversary and inquisitor of the administration…” 
 
 The international media was kept on a tight leash. The latest amendments to 
the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act provide that “offshore” newspapers had to 
appoint a legal representative in Singapore and also make a deposit of $200,000 in 
                                                            
451 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 219-220 and Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 81. 
452 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 222. 
453 Lee Kuan Yew, n 436 at 223. 
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Singapore to cover costs and liabilities that may arise from legal suits.454 The 
International Herald Tribune (“IHT”) was not spared the rod either. An article titled 
“The Claims about Asian Values Don’t Usually Bear Scrutiny” which appeared on 2 
August 1994, drew flake from Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong and even Goh Chok 
Tong when it accused the Lee family of nepotism. IHT’s public apology did not stop 
the trio from suing it, and resulted in a $950,000 damages award in favour of the 
plaintiffs.455 
 
 With Singapore as a hub for English-speaking readers, these international print 
media could not afford to have their circulations restricted, which would hurt their 
bottom line, and have since largely avoided intruding into domestic politics. 
 
D] Stifling Political Dissent 
 
 Lee Kuan Yew believed that a strong paternalistic and centralist state is 
needed for a small country without natural resources and viable domestic market. Lee 
and his successors seriously believed that competitive politics is not suitable for 
Singapore. On 6 April 2011, in the lead-up to the 2011 General Elections, Prime 




454 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 86. 
455 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 86. In 2008, the Asian Wall Street Journal was found to be in contempt of court and 
fined $25,000 for two articles and a letter which were published in the newspaper in June and July 2008 that 
allegedly impugned the impartiality, integrity and independence of the Singapore Judiciary. Justice Tay Yong 
Kwag ruled that the articles suggested that the Singapore judiciary is subservient to Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP 
and is a tool for silencing political dissent, see Channel Newsasia, 25 November 2008. 
456 The Straits Times, 6 April 2011. 
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“Such a political arrangement would result in a weaker system. There is simply not 
enough talent in Singapore to form two “A” teams to govern well, when a small 
country like Singapore has to have the strongest possible team to compete globally.” 
 
 In the aftermath of the 2011 Presidential Elections which saw President Tony 
Tan won by a narrow margin of 0.34 per cent over Tan Cheng Bock, Prime Minister 
Lee Hsian Loong reiterated that Singapore is too small to afford gridlock.457 He again 
warned the electorate that:458 
 
“We must have a harmonious political system where we make important decisions in 
the best interests of Singapore and Singaporeans and keep ourselves safe in this 
uncertain environment. We are too small to be able to afford impasse and gridlock, to 
have two sides blocking one another, so you can’t move, you can’t solve problems, 
you can’t go ahead.” 
 
 Whilst the intention of the Lee Hsien Loong government to maintain political 
harmony in Singapore is laudable, the electorate became agitated when the PAP 
government uses subtle means to stifle opposition political activities. After the 
Workers’ Party won the Aljunied Group Representative Constituency (GRC) in the 
2011 General Elections, the HDB and the People’s Association transferred the 
management of 26 open spaces, often used for community activities, from the town 
council to the People’s Association. This has the indirect effect of restricting the 
opposition from holding their activities. It was further reported that opposition 
Member of Parliament Chen Show Mao’s invitation to a Seventh Month Hungry 
Ghost Dinner was rescinded as the Citizens’ Consultative Committee who granted the 
                                                            
457 The Straits Times, 22 August 2011. 
458 The Straits Times, 22 August 2011. 
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permit to the use of the venue disallowed political party members from attending 
functions held at their sites.459   
  
 In the past, the PAP government’s treatment of opposition politicians under 
Lee Kuan Yew’s reign was never so sanguine. In 1987, a group of Catholic social 
workers were accused of engaging in a “Marxist conspiracy”. Lawyer and former 
solicitor-general, Francis Seow, who represented one of the detainees, lawyer Teo Soh 
Lung, was himself detained on grounds that he was working with American interests 
to undermine Singapore when he entered opposition politics in the 1989 General 
Elections.460 Francis Seow later fled Singapore and is now residing in the U.S. 
 
 The bullying tactics of the PAP government against opposition members was 
never as strongly demonstrated as in the Tang Liang Hong saga. In Singapore, 
property prices in 1996 sky-rocketed to dizzying heights and minority shareholders 
and the public alike were miffed when Hotel Properties Limited, a public listed 
company offered steep discounts to certain affiliated persons including Lee Kuan 
Yew and some of his family members in a development called Nassim Jade and 
Scotts 28.461 Lee and his family members were cleared of any wrongdoing or 
impropriety, but on 23 May 1996, a reporter from Hong Kong-based Chinese weekly 
magazine on Asian affairs called Yazhou Zhoukan interviewed Tan Liang Hong, a 
Chinese-educated lawyer from Singapore on the matter, to which Tang opined:462 
                                                            
459 The Straits Times, 23 August 2011. After vehement protests by the Workers’ Party, the government softened 
its stance and lifted the curbs on events held at the People’s Association sites, meaning that residents can invite 
whoever they wish to their functions, see The Straits Times, 24 August 2011. 
460 Francis T. Seow, “To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew’s Prison” Monograph 42/Yale Southeast 
Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1994 at 145. 
461 Francis T Seow, “Beyond Suspicion? The Singapore Judiciary?” Monograph 55/Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 
2006 at 9-29. 
462 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 29-30. 
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“Why wasn’t this matter handed over to the professional body like the 
Commercial Affairs Department or the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau? They 
are government departments not only rich in experience but are also well known for 
being “iron-faced without selfishness”. They would be more detached and their 
reports would have been more convincing to the people. Koh Beng Seng and Finance 
Minister Richard Hu are after all not experts in this field”. 
 
 For this, Tang was served with a writ of summons for defamation by Lee 
Kuan Yew.463 In a coincidence, Tang, who had in 1992 been rejected as a candidate 
for the NMP scheme, decided to run as an opposition candidate for the Worker’s 
Party in a GRC in Cheng San, together with veteran opposition member J.B 
Jeyaratnam. Tang’s oration in English, Chinese and Malay was witty and well-
focused and his barbs on the PAP leadership often had the crowd responding with 
boisterous appreciation and delight. He was quickly identified as an imminent threat 
to PAP’s electoral victory and so the PAP leadership encompassing then Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong, his deputy Lee Hsien Loong and other PAP members 
including Teo Chee Hean exhorted the public not to be taken in by Tang whom they 
labeled as an “anti-Christian Chinese chauvinist”.  
 
The PAP leaders and the mainstream news media portrayed Tang as a “very 
clever dissimulator” and as “dangerous” to racial and religious harmony in Singapore. 
In response, Tang threatened legal action against Goh Chok Tong and his some of his 
Cabinet members for defamation. Goh challenged Tang to sue him in the courts. 
                                                            
463 Yazhou Zhoukan swiftly apologized and paid Lee a sum of $900,000 as damages but Tang refused to 
apologize and the suit continued against him, see Francis T Seow, n 461 at 30. 
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Three days before polling day, Tang in an interview with Straits Times reporter, 
Ahmad Osman said:464 
 
“Of course I am going to sue them. Not only that, I am going to lodge a 
police report against them for criminal offence. They are telling lies. They are 
defaming, assassinating my character. They concocted lies and go on television and 
spread the lies…” 
 
The next day, Goh and six other PAP leaders sued Tang for defamation and 
demanded an apology to be read out at a Worker’s Party rally. Three writs of 
summons were issued against Tang.465 On 31 December, unfazed by the mounting 
legal problems, Tang at different rallies repeated that he will raise the Hotel Properties 
Limited issue in Parliament. Those speeches formed the basis for another legal action 
against Tang for defamation.466  
 
On 1 January 1997, Tang made two police reports against Lee Kuan Yew, 
Goh and the six PAP leaders for labeling him an “anti-Christian” Chinese chauvinist 
with the intention of defaming him. That same evening, at the last Worker’s Party 
rally, Tang interrupted J.B Jeyaratnam’s speech mid-way to hand him the two police 
reports he had made. With envelope in hand, J.B Jeyaratnam told the enthusiastic 
crowd: “And finally, Mr. Tang Liang Hong has just placed before me two reports he 
has made to the police against, you know, Mr. Goh Chok Tong and his people”. For 
that, J.B Jeyaratnam was himself served with eight defamation lawsuits by Goh and 
some PAP leaders. The plaintiffs argued that by doing so, J.B Jeyaratnam had 
                                                            
464 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 55. 
465 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 54-60.  
466 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 61. 
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endorsed Tang’s police reports of criminal defamation and conspiracy and thus were a 
publication of a libel on them.467 All in all, thirteen law suits for defamation were 
filed against Tang claiming a total of $12.9 million in damages.468 The presiding 
judge awarded damages of $8.08 million.469 Tang was eventually made a bankrupt 
and his properties were seized to pay off the damages.470  
 
The trials were attended by observers from Amnesty International, London 
and the International Commission of Jurists. The International Commission of Jurists 
Report by Stuart Littlemore Q.C stated:471 
 
“The Singapore leadership has a long-standing record of using the high court 
as a mechanism for silencing its opponents-by suing them for statements that, in any 
comparable jurisdiction, would be seen as part of the robust political debate 
inseparable from democratic freedoms, and by being awarded such unconscionably 
high damages and costs as to bankrupt the defendants, forcing them out of 
Parliament.” 
 
That Lee Kuan Yew ruled Singapore with an iron fist is indisputable. At a 
PAP rally, he warned that: “Whoever governs Singapore must have that iron in him or 
give it up. This is not a game of cards, this is your life and mine. I spent a whole 
                                                            
467 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 64. 
468 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 31 and 143. 
469 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 145. 
470 Francis T Seow, n 461at 186. In 2008, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) was sued by Lee Kuan Yew 
and Lee Hsien Loong for an article that appeared in the SDP publication “Demokrat” in April 2006 with the 
caption “Government’s Role in the NKF Scandal”. The High Court awarded $500,000 to Lee Hsien Loong and 
$450,000 to Lee Kuan Yew in damages for the libel, see Channel Newsasia, 12 May 2008 and 13 October 2008. 
Furthermore, ex Singapore lawyer and Workers’ Party election candidate, Gopalan Nair was also indicted for 
contempt when he insinuated that Justice Belinda Ang was biased in the aforesaid defamation suit, see Channel 
Newsasia, 6 June 2008. 
471 Francis T Seow, n 461 at 264. 
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lifetime learning this. And as long as I am in charge, nobody is going to knock it 
down”.472 
 
Even political commentaries made by members of the public do not escape the 
censure of the PAP government if they deemed it unduly critical of the government 
such as to undermine Singapore’s integrity. For instance, writer Catherine Lim’s 
article titled “One Government, Two Styles” in The Straits Times brought her a strong 
reprimand from Goh Chok Tong, who challenged her to join a political party to 
express her political views.473 The incident brought about the concept of “out-of-
bounds” markers, an invisible threshold of political debate within which the 
government will tolerate, but where one crosses the line, the government will not 
hesitate to take him to task.474 
 
The PAP leadership believed that the government should not be continually 
criticized, vilified and ridiculed in the media, or pressured by lobbyists as in America, 
or it would lose control.475 The result will be confusion, conflict and decline. When 
Lee Kim Mun, better known by his “mr. brown” moniker wrote that “Singaporeans 
are fed up with progress”, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reminded that “if a 
columnist presents himself as a non-political observer, while exploiting his access to 
                                                            
472 Speech by Lee Kuan Yew in a video that can be found at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11uHqISCFiU>. 
473 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 84. 
474 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 84. 
475 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 84. The Attorney-General applied for contempt procceedings against three 
individuals who allegedly impugned the reputation of Singapore’s judiciary by wearing identical white T-shirts 
bearing a palm-sized picture of a akngaroo dressed in a judge’s gown. The three individuals were all found 
guilty of contempt and jailed between 7-14 days, see Channel Newsasia, 14 October 2008 and 27 November 
2008. 
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the mass media to undermine the Government’s standing with the electorate, then he 
is no longer a constructive critic, but a partisan player in politics”.476 
 
The aforementioned actions by the PAP leaders were sequences of events that 
led to the formation of a PAP ideology of survival, pragmatism, rationalism and 
dominance. The majority of the electorate were, however, content to allow PAP rule 
with an iron-fist so long as they deliver the “goods”, ie a good life and material wealth 
for their citizens. This social compact between the government and its people 
engendered increasing returns and positive feedback, and so forged a path of self-
reinforcing path dependence in the political sphere. The next section will show how 
the British withdrawal of their troops in late 1960s was a contingency that set in 
motion a series of events which casually connected all temporally consecutive events 
in the sequence that culminated in the formation of GLCs with concentrated 
ownership structures. 
 
7.4 THE GOVERNMENT AS ENTREPRENEUR 
 
A] PAP Ideology and the Government Entering Business 
 
The ubiquitous presence of the PAP government is felt by its citizens through 
the penetration of PAP-led grassroots organizations in every social and political realm 
in Singapore. PAP members of parliament and PAP-affiliated representatives are 
found helming the majority of grassroots organizations such as the People’s 
Association, the Citizens Consultative Committees, the Residents’ Committees and 
                                                            
476 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 85.  
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the Community Development Councils. These organizations plan and lead in 
organizing social and recreational activities amongst the citizens. Indeed, Lee Kuan 
Yew made no apologies that the government had to be intrusive: “We would not have 
made the economic progress if we had not intervened on very personal matters. Who 
your neighbor is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit or where you 
spit…”.477 
 
The economic sphere is no exception. At independence, the only viable 
business community was those led by the rich Chinese merchants, who were engaged 
in commodities trading, entrepot trade and banking.478 These businessmen were not 
keen to go into industry as it needs more capital. However, the Singapore government 
was keen to attract foreign capital and expertise to jumpstart the economy. Having 
alienated several Chinese business leaders who had supported the pro-communist 
factions in the Chinese middle schools and the Nanyang University, the PAP 
government was quick to recognize that its hegemonic hold on power had to extend 
into the economic realm as well in order to fill in the void left by the Chinese business 
community. 479 The Singapore government’s hegemonic hold on power compelled it 
to go into business as well.  
 
The “crisis” that propelled the state into the economic sphere was the British 
government’s withdrawal of its troops from Singapore in 1968. The economic 
                                                            
477 Speech by Lee Kuan Yew in a video that can be found at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11uHqISCFiU>. 
478 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 15 July 1968 at 624. 
479 One of these business leaders was the late Ko Teck Kin, a millionaire and rubber baron who was the 
president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, see Francis T Seow, n 460 at 36-37. In addition, Lee Kuan 
Yew was incensed with Tan Lark Sye, the chairman of the Nanyang University Council, who appointed Dr. 
Chuang Chu Lin, the pro-communist headmaster of Chung Cheng High School to be vice-chancellor of 
Nanyang University, see Lee Kuan Yew, “The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew” Singapore Press 
Holdings, Times Edition, 1998 at 332. 
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implications of the withdrawal were enormous since British expenditures constituted 
12.7 per cent of the GDP in 1967, and were responsible for employment of 20 per 
cent of the workforce. The government’s ideology of survival and pragmatism 
demanded that it stepped up to its plate and become an entrepreneur to create jobs for 
the population, in order to meet the “crisis” created by the British withdrawal of its 
troops.480 The government had to act in the economic sphere because the ideology of 
survival and pragmatism was the bedrock upon which Singapore was governed. The 
ability of the government to “deliver the goods” had by then formed a consensual 
compact between the government and the electorate. To continue its legitimacy, the 
PAP government has to achieve continuous economic growth as an overriding goal. 
From the path dependent perspective, the “crisis” was a “critical juncture” that paths 
the formation of the GLCs. As the capital to start these GLCs came mainly from the 
state, the state naturally held majority stakes in these companies to maintain control 
and account for the public funds used in these companies. 
 
The task of creating industries was handed to the bureaucracy with its 
expanded role in an “administrative state”. By an “administrative state”, Chan Heng 
Chee meant a political system which has two key features: (a) depoliticization of the 
citizenry; and (b) an increase in the power and role of the bureaucrats, accompanied 
by the expansion of the bureaucratic and administrative sector.481 This means 
eschewing competitive political struggles amongst its citizenry in favour of a rational 
application of scientific techniques to production and administration by the state.  
 
                                                            
480 Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, “Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore” 
Institute of South-East Asian Studies, 1989 at 438. 
481 Chan Heng Chee, “Politics in An Administrative State: Where Has The Politics Gone?” Occasional Paper 
series, No. 11, National University of Singapore, 1975 at 4-6. 
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Institutionally, a number of new statutory boards were hived off from 
functions previously centralized in the Economic Development Board (“EDB”). For 
example, The Post Office Savings Bank (“POSB”), the Development Bank of 
Singapore (“DBS”) and the Jurong Town Corporation (“JTC”) amongst others were 
created to carry out commercial activities such as banking and real estate. These 
statutory boards also form subsidiary companies such as the Singapore Broadcasting 
Corporation (“SBC”) in 1986 which in turn formed a subsidiary to produce 
commercials on a fee-for-service basis. Numerous state and quasi-state companies 
were created either directly by ministries or organized under the three wholly 
government owned holding companies, namely, Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, MND 
Holdings Pte Ltd and Sheng-Li Holdings Co Pte Ltd. These statutory boards and state 
companies are not subject to the annual budget or report to Parliament and so enjoyed 
great flexibility in their operations.482 
 
Then Deputy Prime Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee declared in 1977 that the 
government would create new businesses to create new wealth and jobs that would 
add to the growth of the GNP. Government enterprises fulfilled three areas of need: 
(a) as a carry-over from colonial administration in specific areas such as defence; (b) 
in new ventures to encourage investors to take the plunge; and (c) in pioneer 
industries where the initial capital expenditure is too large for the private sector or too 
experimental in nature such as the biomedical sector.483 With these guiding principles 
in mind, the PAP government started new industries such as steel mills (National Iron 
and Steel Mills), service industries such as the shipping line, Neptune Orient Lines 
and an airline, the Singapore Airline. Even trading companies such as International 
                                                            
482 Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, n 480 at 439. 
483 Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, n 480 at 440. 
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Trading Co. (“INTRACO) was started, which directly competed with the private 
sector. The Chartered Industries of Singapore was set-up to exploit opportunities in 
the high-technology sectors, which later became the Singapore Technologies Ltd, a 
high-tech company that was involved in wafer fabrication plants in joint venture with 
multinationals.484 
 
In an “administrative state” model, civil servants acted as entrepreneurs in the 
state-affiliated companies and statutory boards. Former top civil servant, Ngiam Tong 
Dow mused that when he was chairman of DBS, he was asked to approve a fairly 
substantial loan to an Indonesian Chinese businessman to build cold storage facilities 
for his vast prawn farm (the size of Singapore) in Indonesia. He flew by helicopter to 
view the farm and was told that the fertility of the mother prawn would determine the 
size of the harvest. The businessman was no scientist but he engaged a Hawaiian 
zoologist to devise techniques to stimulate mother prawns to produce more fry.485 
 
B] The Enormous Size of the Public Sector 
 
Data on the GLCs is not readily available but it is believed that including the 
subsidiaries of the statutory boards, the number of GLCs numbered 490 in 1983.486 
The table below shows the number of state enterprises in Singapore between 1960 and 
1985. 
 
Table 25: Number of State Enterprises, 1960-1985 
                                                            
484 Lee Kuan Yew, n 479 at 86. 
485 Zhang Zhibin, “Dynamics of the Singapore Success Story: Insights by Ngiam Tong Dow” Cengage 
Learning, 2011 at 68. 
486 Lawrence B. Krause, “Government As Entrepreneur” in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley n 480 at 
442.  
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1960-1967 13 Na Na 
1969 29 Na 192.4 
1972 59 Na 312 
1974 na 180 833 
1982 61 Na 1900 
1983 70 450 2400 
1985 60 Na 1363.5 
1985 429                                              na 
1988 361                                              na 
Source: Linda Low, The Political Economy of Privatisation in Singapore: Analysis, Interpretation and 
Evaluation, McGraw-Hill, Singapore,1991 
First-level WOC+POC-Wholly-owned companies and partially-owned companies incorporated 
directly by the statutory boards and four government-owned companies (ie Ministry of National 
Development Holdings Pte Ltd, Sheng-Li Holdings Co Pte Ltd, Temasek Holdings Co Pte Ltd and 
Singapore Health Corporation). 
Second-level WOC+POC-Wholly-owned companies and partially-owned companies incorporated by 
the first-level WOC and POC. 
Na-not available 
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 As a rough estimate of the size of the GLC sector vis-à-vis the private sector, 
we look at the number of companies listed on the SGX and the number of GLCs.487 
As at 30 June 1975, there were 85 locally registered companies listed on the SGX,488 
as compared to 59 first-level WOC and POC GLCs created in 1972 (see Table 25). 
The percentage of GLCs in the economy was therefore about 40 per cent.  
 
 Not surprisingly, local companies complained about the “crowding out” effect 
of the GLCs on the private sector.489 Furthermore, GLCs were perceived to have 
received special privileges in terms of funding and market share, a charge which the 
government vehemently denies.490  Things came to a head with the economic 
recession of 1985. 
   
7.5 SHIFTING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS 
“ENGINE FOR GROWTH” 
 
A] Rolling Back the Government’s Role in the Economy 
 
The wisdom of the two-prong approach of undergirding the economy with 
state enterprises and the multinationals was severely challenged by the economic 
recession of 1985. It was realized that the multinationals are rudderless and pack their 
bags when there is a recession, leaving behind trails of local unemployment. The 
incestuous relationship between the bureaucracy and the managers of the GLCs, who 
                                                            
487 The companies listed on the SGX are likely to be the largest companies in Singapore, and hence, they will be 
a good gauge of the size of the private sector. 
488 Grace Ooi, “Report on The Shareownership Survey, 1975”  
489 Linda Low, “The Political Economy of Privatization in Singapore: Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation”, 
McGraw-Hill, Singapore, 1991 at 64. 
490 Linda Low, n 489 at 65. 
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were often seconded from the civil service to sit on the boards of the GLCs have 
formed an impregnable wall to local private companies competing for a share of the 
economic pie. As such, the local companies were relegated to be sub-contractors to 
the GLCs and the multinationals, and have remained moribund. The economic 
recession in 1985 was another “conjuncture” in the reactive path dependence that sets 
forth a new direction for growth in Singapore, viz, the rolling back of the government 
in economic activities and the identification of the private sector as the engine of 
growth in the next lap in Singapore’s economic development. 
 
The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985 chaired by current Prime 
Minister, Lee Hsien Loong recommended that the government should roll back its 
participation in business and pave the way for more private sector initiative. The 
Committee therefore decided that the existing GLCs should be privatized gradually 
(ie the government should divest) and private sector growth should be jumpstarted 
and nurtured. The regulatory environment in Singapore should also be eased to 
encourage private sector initiative. This shift in political ideology from an 
authoritarian and interventionist government to a more benign and consultative 
government can be argued to be caused by the following events: 
 
(a) The mood and ground swell of discontent against the PAP exuded by a 
younger electorate who did not have the same social compact as the older 
generation of voters who trusted the PAP unstintingly in return for job and 
income security. The 1984 General Election saw the PAP unsuccessful in 
unseating the Anson opposition member, and another opposition member, Mr. 
Chiam See Tong was voted into Parliament for the Potong Pasir 
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constituency.491 The latter held the opposition ward for 27 years until the 
general election in 2011;  
 
(b) The persistent complaint of “crowding-out” and unfair competition by the 
GLCs over the private sector;492 
 
(c) The public sector surpluses accumulated by the top-earning statutory boards 
and their subsidiaries have exerted a severe strain on liquidity in the economy. 
The high taxes and fees imposed by government departments and the high 
wages which was prematurely and artificially jacked up by the government in 
the early 1980s had eroded Singapore’s international competiveness by the 
mid-1980s;493 
 
(d) The immense control that civil servants had over the real resources and people 
whether in their capacity as civil servants in the bureaucracy or as directors 
and managers in GLCs 494 together with the ever burgeoning size of the public 
sector have created a moral hazard problem;495 
 
                                                            
491 Linda Low, n 489 at 66. 
492 Linda Low, n 489 at 64-65 and 104. 
493 Linda Low, n 489 at 105. 
494  In 1972-73, a list of top ten government officials showed that among them they held a total of 93 
directorships in addition to the chairmanship of major statutory boards, see Kerniel Singh Sandhu and Paul 
Wheatley n 480 at 97. 
495 Civil servants and GLC managers may face temptations for “empire building” and achieving social mobility 
through less salubrious channels such as graft and corruption. The recent probing of the top honchos of the 
Singapore Civil Defence Force and Central Narcotics Bureau by the CPIB, the forgery committed by a civilian 
clerical officer from the Ministry of Home affairs for $617,087 and the $12 million fraud case at the Singapore 
Land Authority have thrown up issues on the moral hazard problem when civil servants and GLC managers 
enjoy immense power,, see TODAY, 27 January 2012, TODAY, 23 December 2011 and The Straits Times, 20 
November and 23 November 2010 respectively. 
272 | P a g e  
 
In fact, the reasons cited by the Public Sector Divestment Committee, chaired 
by Mr. Michael Y. O Fam for the privatization of the state enterprises were: (a) the 
government’s wirhdrawal from commercial activities which no longer need to be 
undertaken by the private sector; (b) the need to broaden and deepen the stock market; 
and (c) the need to avoid and reduce competition with the private sector.496 
 
B] The “illiberal” democracy and the Private Sector 
 
 The approach of the PAP government towards nation building during the 
period between 1985 and 2011 can be described as schizophrenic and “illiberal”. On 
the one hand, the passing of the baton to Goh Chok Tong in 1989 purportedly 
heralded an era of a more benign and consultative government. In 1984, the NCMP 
scheme was introduced to allow more opposition voices in Parliament. Up to three of 
the “best losers” could be inducted into Parliament but the NCMP have limited voting 
powers. The PAP had hoped to placate the electorate’s demand for more opposition 
voices in Parliament, thereby tacitly acknowledging the uphill task facing opposition 
members being voted into Parliament. The scheme purportedly satisfied both the 
demands of the electorate for an alternative voice in Parliament as well as the PAP’s 
future election ploy that there is no need to vote for full-fledge opposition members of 
Parliament as the NCMP and PAP backbenchers can fulfil their role.497 
 
 In addition, the NMP scheme was introduced by Goh Chok Tong in 1991 to 
allow outstanding members of the public to be non-partisan members of Parliament 
with limited voting powers so as to provide feedback, generate debates and contribute 
                                                            
496 Linda Low, n 489 at 107. 
497 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 30. 
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their individual talents and expertise to Parliament in order to realize his vision of a 
more open and consultative government. 498 The NCMP and NMP schemes were, 
however, viewed by the opposition members and the electorates as ploys by the PAP 
government to “manage” the opposition in a “safe” and non-threatening manner. 
 
 On the other hand, the PAP government continued to tighten its hegemonic 
hold on power. In a move that has crippled the opposition for over 20 years, the GRC 
was introduced in 1988 and further refined in 1991 and 1997. Essentially, the scheme 
amalgamated single constituencies into 3-6 member constituencies so that the voters 
vote for a team of Members of Parliament rather than a single Member of Parliament 
to represent the constituency. The rational for the scheme was to ensure sufficient 
ethnic minority representation in Parliament as each GRC has to comprise at least one 
Member of Parliament from the minority ethnic race. Due to the PAP’s 
monopolization of political talent and financial resources, the opposition often found 
it difficult to field as many GRC teams as the PAP at the general elections.499 As a 
result, the opposition never won any GRC until the watershed general election in May 
2011. 
 
 After the 1984 General Elections which saw two opposition members being 
elected into Parliament, the government led by Lee Kuan Yew was fearful that a 
rogue government, which in PAP’s mind would inevitably be an opposition 
government, would squander away Singapore’s hard-earned reserves and eventually 
ran the country into ruin. As a result, the PAP innovated the Elected Presidency (EP) 
scheme in 1991 and tasked it with the mandate to safeguard Singapore’s financial 
                                                            
498 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 30-32. 
499 There is always the fear of losing the electoral deposit, which in 2006 stood at $13,000 per candidate, see 
Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 32. 
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reserves. It is said that the EP holds the second key to the unlocking of Singapore’s 
reserves. The EP also has to approve key appointments in the civil service. The first 
EP was the late deputy prime minister, Ong Teng Cheong, who was elected in 1993. 
The public perceived the EP as a staged event and was not convinced of its need but 
instead perceived it as an additional “weapon” against the opposition.500 The 
altercations between Ong Teng Cheong and the PAP government over the level of 
information the EP is entitled to receive from the government on the size of 
Singapore’s financial reserves led to the curtailment of the EP’s powers in 1994. 
Though the EP was hotly contested by four candidates in the August 2011 
Presidential election, the EP has largely gone back to a ceremonial role as its powers 
are checked by the Presidential Advisory Committee,501 whose advice the EP is 
compelled to accept.  
 
 The result is an “illiberal” democracy where there is a climate of fear amongst 
the electorate and those stepping out into the political sphere.502 The detention without 
trial of 27 supposedly Marxists conspirators in 1987, the use of defamation lawsuits 
against existing opposition members (ie J.B Jeyaratnam) and aspiring opposition 
members (ie Tang Liang Hong) for millions of dollars in damages, the defamation 
lawsuits against the foreign press and executive orders restricting the circulation of 
                                                            
500 Bilveer Singh, n 445 at 33-34. 
501 Members of this Presidential Advisory Committee are appointed by the PAP government, see Bilveer Singh, 
n 445 at 34. The four Presidential candidates in the August 2011 Presidentail elections were Tony Tan Keng 
Yam, retired Deputy Prime Minister, Tan Cheng Bock, former PAP Member of Parliament, Tan Jee Say, former 
civil servant and an opposition candidate in the May 2011 General Elections and Tan Kin Lian, former CEO of 
NTUC Income.  
502 Licenses are required from the Public Entertainment Licensing Unit of the police department for public 
entertainment. The police have banned forum theatres for the reason that they might incite civil disturbances, 
while plays had been banned on grounds that they allegedly impinge on racial, religious and other real or 
imagined public sensitivities. Public-speaking has been defined as public entertainment so that the government 
can keep a lid on certain public-speakers who may be perceived to threaten the political stability of Singapore 
by denying them the license to speak. Such restrictions have made serious indents into the constitutionally 
protected rights of free speech, see Beng Huat Chua, “Constrained NGOs and Arrested Democratization in 
Singapore” in “Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia” edited by Robert P Waller, Routledge, 
2005 at 174.  
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the foreign press material in Singapore if they step out of line and report negatively of 
the ruling party and the out-of-bound markers set by the PAP government have all 
contributed and culminated in a docile, compliant and politically impotent 
electorate.503 In the World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2011 Report, Singapore 
was ranked 49th and 60th place out of 66 countries for freedom of speech and freedom 
of assembly respectively.504 
 
 Despite the “illiberal” democracy created by the PAP government, they 
realized that on the economic front, Singapore needs a vibrant private sector. Lee 
Hsien Loong, in the Report of the Economic Committee, 1985 recognized that “even 
if we pursue an MNC strategy, we will still need strong local companies….”505 He 
said:506 
 
“Local companies are also important in their own right. They account for 30 per cent 
of our exports. They predominate in the commerce sector. Local companies also 
reflect our ability to look for new growth opportunities ourselves. In a downturn, 
local exporters look further for new markets than MNCs, who may merely cur back 
productions in Singapore in line with their world-wide strategies. Local companies 
must therefore be an important part of a mature structure of firms in our economy. 
                                                            
503 In a survey conducted by The Straits Times on 402 young Singaporeans, aged between 21 and 34, it was 
reported that only 0.75 per cent of those polled felt that freedom of expression was of most concern to them 
followed by 0.5 per cent who felt that there is a need for a stronger opposition and 0.5 per cent who felt that 
leadership succession in the PAP was of the most concern to them. When polled about how often they keep 
track of local political issues and events, 11.2 per cent said “never”, 31.6 per cent said “seldom”, 42 per cent 
said “occasionally” and only 15.2 per cent said “often”. When asked which party’s politicians struck a chord 
with them, 64.4 per cent said “none”, see The Straits Times, 16 April 2011. 
504 The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2011 Project sponsored by The Neukom Family Foundation, 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and LexisNexis, a copy of which can be obtained at 
<http:worldjusticeproject.org/site/default/files/wjproli2011_0.pdf> 
505 The Singapore Economy: New Directions”, The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985 at 84. 
506 The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, n 505 at 84. 
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They must form a healthy and self-reliant base, contributing a sizeable share of our 
GNP..” 
 
 Beginning in 1985, the PAP government saw the need to encourage 
indigenous entrepreneurship and assist local companies to grow in size and strength. 
But the economic data showed a fledging private sector in the mid-1980s and the 
dominance of the GLCs. This explained the recommendations of the 1985 Economic 
Committee’s decision to divest the GLCs and “release” them into the private sector by 
listing them on the Singapore Stock Exchange.  
 
It is submitted that PAP’s hegemony on power amidst a political climate that 
stifles dissent had created a risk-averse citizenry with a low tolerance for failure and 
fear of uncertainty.507 Even after 25 years, Heng Swee Kiat, the current Education 
Minister was reported in The Straits Times on 1 February 2012 as having said that one 
CEO had told him the Singaporean worker’s response to a job promotion was “What 
if I fail? Do I still have a job? Is there a support system, and do I get retrenchment 
benefits?” as contrasted with their European counterparts who will ask “what sort of 
training will I get, how will you help me succeed, what will I do and so on”.508 
 
 In the last 25 years, the PAP leaders have lamented over the lack of 
entrepreneurial drive amongst our citizenry. It is submitted that the PAP’s ideology of 
choosing its political leaders through the “mandarinate” system has contributed to this 
                                                            
507 The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, n 505 at 129. 
508 The Straits Times, 1 February 2012. This risk-averse attitude of our young is confirmed by Assistant 
Professor Chung Wai Keung of Singapore Management University, who studied social policy and Chinese 
entrepreneurship. He opined that Singaporeans sought certainty in their careers and eschewed risk-taking, unlike 
the mercantile societies like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Many Singaporeans would therefore pick a routine life of 
paid employment rather than striking out on their own, see Assistant Professor Chung’s interview with The 
Straits Times, 6 April 2011. 
277 | P a g e  
 
phenomenon. Every year, the best and brightest students are offered government 
scholarships and bursaries to study at prestigious overseas such as Harvard, Stanford 
and Cambridge. Upon their return, they serve a 5-8 year bond and are posted to the 
civil service and administrative service or the army.509 Some of these high-flying 
scholars have been co-opted into government to become Members of Parliament and 
even ministers.510 This competition for talent has caused a brain drain in the private 
sector. Singaporeans are conditioned from a young age to excel in their studies, find a 
high paying government job in the civil service or in one of the GLCs or 
multinationals. Few, if any dreamed to be their own boss. And there is no push for the 
average middle-class Singaporean graduate to strike out a business of his own as the 
wages in Singapore for middle managers are relatively high.511 
 
 C] Economic Liberalisation and Growth of Private Sector 
  
 It is submitted that the same political ideology of “survival” and the “crisis 
mentality” had propelled the PAP government to adopt economic liberalization ahead 
of political liberalization in the mid-1980s. Pursuant to the Economic Committee’s 
Report in 1985, the government set up the Public Sector Divestment Committee, 
chaired by Mr. Michael Y.O Fam in 1985 to oversee the gradual divestment of GLCs 
and statutory boards. But divestment was a slow and gradual process as the Minister 
of Finance, Dr. Richard Hu had stated:512 
                                                            
509 Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, n 480 at 96-97. 
510 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was a Brigadier-General in the army before he joined politics in the 1980s. 
Other Ministers who were from the army were former Minister Bridgadier-General George Yeo, Rear-Admiral 
Teo Chee Hean, Major-General Chan Chun Sing and Bridgadier-General Tan Chuan-Jin. Current Minister of 
Education Heng Swee Kiat and Deputy Prime Minister Thaman Shanmutgaratnam were from the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore. The former Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong was previously from the Administrative 
Service and Neptune Orient Lines, a GLC, see Kerniel Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, n 480 at 98.  
511 The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, n 505 at 129. 
512 Linda Low, n 489 at 189. 
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“We are not in a desperate hurry to accelerate this (privatization) process because 
compared to some other countries, we don’t need the money, so we don’t need to sell 
companies simply to raise funds. But where we want to issue equity, it will be where 
the timing is right, when the capacity of the stock exchange is able to absorb this 
release of equity and where it is considered beneficial to increase the shares in the 
market in order to add depth to the stock market.” 
 
 In this spirit, shares held by the government through the three holding 
companies, namely, Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, Sheng-Li Holdings Co Pte Ltd 
(which later changed its name to Singapore Technology Holdings) and MND 
Holdings Pte Ltd were sold to the public by listing their shares on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange. These companies were Singapore Airlines, Resources Development 
Corporation, Singapore National Printers and Neptune Orient Lines. Up to 1988, 
divestment had raked in S$1.1 billion into the government coffers.513 In the 1990s, the 
Singapore Mass Rapid Transit system was privatized together with the liberalization 
of the telecommunications sector which saw Starhub and MobileOne entering the fray 
to compete with the incumbent, Singapore Telecoms.  
 
 From the ideology perspective, the PAP government had shifted from its 
socialist base to a capitalist model. In the Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, 
Lee Hsien Loong opined as follows:514 
 
“Existing government companies broke new ground when they were established, in 
unfamiliar areas where the private sector had no experience. The economy was small, 
                                                            
513 Linda Low, n 489 at 190. 
514 The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, n 505 at 17. 
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and there were many such opportunities for starting businesses. Nobody else was in a 
position to take them up, but the government could see them, and had the resources to 
develop them…Circumstances have now changed. The economy is larger, and the 
private sector is more developed. If there is an opportunity to start an enterprise, 
someone in the private sector will do so…If the government is to step in where the 
private sector has turned away, it needs to know something the private sector does 
not. But the government is unlikely to have the detailed and omniscient grasp of all 
sectors to identify which project to put money on, even if it knows which general 
areas should be promoted. New investments, and with them the impetus for growth, 
have to be the responsibility of the private sector.” 
 
 As part of the strategy to grow the private sector, the government also saw the 
need to develop an external economy. From 1990s, the government encouraged local 
businesses to internationalize or globalize their businesses to find new markets 
beyond South-east Asia. In addition, the Report of the Economic Committee, 1985 
recommended the expansion of the Small Industries Finance Scheme, the creation of a 
second-tier stock market for listing of start-ups which had no track record of earnings, 
the establishment of venture equity funds, the introduction of a scheme similar to the 
U.K Business Expansion Scheme and the introduction of employee stock options.515 
School curriculums were developed to instill entrepreneurship, innovation and 
creativity amongst the students such as Bizworld, which was developed by the 
founder of Fisher and Juvertson. The Nanyang Technological University set up the 
                                                            
515 The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, n 505 at 127-128. 
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Nanyang Technopreneur Centre in January 2001, followed by the National University 
of Singapore’s Centre for Entrepreneurship in October 2001.516  
 
 In 2002, the Entrepreneurship and Internationalization Subcommittee, 
Economic Review Committee recommended the six “C”s for accelerated 
development of the private sector. They are:  
 
(a) fostering an entrepreneurial culture in the new generation of Singaporeans 
beginning with instilling strong entrepreneurial instincts and awareness in our 
students;  
 
(b) developing a critical mass of talent in the private sector that will inject 
vibrancy into the enterprise ecosystem;  
 
(c) recommending enterprise-friendly approaches to economic management, 
industry regulation and procurement by the government;  
(d) fostering outward oriented policies to create strong linkages between 
foreign markets and the home base;  
 
(e) making more capital available to fund promising enterprises at all stages of 
development; and  
 
(f) introducing a package of fiscal incentives to channel more capital towards 
enterprise financing.517  
                                                            
516 The Report of the Entrepreneurship and Internationalization Subcommittee Economic Review Committee, 13 
September 2002 at 4-6. A copy of the report is available at 
<http://app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/507/doc/ERC_EISC_FinalReport2.pdf> 
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The Subcommittee advocated greater public-private sector co-operation in 
amassing critical talent for the private sector by co-sponsorship and allowing 
government scholars to serve their bonds by working two years in a small and 
medium enterprises (SME) as well as developing industry clusters when venturing 
overseas. The latter is a “reverse EDB” approach where GLCs partner other 
Singapore enterprises with complementary skill sets to compete abroad. The 
government should outsource more government functions to the private sector and 
also provide test-beds for SMEs’ products and services. For example, the Public 
Utilities Board contracted an SME to use “bioscrubbers” which can filter and treat 
sewage air at sewage facilities, leading to a safer working environment and lower 
operating cost.518 
 
 D]De-politicization519 Stymies Economic Vibrancy  
 
 D.1] Searching for a national identity? 
 
 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the economic success of Singapore in 
achieving double digit growth had, in the eyes of the PAP government spawned a 
nation of “excessive material consumers” and “excessive individualism”. The open-
door policy of Singapore in trade and investment had brought the ill-effects of 
Westernization into the doorsteps of Singapore. The PAP government felt the need to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
517 The Report of the Entrepreneurship and Internationalization Subcommittee, Economic Review Committee, n 
516 at 3. 
518 The Report of the Entrepreneurship and Internationalisation Subcommittee, Economic Review Committee, n 
516 at 8, 11, 23-24. 
519 Politicization refers to the process which individuals acquire political beliefs and values, and by which these 
are transmitted from generation to generation, see Bilveer Singh, n 445 at xxix. De-politicization is the reverse 
process. 
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address the rot that threatened and to counteract this lack of “cultural ballast” amongst 
our citizenry. This led to several society-wide campaigns to revitalize “Asian values”. 
This included the introduction of policies to reinforce the family institutions, such as 
giving priority to three-generation families in their application for public housing, 
intensifying the teaching of mother tongues as second languages and the renewed 
interest to teach moral education in our schools. In 1984 a subject called “Moral 
Education and Religious Knowledge” was used to introduce Confucian ethics into our 
school curriculum, which was, however, abandoned in 1990 due to its unpopularity 
amongst students and objections from the minority races.520 
 
 Against the backdrop of “creeping individualism”, the 1987 detention of 27 
“Marxist” conspirators was another “crisis” that propelled the PAP government into 
immediate action. They commissioned the report on religion and religious conversion 
in the immediate aftermath of the “Marxist conspiracy” On 28 October 1988, the first 
Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong spoke of the challenge facing the government 
in formulating a national ideology, and on 5 November 1988, a government 
committee was set up to draft a set of core values that will unite Singaporeans in the 
years ahead. A period of consultation followed between the government and the 
public that culminated in the White Paper on 28 December 1989, a part of which 
restricts the autonomy of religious organizations and personnel.521 The White Paper 
was institutionalized as the Maintenance of Religious and Harmony Act on 10 
                                                            
520 Beng-Huat Chua, n 419 at 116-119. 
521 Under section 8 of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, Cap. 167A, a restraining order may be made 
against a religious personnel who has, inter alia, committed an act or attempting to commit an act causing 
feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups; and carrying out activities to 
promote a political cause, or a cause of any political party while, or under the guise of, propagating or practising 
any religious belief. 
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November 1990. On 6 January 1991, a White Paper on Shared Values was introduced 
and debated in Parliament on 14 January 1991.   
 
 The five core values, also called the “Shared Values” were: (a) nation over 
community and community over self; (b) family as the basic building block of 
society; (c) consensus over contention; (d) respect and community support for the 
individual; and (e) racial and religious tolerance and harmony.522 The first “shared 
value” of “nation over community and community over self” is what Professor 
George Lodge will term as “communitarian values”. Then Deputy Prime Minister, 
Lee Hsien Loong in parliamentary debates on 14 January 1991 exhorted Singaporeans 
to find their own balance between the two extremes of individualism and 
communitarianism. He said:523 
 
“We also have both strands (individualism and communitarianism) in our tradition. 
We believe in developing each individual to his or her fullest potential. We value our 
citizens, not just because they happen to be useful to the country, but because we 
believe that each person is intrinsically worthy of respect. In economic matters, we 
depend on competition and on the free markets to make each person give of his 
best…We believe that people will perform best when they are rewarded according to 
their contribution and when they compete furiously against others in order to do well. 
That is the individualistic strand in our national ethos. But Singapore has not 
succeeded by being an individualistic society. We depend on cooperation and 
teamwork amongst ourselves so that we will do well not just as individual 
Singaporeans, but as the Singapore team, competing against other nations. We have 
                                                            
522 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, “The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore” Routledge, 
London and New York, 1995 at 213. 
523 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 14 January 1991 at 832. 
284 | P a g e  
 
succeeded as a nation because we have repeatedly pulled together to overcome 
adversity, and put the nation’s interests first.” 
 
 The vision of a harmonious society is to be achieved through consensus and 
not contention, strife, conflict or discord. The PAP government eschewed an 
adversarial type of society, preferring the consensus-building Japanese society to the 
adversarial American one.524 The then deputy prime minister took the opportunity to 
reiterate that the “welfare state” is out of the question for Singapore.525 To encourage 
risk-taking and entrepreneurship, the government kept social safety-nets to a 
minimum.526  
  
D.2] Non-competitive politics result in burgeoning government sector but shrinking 
private sector 
 
 It is submitted that Singapore had in the last 20 years remained a “tight” 
society with little progress in the democratic process in contrast to the aggressive 
liberalization on the economic front. The introduction of the NMP and NCMP 
schemes were ostensible progress made to the democratization process in Singapore 
but this process was held in check by the use of the GRC system to hobble opposition 
parties in their feat to secure seats in Parliament. The frequent use of defamation suits 
against opposition members and the threat of the Internal Security Act had dampened 
the spirit and pace of democratization in Singapore. Similarly, in 2000, the 
government introduced the Speakers’ Corner as a platform for citizens to voice their 
                                                            
524 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 14 January 1991 at 838. 
525 Official Records of Parliamentary Debates, 14 January 1991 at 836. 
526 The Report of the Economic Committee, 1985, n 505 at 129. 
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views and opinions.527 But in substance, opposition members led by Dr. Chee Soon 
Juan who gathered near Raffles City shopping Centre on 10 September 2006 and near 
the Speakers’ Corner on 16 September 2006 were arrested and charged with unlawful 
assembly and procession.528 One could even say that except for the ballet box, 
Singaporeans have hardly any freedom to exercise their political rights at all. But the 
economic sphere is different.  
 
On the economic front, however, the private sector was given great impetus by 
the government in terms of funding and opportunities.529 The Department of Statistics 
in 2005 reported that the value of gross fixed capital formation by the private sector 
versus the public sector was $35,316.1 million to $7,886.4 million respectively.530 
The contribution of the GLCs to Singapore’s GDP was 12.9 per cent in 2001.531 The 
Singapore government’s share of GDP was about 9 per cent, so that the private sector 
(ie local companies and MNCs) accounted for about a whopping 78 per cent of 
Singapore’s GDP.532  
 
 No doubt the free market ideology adopted by the PAP government appeared 
to have given some impetus to the private sector in the early 1990s, it is argued that 
the full blossoming of the private sector is crippled by the political infancy of the 
                                                            
527 Anyone who wants to speak at the Speakers’ Corner must first register with the police station nearby, and no 
broadcasting instruments are permitted, despite the busy traffic din that surrounds the area that would drown out 
the voices of the speakers, see Beng Huat Chua, n 502 at 174. 
528 Channel Newsasia, 22 August 2008. 
529 For a comprehensive overview of the government measures recommended to grow the private sector, see 
Report of The Entrepreneurhsip and Internationalization Subcommittee Economic Review Committee, 200, n 
556. 
530 Economic Survey of Singapore, 2005, Statistical Appendix, Singapore Department of Statistics, a copy 
available at <http://app.mti.gov.sg/data/article/1962/doc/ESS_2005Ann_SA.pdf> 
531 “Contribution of Government-linked Companies to Gross Domestic Product”, Occasional Paper on 
Economic Statistics, Singapore Department of Statistics, March 2001. 
532 “Motion on Temasek Charter and EISC’s Recommendations on Government Business-Speaking Points for 
DPM’s Round-up Speech”, Parliament Sitting on 28 August 2002, a copy of the proceedings ia vailable at 
<http://app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/507/doc/Motion_on_Temasek_Charter_and_EISC.pdf> 
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government and its citizenry. Where individuals are cramped from an early age into 
standardized “closed” education systems that emphasizes only academic excellence, it 
is not surprising that there is little creativity and innovation amongst the young.  
Without creativity, innovation, risk-taking and daring in the young, Singapore has 
little hope of producing entrepreneurs. Furthermore, when the young matured into 
adults, they are constrained in many aspects as to their freedom to think and express 
themselves socially and politically because of the out-of-bound markers set by the 
government. The result is a dearth of entrepreneurs in Singapore.  
 
In the last six years, the number of domestic companies appears to have 
shrunken. In 2004, the number of companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange 
was 633 comprising 608 domestic companies and 25 foreign companies.533 Though in 
2010, the number of companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange swelled to 
778, it comprises only 461 domestic companies and 317 foreign companies.534 
Clearly, there was a decrease in the number of local companies that made it to the 
stock exchange. In respect of the SMEs, in 2004, the number of SMEs listed on the 
second board (SESDAQ) was 163 local companies.535 In 2010, the number of SMEs 
listed on Catalist (formerly the SESDAQ) decreased to 133, comprising 97 domestic 
companies and 36 foreign companies.536 There was, in fact, a drop in the number of 
local SME that made it to the second board.  
 
                                                            
533 Figures taken from The World Federation of Stock Exchanges, website available at <www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2004/equity-markets/number-listed-companies> 
534 Figures taken from The World Federation of Stock Exchanges, <www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2010/equity-markets/number-listed-companies> 
535 Figures taken from The World Federation of Stock Exchanges, <www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2004/number-companies-shares-traded> 
536 Figures taken from The World Federation of Stock Exchanges, <www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2010/alternative-and-sme/number-companies-shares-traded> 
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In addition, Singapore’s private sector as represented by the number of listed 
companies paled in comparison to the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong had 1,413 
companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange comprising 1,396 domestic 
companies and 17 foreign companies as at 2010.537 The number of domestic 
companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is about three times that of 
Singapore’s. It is strenuously argued that this vibrancy of the Hong Kong’s private 
sector stems from the greater political freedom exercised by its inhabitants. In the 
2011 World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, Hong Kong ranked 21/66 as against 
Singapore’s 39/66 with respect to the indicia, “fundamental rights”. With respect to 
the indicia of “open government”, Hong Kong is way ahead of Singapore at 5/66, 
against Singapore’s 19/66.538  
 
I would strenuously argue that political liberalization is a “necessary and 
sufficient” condition for economic vibrancy in the private sector. For close to 50 
years, the political de-politicization of the citizenry had failed to produce a path of 
economic vibrancy in the private sector. The private sector remained dominated by 
family firms co-existing with the huge GLCs funded by the Simngapore governmemt. 
The stage is set for another “conjuncture” to set forth a new direction in Singapore’s 
economic development. It is the development of the “new normal” in Singapore’s 
political landscape.  
 
7.6 The “New Normal” As A Way to Nurture the Private Sector? 
 
                                                            
537 Figures taken from The World Federation of Stock Exchanges, n 533. 
538 The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2011, n 504 at 65 and 92 respectively. 
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  President Tony Tan Keng Yam in his election campaign for the Presidency 
spoke about the “new normal” in Singapore’s political landscape. This refers to the 
new reality of significant changes on the political and socio-economic front. In the 
days leading up to the 2011 General Election, Singaporeans through the use of social 
media such as Facebook and twitter, social websites that were critical of the 
government such as The Online Citizen and Temasek Review, vented their discontent 
and anger against government policies that were perceived to be heavy-handed 
against the citizens. Chief amongst this is the perceived elitism of the PAP leaders in 
benchmarking their salaries to the top 48 earners as well as the uncontrolled 
admission of immigrants into Singapore leading to competition in jobs and wages, 
space, transport and infrastructural services. The online vitriol so affected the ruling 
elite that the Prime Minister even issued an apology for his government’s 
shortcomings on 3 May 2011.539  
 
The 7 May 2011 General Election was a watershed election that saw an 
opposition GRC won the Aljunied ward and admitted five opposition members into 
Parliament. The PAP’s share of the votes dipped to 60.1 per cent from a high of 75.3 
per cent in the 2001 General Election.540 As at February 2012, there are five elected 
opposition members, three NCMPs and nine NMPs in Parliament. Significantly, no 




539 The Straits Times, 4 May 2011.  
540 The Sunday Times, 8 May 2011. 
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 It is clear that the “new normal” has achieved some permanence as evidenced 
by the Worker’s Party’s continued victory in the Hougang by-election on 26 May 
2012.541  
  
 After the 2011 General Elections, the government responded to the call of its 
citizens for greater political freedom. Strongman Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong 
stepped down from the cabinet and three Ministers who incurred the ire of 
Singaporeans, namely Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Mr. Mah Bow Tan and Mr. Raymond 
Lim resigned from the cabinet.542 The hitherto “sacred cow” of pegging ministerial 
salaries to the top eight earners in six professions with a one-third discount was 
jettisoned in favour of a wider benchmark of the top 1,000 earners with a 40 per cent 
discount.543 This was needed to counter allegations of elitism and the loss of the spirit 
of public service in our political leaders. In the PAP’s newsletter, Petir issued on 8 
September 2011, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called upon PAP Members of 
Parliament to “reinvent” themselves.544 He called upon them to “actively listen to the 
voices from all walks of life, build political support for the policies to take Singapore 
forward, and gain recognition for the government’s good work”.545 
 
 At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that new media in the form of online 
interactive websites like The Online Citizen, Temasek Review Emeritus, Stomp and 
online news website like Yahoo News! have created a new platform for voicing 
political dissent in Singapore. The internet forum is an uncensored and unregulated 
                                                            
541 The Sunday Times, 27 May 2012. The Worker’s Party’s candidate Mr. Png Eng Huat garnered 62.1 per cent 
of the votes against PAP’s candidate, Desmond Choo.  
542 The Sunday Times, 15 May 2011. 
543 The Straits Times, 5 January 2012. 
544 The Straits Times, 9 September 2011. 
545 The Straits Times, 9 September 2011. 
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platform where the secrecy of the identities of the contributors have empowered the 
citizenry to express their dissent without fear of being found out short of a legal 
suit.546 This has brought to the fore the angst of the people against the PAP 
government and created a perception of strong dissent against the PAP government. 
The interactive new media allows Singaporeans to share their views with each other 
in anonymity, and in some instances even egged each other on to express their dissent 
against the government. The government is quite powerless in the face of this 
challenge by a “faceless” public. For instance, the sea of adverse public opinion on 
various episodes such as a Ministry of Education scholar from the People’s Republic 
of China, Sun Xu blogging on Weibo that “there are more dogs than humans in 
Singapore” and the apology in Parliament by Member of Parliament for the Tampines 
GRC, Baey Yam Keng for saying that “there might be something in Sun’s words that 
Singaporeans could reflect on” and that whilst he disagreed with Sun, he felt that 
“Singaporeans could be more open to criticism” are all part of the “new normal” 
where public opinion seeks to shape the political developments in Singapore through 
the tit-for-tat dialogue between the government and its people via the social media 
platform. 547   
 
It would appear that the era of a more open and consultative style of 
government has finally arrived. The Prime Minister, in his National Day Rally Speech 
                                                            
546 When a contributor to Temasek Review Emeritus alleged nepotism in the appointment of Ho Ching, Lee 
Hsien Loong’s wife to be chief executive of Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, Lee Hsien Loong threatened Temasek 
Review Emeritus’s editor Richard Wan with a defamation lawsuit, see MyPaper, 23 February 2012. Similarly, 
Lee Hsien Loong’s brother Lee Hsien Yang threatened a defamation lawsuit against the same socio-political 
website, see Channel Newsasia, 23 February 2012. In both instances, the socio-political website withdrew the 
defamatory comment and apologized to the brothers. 
547 TODAY, 27 March 2012 and 29 February 2012.  Another episode that illustrates this ongoing dialogue 
between the government and its people can be found in the comment by Deputy Prime Minister Tharman 
Shanmutgaratnam that a Singaporean family earning less than $1,000 could afford to buy a small flat. A torrent 
of public opinion followed his comment on social media like The Online Citizen and Yahoo News disputing this 
fact, see Channel NewsAsia 2 and 3 March 2012. 
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recounted that Singaporeans are stepping forward to work with one another and the 
government on projects that is good for Singapore. For instance on the KTM railway 
line, the Ministry of National Development, the Urban Redevelopment Authority and 
Minister Khaw Boon Wan and Tan Chuan Jin have taken extensive consultation with 
the public to look for creative ways to preserve the green spaces without affecting the 
development potential of the land.548 Even on the building of proposed eldercare 
centres and studio apartment for the aged and elderly, the government is consulting 
widely with the affected stakeholders.549 Responding to the electorate’s gripe of 
insufficient public housing, the HDB ramped up the building of build-to-order flats by 
25,000 units and also increased the qualifying income ceiling for HDB flats to 
$10,000 and for executive condominiums to $12,000 respectively. With respect to 
allegations of increased competition from foreign labour, the Ministry of Manpower 
tightened up the foreign workers’ levy and dependency ratios, and also raised the 
minimum salary bracket for “S” pass holders from $1,800 to $2,000. It is hoped that 
this will reduce the competition for jobs in the “PMET” sector.550 
  
 More importantly, the “new normal” signals a developing partnership between 
the government and the people in every aspect of social, political and economic 
life.551 On the social front, the “Yellow Ribbon” project seeks to help inmates readjust 
back to life in society after their release from prison. In respect of economic 
partnership, the government encourages local-foreign tie-ups. For example, a new 
                                                            
548 A copy of the Prime Minister’s speech can be found at 
<www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/primeminister/2011/Prime_Minister_Lee
_Hsien_Loong_National_Day_Rally_2011_Speech_in_English> 
549 The Straits Times, 9 and 13 February 2012. 
550 The Prime Minister’s National Day Rally Speech, 2011 n 588. The acronym “PMET” refers to professionals, 
managers, executives and technicians. 
551 The Prime Minister said that there is a new compact between the government and the people- but cautioned 
against a situation where the population relinquishes its strength of being able to move together, even on issues 
where there might not be unanimous consent. He called on Singaporeans to speak out, and also to participate 
and feel the responsibility to do their part to make things happen the right way, see TODAY, 5 April 2012. 
292 | P a g e  
 
start-up called “Biomers” was set up by local and foreign National University of 
Singapore students, which produces translucent orthodontic braces. The company has 
26 staff, half of whom are Singaporeans.  
 
 Going forward, Singapore will be a melting pot of ideas and ideals, creativity 
and innovation. Both locals and foreigners will have much to contribute and the 
government will partner them in their endeavours. The government will take a back 
seat through funding support but let the private sector be the prime mover and initiator 
of growth. For example, Spring Singapore’s Incubator Development Programme 
provides funding support of up to 70 per cent of qualified expenses involved in the 
running of incubator programmes that benefit innovative start-ups. iAxil, an arm of 
Ascendas, is a beneficiary of Spring’s Incubator Development Programme, and have 
helped innovative start-ups from seeding stage to growth into overseas markets.552 
Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shamugaratnam announced in The Budget 2012 that 
a Project Finance Company will be established by Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd to assist 
local companies venturing overseas in terms of providing risk and credit insurance for 
trade finance and guarantees for loans by commercial banks. 553   
 
 In addition, the government had been supplying growth capital for growth-
oriented SMEs through seeding public-private co-investment funds. The government 
hopes to nurture a critical mass of 1,000 local Singapore enterprises with revenue of 
                                                            
552 The Straits Times, 23 August 2011. 
553 Report of The Economic Strategies Committee, 2010, a copy can be obtained at 
www.ecdl.org/media/Singapore%20Economic%20Committee_2010.pdf at 25-26. Further, see The Budget 
2012, The Straits Times, 18 February 2012 which reports that $400 million will be funded through the Project 
Finance Company. 
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over $100 million so that Singapore companies can compete globally.554 Whether 
Mao’s idiom “Let a thousand flowers bloom and a thousand thoughts contend” will 
materialize remains to be seen. The dynamics of this new social compact between the 
government and its people will determine the extent of growth of the private sector. It 
is believed that the loosening of PAP’s grip on political power will have a positive 
impact on the growth of the private sector. 
 
 One last point to consider is the concentrated ownership structure of our 
GLCs. The empirical study of the GLCs in chapter 1 shows that their average 
ownership concentration is 49.39 per cent. With the exception of the Singapore 
Telecommunications Limited which saw Singaporeans being awarded 200 units of 
telecom shares for free in its IPO,555 the divestment of the GLCs have not resulted in a 
more disperse ownership structure for the GLCs. This is because the government will 
only divest its shares in the GLCs at a fair price and in a manner that will not unsettle 
the market. The government is committed to see that the GLC remained properly 
managed after its divestment and that shareholders receive full and fair value for their 
shares.556 The concentrated ownership of the GLCs is self-reinforcing because of the 
PAP’s ideology of making rational choices that brings about efficiency gains for 
Singapore. The GLCs are Singapore’s crown jewels and as most of them are profit-
making, adding into the reserves of Singapore, the GLC system is self-reinforcing and 
it will take a long time to dismantle them. 
 
                                                            
554 Report of the Economic Strategies Committee, 2010 n 553 at 24 and 26. The government will contribute 
$500 million for funding of new capital for these SMEs. 
555 The Straits Times, 20 February 1994. 
556 “Motion on Temasek Charter and the EISC’s Recommendations on Government Business-Speaking Points 
for DPM’s Round-up Speech, Parliament Sitting on 28 August 2002 , a copy of the proceedings is available at 
<http:app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/507/doc/Motion_Temasek_Charter_and_EISC.pdf> 
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From the path dependence perspective, the political ideology of survival, 
pragmatism and rationalism is self-reinforcing because an elite that benefits from the 
existing arrangement has sufficient strength to promote its reproduction.557 In this 
analysis that employs a power perspective, the genesis of an institution is not a 
predictable outgrowth of pre-existing power arrangements. It was not a predictable 
outcome for PAP to win the 1959 general elections. It was a contingent event, but 
once the PAP won the elections and established its government, it was reinforced 
through predictable power dynamics. The institution (ie establishment of Western 
democratic government by universal suffrage) initially empowered the PAP at the 
expense of other political groups; this advantaged group uses its additional power to 
expand the institution (ie expand the power and reaches of its government to 
internalize the ideology of survival, pragmatism and rationalism in its citizenry); the 
expansion of the institution increases the power of the advantaged group and the 
advantaged group encouraged additional institutional expansion.  
 
In this cycle, we saw how forming the PAP government in 1959 altered the 
power structure within the society at that time whereby the previously subordinate 
actors, viz the PAP moderates strengthened their position vis-à-vis the pro-
communists faction in the PAP party. The success of the PAP government in bringing 
the good life and material wealth to its people was a self-reinforcing mechanism that 
perpetuated the hegemony of the PAP government in every sphere of life in Singapore 
including the economic sphere. As a result GLCs dominated the economy until 1985 
when the economic recession throws into the open the conflictual struggle between 
the government sector and the private sector.  
                                                            
557 James Mahoney, n 34 at 521. 
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In power-centred path dependence, there is an in-built dynamic process for 
potential change. The reproduction of elite-supported institutions may eventually 
disadvantaged subordinate groups to the point that these groups successfully 
challenge the prevailing arrangements. We witnessed these events when the private 
sector complained about “crowding out” by the GLCs in 1985. This crossroads set in 
motion a path dependent process of adjustments between the different actors. The 
watershed election in May 2011 is another manifestation of this power conflict and 
struggle where the subordinate groups are again challenging the elite-supported 
group. Where this challenge is particularly strong and sustained, we can see 




 This chapter seeks to show the political roots of corporate ownership. The 
British withdrawal of their troops in the late 1960s was a “critical juncture” that set in 
motion a series of events that created an entire stable of companies called GLCs. 
GLCs were born out of necessity in the aftermath of the politics of survival and a 
“crisis mentality”. Another “conjuncture” occurred in 1985 when the economic 
recession gripped the country. The same pragmatism impelled the PAP leaders to 
embark on a path of privatization and divestment of these companies in order to give 
space for growth in the private sector. Within the backdrop of reactive path 
dependence, self-reinforcing path dependence in the form of the enduring political 
ideology of survival, pragmatism, rationalism and dominance brought about 
                                                            
558 James Mahoney, n 34 at 521-523. 
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increasing returns, and perpetuated and reproduced the stable of GLCs, particularly in 
new high technology sector such as the biomedical sector.  
 
The last 20 years have seen some expansion of the private sector, albeit a 
sluggish expansion as compared to other dynamic economies like Hong Kong. It is 
submitted that this phenomenon is caused by the constraints in political freedom and 
liberalization imposed by the PAP government as discussed above. Economic 
liberalization alone cannot engender a vibrant economy. Political liberalization has to 
be carried out hand-in-hand with economic liberalization in order to achieve a vibrant 
economy. The watershed 2011 General Election is a reactive “conjuncture” as it sets 
forth a new direction for developing Singapore’s political economy. In other words, 
the self-reinforcing path dependence of an ideology of survival, pragmatism and 
rationalism was held together in a power-centred approach. But things appeared to 
have come to a head in this conflictual struggle between the elite-supported groups 
and the subordinate groups. The subordinate groups have challenged the status quo by 
championing the opposition cause in the May 2011 General Elections. Whether this 
new direction of political developments will forge a path of economic vibrancy in the 
private sector remains to be seen. It depends on whether the “new normal” (ie the 
genesis of a new institutional pattern) will achieve increasing returns and positive 
feedback so as to reproduce the institutional path to cause the expansion and growth 









8.1 SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the thesis I seek to prove in this 
dissertation. This dissertation is a theoretical and empirical one. The legal question 
which I sought to prove is whether law and politics matter in the separation of 
ownership from control in Singapore’s largest companies. Chapter 1 begins with 
Berle and Means’ seminal study in the U.S where they reported that ownership had 
separated from control in the largest American corporations. Various theories tried to 
explain the diffuse ownership structure of U.S firms ranging from the “economic 
efficiency” theory by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen to Kenneth Arrow’s 
organizational decision-making and Alfred Chandler’s managerial revolution. In the 
1990s, Rafael La Porta and Mark J Roe proferred the “law matters” and “politics 
matters” theses respectively to explain the diffuse ownership phenomenon in the U.S. 
This thesis seeks to answer the legal question from the new perspective of path 
dependency. 
 
Chapter 2 is an empirical study of the ownership concentration in Singapore’s 
largest companies in the year 2007-8, which was the year this study began. It was 
found that the median of the 20 largest shareholders’ holding is a whopping 89.17 per 
cent and the median of the largest shareholders’ holdings is 32.77 per cent. This 
shows that ownership is concentrated in Singapore’s companies. It is further found 
that 53 companies are majority controlled, 29 are minority controlled, 13 are joint-
mainority-management controlled and 5 are management controlled.  
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Chapter 3 sought to cast serious doubts on the “law matters” thesis. First, it 
examines the empirical evidence on ownership structures around the world and found 
that “good law” countries support both the dispersed and concentrated ownership 
structures. At first cut, this evidence already casts aspersions on the “law matters” 
thesis which seemed to imply that “good law” countries only support dispersed 
ownership structures. On the other hand, “bad law” countries tend to support 
concentrated ownership structures, although the dispersed ownership structure was 
found in Japan (a “bad law” country).  
 
Furthermore, Brian Cheffins and John Coffee have ably argued that other 
factors, than the law, had caused the dispersed ownership structure in the U.K and the 
U.S respectively. On the other hand, Mark Roe posited that social democratic politics 
was the cause of the concentrated ownership structure in Germany. As regards the 
U.S, Mark Roe had argued that American politics and its fear of concentrated power, 
both politically and economically, had caused the dispersed ownership structure in the 
U.S.    
 
Secondly, extant studies have shown the ADRI to be seriously flawed in terms 
of its endogeneity and its lack of a proper comparative law methodology. 
 
Chapter 4 disputes the “law matters” thesis and introduces path dependence 
theories to explain how concentrated ownership arose in Singapore’s oldest 
companies from a historical perspective. Raffles founding of a free port in Singapore 
in 1819 was a “contingency” that was unpredictable and entirely stochastic. It sets 
forth a series of events that were path dependent. “Critical junctures” or breakpoints 
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such as the immigration of the Chinese from Southern China to Nanyang in search of 
a better life and the rubber and tin mining boom were the foundation for the growth of 
the Chinese business enterprises in early Singapore. At the “critical juncture” when 
businesses were formed, the Chinese selected the “concentrated ownership” genre.   
 
Chapter 5 then follows on to explain how concentrated ownership once started 
in these companies became “locked-in” by the Chinese culture of keeping control 
tightly within the family. Culture which is the “mother of all path dependencies” 
produced increasing returns and positive feedback, thus self-reinforcing concentrated 
ownership structures in these family firms.  
 
In addition to culture as an agent in formenting concentrated ownership in 
Chinese family firms, Chapter 6 explores the behaviour of family owners/founders in 
SGX-listed family firms by arguing how rent-seeking controlling owners reproduced 
and perpetuated concentrated ownership to extract private benefits of control. 
 
Chapter 7 examines concentrated ownership in the GLCs from the political 
angle. It applies Mark J Roe’s “politics matters” thesis to examine the formation of 
the GLCs by the government. It argues how the PAP’s ideology of survival, 
hegemony and dominance so stifled the private sector’s growth that it sets in motion a 
sequence of events that were reactive to it. James Mahoney’s reactive path 
dependence theory was used to explain the events that led to the formation of 
concentrated ownership structures in the GLCs. The 1985 economic recession was a 
“critical juncture” that sets forth a sequence of events that were reactive to PAP’s 
hegemony in business. The PAP government understood that its hitherto dominance 
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was “crowding out” the private sector and therefore it began a series of economic 
incentives to grow the private sector, such as encouraging local entrepreneurship and 
developing an external economy. However, these measures were insufficient to create 
a vibrant private sector and this author argues that political liberalization is a 
“sufficient and necessary” condition for economic growth. The 2011 General Election 
is another “conjuncture” that is reactive to the status quo. It paths the “new normal” 
which it is hoped will lead to a creative and innovative population that will be able to 
propel the private sector forward.  
   
 8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
 This dissertation is important because it propounds a new perspective for 
explaining corporate ownership structure, and adds to the existing knowledge and 
debate on ownership structures. The theory of path dependence originates as an 
economic theory but has been extended into the historical sociological arena. It is a 
broad and malleable theory that can be used to explain how concentrated ownership 
develops in Singapore and persists to this day. This dissertation is the first in 
Singapore in 50 years that sought to prove empirically that ownership is concentrated 
in Singapore’s companies, although anecdotal evidence had always assume that 
ownership is concentrated in Singapore’s companies. 
  
Using a case-study method, this dissertation sought to cast doubts on the “law 
matters” thesis in the context of Singapore, just as Brian Cheffins and John Coffee did 
for the U.K and U.S respectively. In fact, the “law matters” thesis had been severely 
criticized as containing many methodological and conceptual flaws. 
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Mark J Roe’s “politics matters” thesis is a more plausible explanation and this 
dissertation seeks to prove its validity in the context of Singapore’s political 
developments and how it impacted the ownership structure in Singapore’s companies. 
 
The two theses are relevant for emerging economies developing their stock 
markets and companies. They will have to understand that the first ball they drew out 
of the Polya urn will set the course for development. They will have to understand 
that “history matters” and the institutions, legal infrastructure, norms and culture they 
inherited from their colonial masters or predecessors will determine whether they 
have a dispersed or concentrated ownership structure. All these consideration affects 
the degree of success of the transplantation of legal rules and strategies from the more 
developed countries into emerging economies. Any transplantation of legal rules and 
strategies have to be adapted according to the historical, socio-economic, legal and 
political environment because from these original conditions, path dependence will 
either reinforce and perpetuate the situation like the manner in which concentrated 
ownership is perpetuated in the Chinese family firms in Singapore or economic and 
political conditions may become reactive conditions to oppose the status quo and set a 
new direction. 
 
8.3 GUIDANCE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
  More case studies have to be done to show that the “law matters” thesis, 
though empirically correct, is flawed and a poor explanation for the fact that strong 
minority protection laws will create a dispersed ownership structure and vibrant stock 
markets. Many commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia, Singapore and Hong 
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Kong have in place strong minority protection laws, yet the ownership structure of 
their companies is concentrated. Mark J Roe’s “politics matters” theory has more 
credence, and if one scrutinizes his theory closely, its roots lie in path dependence 
theories. Thus, there is no one unifying theory like the “law matters” theory that will 
explain the ownership structures of all the countries in the world but one has to do a 
case-by-case analysis to explore how ownership patterns evolved and how path 
dependence guides this process.  
 
 Another area for future research concern is the “new normal” movement 
where citizens are challenging the government’s decisions and policies by instituting 
court proceedings. When the Member of Parliament, Yaw Shin Leong resigned from 
his position and vacated the Hougang seat, thereby creating the need to call for a by-
election, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong responded that there were other more 
important national issues to consider and refused to commit to a date when he would 
call a by-elction. A citizen of the Hougang constituency then lodged a legal challenge 
in court to “force” the Prime Minister to hold the by-election within three months as 
there is a gap in the Constitution on the time-frame within which the Prime Minister 
should call a by-election. The case is still pending in court.559 The second legal 
challenge was lodged by Mr. Kenneth Jeyaratnam, the chairman of the Reform Party 
to question the Executive’s scope of power to grant loans and guarantees, specifically 
the $5 billion loan/guarantee to the International Monetary Fund. He alleged that the 
$5 billion loan/guarantee was contrary to section 144 of the Constitution as it was not 
approved by Parliament or the President.560   
 
                                                            
559 The Straits Times, 10 May 2012 and  17 May 2012. 
560 Blog by Mr. Kenneth Jeyaratnam at http://the onlinecitizen,com/2012/07/the-truth-about-that-imf-loan/ and 
The Straits Times, 18 July 2012. 
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 These instances show that subordinate groups are reacting to the elite-
supported group, and future research can be carried out to test whether a new political 
climate of openness, debate and challenge of the status quo will create a new 
generation of more daring, risk-taking and entrepreneurial citizenry who will take the 
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2. Asia Food & 
Properties Limited 
















3. Asia Pacific 
Breweries Limited 
(a) Asia Pacific 
Investment Pte 
Ltd 
(b) Fraser & 
Neave Limited 
(c) Great Eastern 
Life Assurance Co 
Ltd 




















(h) 13.53 held by 
the public 
Joint venture 
between Fraser & 





4. BIL International 
Limited 
(a) Camerlin 



































Henry Ngo Majority 
controlled 





(c) Henry Ngo 
 
(c)   0.75 
      80.76 
 














(d) Chew Leong 
Chee 












(b)  8.63 








(h) 25.26 held by 
the public 











(b) Selat Pte 
Limited 








































8. Chip Eng Seng 
Corporation Ltd 
(a) Lim Tiam 
Seng 
(b) Kwek Lee 
Keow 





     44.51 
Joint venture 
between Lim Tiam 


















(a) Hong Realty 
(Private) Limited 
(b) Hong Leong 
Holdings Limited  
(c) Hong Leong 
Investment 
Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
(d) Garden Estates 
(Pte) Limited 
(e) Euroform (S) 
Pte. Limited 
(f) Hong Leong 
Corporation 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
(g) NIN 
Investment 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
(h) SGI 
Investment 









      49 
 














71.32 held by the 
public 





is Sim Wong Hoo. 
11. CSE Global 
Limited 











(d) JP Morgan 















(f) 48.93 held by 
the public 
Owned by Tan 








is Tan Mok Koon. 









(c) 28.53 held by 
the public 
Loi Kai Ming 
through C& P 
Holdings Pte Ltd, 
Loi Kai Meng (Pte) 











The Jardine Group Majority 
controlled 
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15. Fraser & Neave 
Ltd 
(a)Great Eastern 
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through OCBC Ltd 
and Temasek 
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family owned with 
government 
interests 














(b) Golden Hope 
Limited 
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Family members of 
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Holdings Pte Ltd 
(b) Lam Choon 
Sen, David 
(c) Liew Yew Pin 
(d) Srichai Uthai 
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Co-founded by 
Lam Choon Sen, 





nominees are Lam 
Choon Sen, 
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Yew Pin 
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(b)   0.05 
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(b) Tye Hua 
Nominees (Pte) 
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(c) UOB Kay 




(e) C Y Wee & Co 
Pte Ltd 
(f) Wee Cho Yaw 
 






















(i) 41 held by the 
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23. Ho Bee Holdings 
Limited 
(a) Ho Bee 
Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
(b) Airjet Auto-
Care Pte Ltd 





     64.51 
 
(d) 33.59 held by 
the public 
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Pte Ltd 
(c) Cheong Sim 
Eng 
(d) Cheong Kim 
Pong 
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Chuan 




(h) JP Morgan 



































26. Hong Leong Asia 
Ltd 
(a) Hong Leong 
Corporation 
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Holdings Pte Ltd 
(b)Hong Leong 
Corporation 










Holdings Pte Ltd 
(h)Tudor Court 



















     46.02 
 








(a) Tan Chee Hoe 
& Sons Sdn Bhd 
(b) Tan Eng 
Teong Pte Ltd 
(c) Tan Teck Lin 
(a) 48.15 
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Holdings Sdn Bhd 
(d) Tan Eng Sin 
(e) Tan Hwa Lam 
(f) Tan Hwa Lian 
(g) Tan Hwa 
Kheong 
 
(h) Chng Gim 
Huat Holdings Pte 
Ltd 









(j) 24.7 held by 
the public 
29. Hotel Plaza 
Limited 




(b) 18.2 held by 
the public 





30. Hotel Properties 
Limited 
(a) Ong Beng 
Seng 












(d) 32.67 held by 
the public 
Joint venture 
between Ong Beng 







31. Hwa Hong 
Corporation Limited 
(a) Ong Choo Eng 
(deemed interests) 
(b) Ong Kay Eng 





(e) Hong Leong 
Investments 









(f) 28.85 held by 
the public  





32. Hyflux Ltd (a) Lum Ooi Lin 
 













(d) 48.89 held by 
the public 
Lum Ooi Lin Minority 
controlled 




Holdings Pte Ltd 
(b) First Pacific 
Investments Ltd 











30.91 held by the 
public 

























































37. Jaya Holdings 
Limited 
(a) Affinity Asia 



























      46.56 
 






39. KS Energy 
Services Limited 
(a) Pacific One 
Energy Limited 
(b) Kim Seng 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
(a) 21.71 
(b)  9.56 
      31.27 
 
(c) 60.31 held by 
the public  
Joint venture 
between Kris 
Taenar Wiluan and 




40. Labroy Marine 
Limited 
(a) Tan Boy Tee 
(b) Chan Sew 




      71.59 
 
(c) 34.10 held by 
the public 
Founded by Tan 



















42. MCL Land 
Limited 










43. Metro Holdings 
Limited 
(a) Ong Tjoe Kim 




(c) Ngee Ann 
Development Pte 
Ltd 




(d) 49.77 held by 
the public 
 
Ong Tjoe Kim and 
Jopie Ong Hie 
Koan through 
vehicles Eng Kuan 
Company Private 
Limited, Dynamic 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
and Leroy 
Singapore Pte Ltd 
Minority 
controlled 
44. Midas Holdings 
Limited 
(a) Chen Wei Ping 
(b) Chew Hwa 
Kwang Patrick 




      51.14 
Founded by Chen 
Wei Ping and 
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Seng  
(d) 49.69 held by 
the public 
45. MMI Holdings 
Ltd 
(a) Teh Bong Lim 
(b) Tan Choo 
Pie@ Tan Chang 
Chai 
 








(d) 66.36 held by 
the public 
Co-founded by The 








(b) 18.76 held by 
the public 
Ong Beng Seng Majority 
controlled 






Company Pte Ltd 






Company Pte Ltd 
(h)Lee Brothers 

































are Lee Seng Wee 
and Lee Tih Shih 
48. Orchard Parade 
Holdings Ltd 











(c) 36.38 held by 
the public 





49. Overseas Union 
Enterprises Limited 









      88.51 
 
(d) 11.48 held by 
the public 




(a) Henry Ng Han 
Whatt 
(b) Patrick Ng Bee 
Soon 
(a), (b), (c) & (d)   
59.37 
 
(e) 26.48 held by 





338 | P a g e  
 
(c) Jane Kimberly 
Ng Bee Kiok 





(a) Henry Ng Han 
Whatt 
(b) Patrick Ng Bee 
Soon 
(c) Jane Kimberly 
Ng Bee Kiok 
(d) Ng Bee Bee 
(deemed interests) 
(a), (b), (c) & (d)    
60.04 
 

















(c) Lim Cheok 
Peng 
 

















53. Petra Foods 
Limited 



















held by the 
public 








(a) Chew Hua 
Seng 
(b) Chung Gim 
Lian, Doris 
(c) Credit Suisse 
Trust Limited as 
Trustee of the 
Humble Trust 
 

























(b) Loo Choon 
Yong 
(a) 40.08 
(b)   9.82 
      49.90 
 
(c) 46.17 held by 
the public 










(b) Chia Kim 
Piow 
(c) Wong Oi Moi 
(a) 29.14 
(b)  4.04 
(c)  1.23 
(d) 10.68 
(e) 10.68 
The Chia Kim 
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(d) Wong Liang 
Feng 
(e) Chaung Swee 
Khim 
      55.77 
 
(f) 39.43 held by 
the public 
57. SC Global 
Developments Ltd 
(a) Cheong SP 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
(b) Simon Cheong 
Sae Peng 
(c) Ding Li Feng 












(e) 34 held by the 
public 





58. Singapore Land 
Limited 





















(e) 21.58 held by 
the public 








59. Stamford Land 
Corporation Ltd 
(a) Ow Chio Kiat (a) 39.04 
 
(b) 57.47 held by 
the public 
Ow Chio Kiat Minority 
controlled 
60. The Straits 
Trading Company 
Limited 










61. Swiber Holdings 
Limited 
(a) Goh Kim Teck 
(b) Jean Pers 
(c) Yeo Chee 
Neng 
(d) Hendrik Eddy 
Purnomo 
(e) Francis Wong 
Chin Sing 















(h) 39.01 held by 
the public 
 




62. Tat Hong 
Holdings Ltd 
(a) Chwee Cheng 
& Sons Pte Ltd 
(b) Ng Chwee 
Cheng 
(c) Ng San Tiong 
(d) Ng Sun Ho 
(e) Ng Sang Kuey 
(f) Ng Sun Hoe 
(g) Ng Sun Wee 
(h) Ng Sun Eng 
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(j) 45.04 held by 
the public 
63. United Fiber 
Systems Limited 








      48.08 
 












(a) Toh Bee Yong 
(b) Poh Seng Poo 
(c) Chee Teck Lee 
 
(d) The Overlook 








(f) FMR LLC 
(g) Colonial Fisrt 
State Group Ltd 
(institutional 
investors) 














(i) 46 held by the 
public 







are Toh Bee 
Yong, Poh Seng 
Poo and Chee 
Teck Lee. 





(b) U.I.P Holdings 
Limited 
(c) Tye Hua 
Nominees (Pte) 
Ltd 
(d)UOB Kay Hian 
Pte Ltd 
 










(f) 38.75 held by 
the public 





66. United Engineers 
Limited 
































57.82 held by the 
public 
Lee Foundation 










are Lai Teck Poh 
and Tang I-Fang. 











(i) Eng Hueng 
Fook Henry 









(d)Wee Ee Chao 
(e)Wee Ee Lim 
(f) UOB Kay Hian 
Pte Ltd 
(g) CY Wee & Co 
Pte Ltd 
 
(h) Estate of Lien 
Ying Chow, 
Dec’d 















     6.61 
 


















are Wee Cho Yaw 
and Wee Ee 
Cheong 
68. United Industrial 
Corporation Limited 
(a) UOL Equity 
Investments Pte 
Ltd 
(b) UOL Group 
Limited 
(c) UOB Bank Ltd 


















(g) 35 held by the 
public 
Joint venture 
between the UOL 
Group Ltd (Wee 
Cho Yaw’s family) 
and the JS Summit 
Holdings Inc of the 
Philippines 
Majority 
controlled by joint 
venture partners 
69. UOL Group 
Limited 
(a) Wee Cho Yaw 
(b) Wee Ee 
Cheong 
(c) Wee Ee Lim 






     39.01 
 
(e) 61 held by the 
public































(d) Wong Ngit 
Liong 
(c) 6.89 




(e) 58.93 held by 
the public 
investors controlled. The 
minority’s 
nominee director 












(c) Third Avenue 
Management LLC 
 
(d) Eng Hueng 

















International Limited  
(a) Wilmar 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
(b) Archer Daniels 
Midland Asia-
Pacific Limited 
(c) Global Cocoa 
Holdings Ltd 
(d) FFM Berhad 
(e) PPB Group 
Berhad 













(h) 13.8 held by 
the public 
Joint venture 
between the Kuok 





73. Wing Tai 
Holdings Limited 























(f) 54.89 held by 
the public 
Founded by the 
Cheng family and 





74. Yeo Hiap Seng 
Ltd 















     85.85 
 





















































Classification of Control-Government-linked firms-as at 1 July 2008 
 
Name of Company Name of 
substantial 
shareholders 




held by block (%) 

























40.53 held by the 
public (of which 































are Sum Wai Fun, 
Adeline, Lim Jit 
Poh and Ong Ah 
Heng. 





Holdings Pte Ltd 
(a)15.46 
(b)12.55 
     28.01 
 










are Koh Boon 
Hwee and Kwa 
Chong Seng 
79. Gallant Venture 
Ltd 
(a) PVP Venture 










     75.36 
 




Cho Park, the 
Salim Group and 
Temasek Holdings 









Holdings Pte Ltd 
(a) 22.04 
 









nominee director is 
Tow Heng Tan 
81. K1 Ventures 
Limited 
(a) Kephinance 
Investment Pte Ltd 
(b) Green Street 
Partners LP 
 
(c) BV Singapore 
(a) 35.21 
(b) 12.56 
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Holdings Ltd  
(d) 39.75 held by 
the public 
interests 






































Holdings Pte Ltd 





      63.56 
 












85. Neptune Orient 
Lines Limited 
(a) Temasek 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
(b) Lentor 
Investments Pte Ltd 
(c) Startree 
Investments Pte Ltd 
 

































Holdings Pte Ltd 
 



























































Holdings Pte Ltd 
 























(d) 34.54 held by 
the public  
91. SingTel (a)Temasek 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
 









(c) 39.72 held by 









Holdings Pte Ltd 
(a) 54.67 
 















































(a) Keppel Oil and 
Gas Services Pte Ltd 
(a) 45.44 
 
(b) 54 held by the 
public 
Temasek Holdings 






97. Singapore Press 
Holdings Limited 
None All the shares are 
held by the public 





Holdings Pte Ltd 
(a)55.29 
 







99. Starhub Ltd (a) Asia Mobile 
Holdings Pte Ltd 








     66.81 
 




Holdings Pte Ltd 
through ST 
Telemedia Pte Ltd, 
Qatar Telecom 






















Note: The total shareholding in some companies exceeds 100 per cent because of deemed interests. 
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Appendix III 
Classification of Block Holdings, Controlling Blocks, and Types of Family Control 
Name of Company Substantial 
shareholders that 
control a block of 
shares 
Percentage of 
voting interest by 






1. Allgreen Properties Limited Kuok (Singapore) 
Limited 
34.1   Strong 
Kerry Group 
Limited 
21.33 55.43  
2. Asia Food & Properties 
Limited 
The Widjaja Family 
Master Trust 
65.55   strong 
     
  65.55  
3. BIL International Limited (a) Camerlin 
Holdings Sdn Bhd 
19.72    
(b) Camerlin Group 
Berhad 




26.42 48.47  
4. Bonvests Holdings Limited (a) Goldvein 
Holdings Pte Ltd 




20.33    
(c) Henry Ngo 0.75 80.76  
5. Boustead Singapore 
Limited 
(a) Wong Fong Fui 31.75   moderate 
(b) Saiman 
Ernawan 
8.63 40.38  
6. Bukit Sembawang Estates 
Limited 
(a) Singapore 
Investments Pte Ltd 
13.37   Moderate 
(b) Selat Pte 
Limited 
11.38    
(c) Lee Rubber Co 
Pte Ltd 




4.53    
(e) Lee Latex Pte 
Limited 
2.04    
(f) Island 
Investments 
Company Pte Ltd 
1.09    
(g) Lee Plantations 
Pte Limited 
0.59    
(h) Lee Foundation 0.57 42.05  
7. Chip Eng Seng Corporation 
Ltd 
(a) Lim Tiam Seng 9.93   moderate 
(b) Kwek Lee 
Keow 
2.61    
(c) Lim Tiang 
Chuan 
6.67    





25.3 44.51  
8. City Developments Limited (a) Hong Realty 
(Private) Limited 
3.94   moderate 
(b) Hong Leong 
Holdings Limited  
18.29    
(c) Hong Leong 
Investment 
Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
17.24    
(d) Garden Estates 
(Pte) Limited 
2.23    
(e) Euroform (S) 
Pte. Limited 
2.16    
(f) Hong Leong 
Corporation 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
1.95    
(g) NIN Investment 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
1.62    
(h) SGI Investment 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
1.57 49  
9. Creative Technology 
Limited 
(a) Sim Wong Hoo 28.68 28.68 moderate 
10. CSE Global Limited (a) Tan Mok Koon 13.26 13.26 moderate 
11. CWT Limited (a) Loi Kai Ming 50.17 50.17 strong 
(deemed interests)      
12. Dairy Farm International 
Holdings Limited 
(a) Jardine Strategic 
Holdings Ltd 
77.97 77.97 Strong 
13. Ezra Holdings Limited (a) Lee Kian Soo 13.26    
(b) Lee Chye Tek 
Lionel 
14.26    
(c) Goh Giak Choo 1.88    
(d) Jit Sun 
Investments Pte Ltd 
6.19 35.59 moderate 
14. Fraser & Neave Ltd (a)Great Eastern 
Life Assurance Co 
Ltd 








3.35    
(d) Lee Latex Pte 
Ltd 
0.77    
(e)Tropical Produce 
Company Pte Ltd 
0.62    
(f) Selat Pte Ltd 0.38    
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(g)Lee Pineapple 
Company Pte Ltd 
0.28    
(h)OCBC Ltd 4.04 20.78 weak 
15. Genting International PLC (a) Genting 
Overseas Holdings 
Limited
50.44    
(b) Golden Hope 
Limited 
6.74    
(c) Resorts World 
Limited 
6.16 63.34 strong 








28.92 48.45 moderate 
17. Goodpack Limited (a) Goodpack 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
24.86    
(b) Lam Choon Sen, 
David 
1.02    
(c) Liew Yew Pin 0.57    
(d) Srichai Uthai 0.5    
(e) Tan Bien Chuan 0.2 27.15 moderate 
18. Great Eastern Holdings 
Ltd 
(a) OCBC Bank 86.9 86.9 strong 
19. GuocoLand Limited (a) Guocoland 
Assets Pte Ltd 
63.9    
(b) Quek Leng 
Chan 
2.36    
(c) Kwek Leng Hai 2.98    
(d) Quek Chee 
Hoon 
0.42 69.66 strong 
20. Guthrie GTS Limited (a) GA 1821 Pte 
Ltd 
64    
(b) Putra Masagung 0.05 64.05 Weak 





21.85    
(b) Tye Hua 
Nominees (Pte) Ltd 
8.03    
(c) UOB Kay Hian 
Pte Ltd 
5.83    
(d) United Overseas 
Insurance Limited 
1.97    
(e) C Y Wee & Co 
Pte Ltd 
0.76    
(f) Wee Cho Yaw 0.49 38.93 moderate 
22. Ho Bee Holdings Limited (a) Ho Bee 
Holdings (Pte) Ltd 
62.73    
(b) Airjet Auto-
Care Pte Ltd 
1.67    
(c) Chua Thiam 
Chok 
0.47 64.87 strong 
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23. Hong Fok Corporation 
Limited 
(a) K.P Cheong 
Investments Pte Ltd 
13.15    
(b) P.C Cheong Pte 
Ltd 
13.15    
(c) Cheong Sim 
Eng 
12.41    
(d) Cheong Kim 
Pong 
0.51    
(e) Cheong Pin 
Chuan 
1.03    
(f) Cheong Pin 
Seng 
1.75    
(g) Winfoong 
Holding Limited 
24.1 66.1 strong 
24. Hong Kong Land Ltd (a) Jardine Strategic 
Holdings Ltd 
47.72 47.72 Moderate 
25. Hong Leong Asia Ltd (a) Hong Leong 
Corporation 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
61.1    
(b) Starich 
Investments Pte Ltd 
6.18 67.28 strong 
26. Hong Leong Finance Ltd (a)Hong Leong 
Investments 
Holdings Pte Ltd
22.65    
(b)Hong Leong 
Corporation 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
4.48    
(c)Hong Realty 
(Private) Ltd 
4.23    
(d)Hong Leong 
Foundation 
3.15    
(e)Garden Estates 
(Pte) Ltd 
2.79    
(f) City 
Developments Ltd 
2.08    
(g)SGI Investment 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
2.48    
(h)Tudor Court 
Gallery Pte Ltd 
1.48    
(i)Hong Leong 
Holdings Ltd 
1.24    
(j)Kwek Leng Beng 0.88    
(k) Hong Leong 
Enterprises Pte. Ltd. 
0.56 46.02 moderate 
27.Hotel Grand Central 
Limited 
(a) Tan Chee Hoe & 
Sons Sdn Bhd 
48.15    
(b) Tan Eng Teong 
Pte Ltd 
4.37    
(c) Tan Teck Lin 
Holdings Sdn Bhd 
2.92    
(d) Tan Eng Sin 1.8    
(e) Tan Hwa Lam 1.46    
(f) Tan Hwa Lian 1.44    
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(g) Tan Hwa 
Kheong 
0.37 60.51 strong 
28. Hotel Plaza Limited (a) UOL Group 
Limited 
81.57 81.57 strong 
29. Hotel Properties Limited (a) Ong Beng Seng 25.44    
(b) Peter Fu Chong 
Cheng 
24.48 49.92 weak 
30. Hwa Hong Corporation 
Limited 
(a) Ong Choo Eng 
(deemed interests) 
28.98    
(b) Ong Kay Eng 6.44    
(c) Ong Hoo Eng 7.19 42.61 moderate 
31. Hyflux Ltd (a) Lum Ooi Lin 33.88 33.88 moderate 





68.95    
(b) First Pacific 
Investments Ltd 
0.08    
(c) First pacific 
Investments (BVI) 
Limited 
0.06 69.09 strong 
33. Jardine Cycle & Carriage 
Limited 
(a) Jardine Strategic 
Holdings Ltd 
64.57 64.57 strong 
34. Jardine Matheson 
Holdings Ltd 
(a) Jardine Strategic 
Holdings Ltd 
53.45 53.45 strong 





81.29 81.29 strong 





33.52   moderate 
(b) Ooi Thean Yat, 
Ronald Anthony 
13.04 46.56  
37. KS Energy Services 
Limited 
(a) Pacific One 
Energy Limited 
21.71    
(b) Kim Seng 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
9.56 31.27 moderate 
38. Labroy Marine Limited (a) Tan Boy Tee 64.72    
(b) Chan Sew Meng 
@ Chan Kwan Bian 
6.87 71.59 strong 
39. Mandarin Oriental 
International Limited 
(a) Jardine Strategic 
Holdings Ltd 
73.58 73.58 strong 
40. MCL Land Limited (a) HKL (MCL) Pte 
Ltd 
77.38 77.38 strong 
41. Metro Holdings Limited (a) Ong Tjoe Kim 
(deemed interests) 
40.55    
(b) Jopie Ong Hie 
Koan (deemed 
interests) 
  40.55 moderate 
42. Midas Holdings Limited (a) Chen Wei Ping 27.32    
(b) Chew Hwa 
Kwang Patrick 
15.93    
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(c) Chew Hua Seng 7.89 51.14 strong 
43. MMI Holdings Ltd (a) Teh Bong Lim 14.35    
(b) Tan Choo Pie@ 
Tan Chang Chai 
11.12 25.47 moderate 
44. Natsteel Limited (a) 98 Holdings Pte 
Ltd 
81.25 81.25 strong 
45. OCBC Ltd (a)Selat Pte Ltd 11.3    
(b)Singapore 
Investments Pte Ltd 
3.63    
(c)Lee Foundation 3.59    
(d)Lee Rubber 
Company Pte Ltd 
3    
(e)Lee Latex Pte 
Ltd 




0.93    
(g)Lee Pineapple 
Company Pte Ltd 
0.65    
(h)Lee Brothers 
(Wee Kee) Pte Ltd 
0.51    
(i)Tropical Produce 
Company Pte Ltd 
0.47    
(j)Kota Trading 
Company Sdn Bhd 
0.47    
(k)Island 
Investment 
Company Pte Ltd 
0.47 26.41 weak 
46. Orchard Parade Holdings 
Ltd 
(a) Far East 
Organisation Pte 
Ltd 
57.56 57.56 strong 
47. Overseas Union 
Enterprises Limited 
(a) OUE Realty Pte 
Ltd 
51.19    
(b) Golden Concord 
Asia Limited 
13.47    
(c) Barinal N.V 23.85 88.51 moderate 
48. Pan-United Corporation 
Limited 
(a) Henry Ng Han 
Whatt 
59.37    
(b) Patrick Ng Bee 
Soon 
     
(c) Jane Kimberly 
Ng Bee Kiok 
  59.37 strong 
49. Pan-United Marine 
Limited 
(a) Henry Ng Han 
Whatt 
60.04    
(b) Patrick Ng Bee 
Soon 
     
(c) Jane Kimberly 
Ng Bee Kiok 
     
(d) Ng Bee Bee   60.04 strong 
50. Petra Foods Limited (a) John Chuang 53.44 53.44 strong 
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51. Raffles Education 
Corporation Ltd 
(a) Chew Hua Seng 10.15    
(b) Chung Gim 
Lian, Doris 
2.89    
(c) Credit Suisse 
Trust Limited as 
Trustee of the 
Humble Trust 
24.03 37.07 moderate 
52. Raffles Medical Group 
Limited 
(a) Raffles Medical 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
40.08    
(b) Loo Choon 
Yong 
9.82 49.9 moderate 
53. Rotary Engineering 
Limited 
(a) REL 
Investments Pte Ltd 
29.14    
(b) Chia Kim Piow 4.04    
(c) Wong Oi Moi 1.23    
(d) Wong Liang 
Feng 
10.68    
(e) Chaung Swee 
Khim 
10.68 55.77 strong 
54. SC Global Developments 
Ltd 
(a) Cheong SP 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
50.87    
(b) Simon Cheong 
Sae Peng 
0.17    
(c) Ding Li Feng @ 
Ting Li Feng 
0.2 51.24 strong 
55. Singapore Land Limited (a) UIC Enterprise 
Pte Ltd 




20.76    
(c) UIC Investment 
Pte Ltd 
0.04 72.42 strong 
56. Stamford Land 
Corporation Ltd 
(a) Ow Chio Kiat 39.04 39.04 moderate 
57. The Straits Trading 
Company Limited 
(a) The Cairns Pte 
Ltd 
81.61 81.61 moderate 
58. Swiber Holdings Limited (a) Goh Kim Teck 16.71    
(b) Jean Pers 9.49    
(c) Yeo Chee Neng 9.49    
(d) Hendrik Eddy 
Purnomo 
5.42    
(e) Francis Wong 
Chin Sing 
3.61    
(f) Nitish Gupta 1.36 46.08 moderate 
59. Tat Hong Holdings Ltd (a) Chwee Cheng & 
Sons Pte Ltd 
41.49    
(b) Ng Chwee 
Cheng 
5.48    
(c) Ng San Tiong 1.56    
(d) Ng Sun Ho 1.19    
(e) Ng Sang Kuey 0.7    
(f) Ng Sun Hoe 0.62    
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(g) Ng Sun Wee 0.51    
(h) Ng Sun Eng 0.49    
(i) Ng Sun Giam 0.18 52.22 strong 
60. Unisteel Technology Ltd (a) Toh Bee Yong 18.25    
(b) Poh Seng Poo 0.82    
(c) Chee Teck Lee 0.58 19.65 moderate 
61. UOB-Kay Hian Holdings 
Ltd 
(a) United Overseas 
Bank Limited 
39.4    
(b) U.I.P Holdings 
Limited 
15.9    
(c) Tye Hua 
Nominees (Pte) Ltd 
0.61    
(d)UOB Kay Hian 
Pte Ltd 
0.5 56.41 moderate 








9.84    




2.75    
(d) Singapore 
Investments Pte Ltd 
1.2    
(e) The Great 
Eastern Trust 
Private Limited 
1.1    




0.78 29.55 weak 
63. United Overseas Bank Ltd (a)Wee Investments 
Pte Ltd 
7.49    
(b)Wee Choo Yaw 1.09    
(c)Wee Ee Cheong 0.23    
(d)Wee Ee Chao 0.01    
(e)Wee Ee Lim 0.13    
(f) UOB Kay Hian 
Pte Ltd 
4.37    
(g) CY Wee & Co 
Pte Ltd 
2.14 15.46 moderate 
64. United Industrial 
Corporation Limited 
(a) UOL Equity 
Investments Pte Ltd 
11.94    
(b) UOL Group 
Limited 
2.24    
(c) UOB Bank Ltd 9.81    
(d) Wee Cho Yaw 4.99 28.98 moderate 
65. UOL Group Limited (a) Wee Cho Yaw 29.04    
(b) Wee Ee Cheong 0.05    
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(c) Wee Ee Lim 0.04    
(d) UOB bank Ltd 9.88 39.01 moderate 
66. WBL Corporation Limited (a) Oversea-
Chinese Banking 
Corporation Ltd 
25.84 25.84 moderate 
67. Wilmar International 
Limited  
(a) Wilmar 
Holdings Pte Ltd 
49.35    
(b) Archer Daniels 
Midland Asia-
Pacific Limited 
1.13    
(c) Global Cocoa 
Holdings Ltd 
5.72    
(d) FFM Berhad 9.5    
(e) PPB Group 
Berhad 
9    
(f) Kuok Brothers 
Sdn Berhad 
0.003    
(g) Harpole 
Resources Limited 
8.8 83.503 moderate 
68. Wing Tai Holdings 
Limited 
(a) Wing Sun 
Development 
Private Limited 
28.04    
(b) Winlyn 
Investment Pte Ltd 
9.18    
(c) Empire gate 
Holdings Limited 
1.53    
(d) Winway 
Investment Pte Ltd 
0.45 39.2 moderate 




31.54    
(c)Sino Land 
Company Ltd 
4.33 85.85 strong 
     
Mean for block holders  16.21822768 69.51766667  
Median for block holders  6.185 51.14  
 
 
 
 
 
